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Violence

War, State, and Anthropology in Mozambique

How is one to make sense of state formation as a predominantly violent process? More concretely, how is one, as an anthropologist, to understand one's interlocutors' repeated insistence on life being a sustained period of suffering (*sofrimento*)? One point at which to start is with the most recent large-scale period of violence, namely the Mozambican civil war (1976–92). During this phase of violent upheaval, the traditional field was implicated in complex ways and its reality as a domain of the potential was actualized in various manners vis-à-vis state dynamics and war machine dynamics. By describing the civil war as it was experienced and as it unfolded in Honde and Chimoio, this chapter gradually zooms in on and historically contextualizes what I term the rural-urban continuum of fieldwork sites. In introducing the fieldwork sites, I will also emphasize how Honde and Chimoio must not be seen as pristine localities into which one enters but rather physical sites in which social configurations, practices, memberships, and the field of the traditional have been continuously and violently altered by ongoing processes of state formation—most recently and most dramatically by the civil war.

Independence and Civil War

The space on the East African coast that gradually became Mozambique was under Portuguese colonial rule for almost five hundred years until its 1975 independence. The process of colonization and state formation

in Mozambique was multistranded and gave rise to various forms of ter-
ritorialization and structures for capturing the labor force of the popula-
tion—also including non-Portuguese polities of the state kind. Freedom
was, however, achieved in 1975 in Mozambique as in Portugal's other
African colonies.

Independence was, arguably, to a large extent a result of a coup d'état
on 25 April 1974 that toppled Salazar's authoritarian government in Por-
tugal, as well as the recognition by the new regime of the vast financial
resources being squandered in the country's colonial wars (Newitt 1995).
Reflecting a broader African trend, different movements aiming to liber-
ate Mozambique had been formed during the late 1950s and early 1960s,
culminating with the forming of *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (Fre-
limo, Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) in Dar-es-Salaam in 1962
from three previous liberation movements.[1] Frelimo's prominent leaders
were often black Mozambican intellectuals who had attended mission
schools, and some—such as its first president, the anthropologically
trained Eduardo Mondlane—had also received foreign education. From
1964 onward Frelimo fought militarily for independence, operating from
so-called "liberated villages" under their control within Mozambique
and, initially, also from guerrilla bases in Tanzania.[2] The protracted strug-
gle between the colonial army and Frelimo drew large parts of the colony
into the armed conflict, as the Portuguese extensively utilized methods of
dirty warfare, including massacres (Reis and Oliveira 2012). Further, the
colonial state also encapsulated the rural population in so-called "pro-
tected villages" in order also to insulate them from rebel influence.

This territorial war dynamic enmeshed a large part of the rural pop-
ulation in the modus operandi of two opposed formations of military
power: the guerrilla movement and the colonial state. With the transi-
tion to independence in 1975, Frelimo restructured, transitioning from
a mobile guerrilla movement to a political party dominating a territo-
rial state. Nonetheless, the newly independent Mozambican state was
in crucial ways also shaped by the militancy embedded in the Frelimo
movement since 1964, an orientation often accorded to the change of
leadership from Eduardo Mondlane (who was killed by a letter-bomb in
1969) to Samora Machel.[3] Samora, as he is (sometimes affectionately)
called in Mozambique, was the leader of Frelimo from 1969 and the
president of Mozambique from independence in 1975 until he was killed
in a plane crash in 1986.[4] During his rule, a party-state was erected that
was characterized by a strongly vertical and militarily informed orga-
nizational structure dividing *o povo* (the people) into different sections
serving the nation and the party: one section for women (OMM, *Or-
ganização da Mulher Moçambicana,* the Organization for Mozambican

Women), one for youths (OJM, *Organização da Juventude Moçambicana,* the Organization for Mozambican Youth), a trade union (OTM, *Organização dos Trabalhadores de Moçambique,* Organization of Workers of Mozambique), as well as local, so-called *grupos dinamizadores* ("dynamizing groups")—party groups that educated politically and organized people around party initiatives and production schemes.[5]

Frelimo had barely begun to implement these radical politics from the late 1970s onward before, perhaps paradoxically, being challenged by a guerrilla movement: Renamo—*Resistência Nacional Moçambicano* (Mozambican National Resistance). What is generally acknowledged is that Renamo was partly created by Southern Rhodesia around 1976 as a direct result of Mozambican independence in 1975. Renamo's two aims were to target mainly Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) guerrillas—black liberation fighters struggling for a liberated Zimbabwe—which operated from bases in Mozambican hinterlands, and also to wreak havoc on the new majority-ruled state of Mozambique.[6] Effectively, Renamo may early on be seen as Southern Rhodesian guns for hire (Newitt 1995: 564). Following Zimbabwe's independence in 1980 most researchers point out that the political control and logistical support of Renamo was transferred from Salisbury to Pretoria's BOSS (South African Bureau of State Security) and SADF (South African Defence Force). Renamo thereby became integral to Apartheid South Africa's policy of regional destabilization as a defense strategy.

However, from here diverse views and conflicting analyses emerge as to the nature of Renamo. On the one hand and emphasizing the movement's roots, many scholars also lay the heaviest responsibility for the extremely violent dynamics and development of Renamo within Mozambique on *exogenous factors.* They argue that Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were directly involved and also point out that SADF forces participated in battles on Mozambican soil, ran army bases, provided logistics, and also killed Frelimo activists abroad.[7] This claim, however, is contested by researchers that stress *endogenous factors,* and these especially point to Renamo's popular base from which it drew support among the disgruntled Mozambican civilian population due to (at least) two much-criticized Frelimo strategies: forced villagization for increasing agricultural production in the early 1980s and attacks on traditional authority, especially the *régulo* (chief), bolstered by the rhetoric that traditional practices (however conceived) were "obscurantist" and therefore counterproductive. Both policies, some claim, contribute strongly to explaining a widespread peasant support for Renamo during the civil war.[8]

Opposing this latter view, and rather indicating strong exogenous interests in Mozambique, is the far from insignificant role played by

foreign interests. This adds to the points made about Southern Rhodesia's and South Africa's interests and direct involvement in the war, corroborated by former SADF chief Magnus Malan who claimed to have helped create Renamo (L. Magaia 1988: 6). The propagandist support of Renamo—dubbed "freedom fighters" or likened to the contras of Nicaragua by the right wing in United States—also materialized through the training of troops and provision of weaponry and money (ibid.: 3).[9] Reflecting the cold war context, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other Eastern Bloc countries also had interests in Mozambique's postindependence development, and all had in different ways invested politically and with capital. Further, following independence, the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic provided military logistics, expertise, and capital to Frelimo and its army FAM (*Forças Armadas de Moçambique*).[10] Given these global political currents, Mozambique was embroiled in a "cold war turned warm."[11]

Beyond causation, Renamo's early cross-border raids soon developed into a large-scale civil war encompassing more or less the full territorial expanse of Mozambique and lasting until a General Peace Agreement (GPA) was reached in 1992.[12] Away from macropolitics, on the ground the civil war was exceptionally brutal as the so-called civilian population became the object of control and, conversely, a target for all sides in the conflict. Figures may indicate the scale of damage and violence. Through 1992, of Mozambique's mid-1980s population of 13–15 million, 1 million had been killed, 1.7 million were refugees in neighboring countries, and at least 3.2 million were *deslocados* ("uprooted"), typically living around major cities, often in abject poverty (Hanlon 1996).[13] Following the civil war, Mozambique had in 1992 the lowest GDP per capita rate in the world (Braathen and Palmero 2001: 270), and large parts of the physical and administrative infrastructure of the postindependence Frelimo state had vanished (Hanlon 1996: 15).

A key aspect of this account of the country's recent political history from late colonialism to the post–civil war period is that Mozambican processes of state formation are invariably related to violence. However, a superficial assessment of recent developments in Mozambique might argue that the violence of state formation and the relevance of wider social, political, and cosmological issues have ground to a halt with the 1992 GPA.[14] Such an argument is flawed for several reasons, but perhaps most importantly by undercommunicating (or worse, miscommunicating) the multiple prolongation of war dynamics in different guises in peacetime. For instance, on the national political level, bellicose rhetoric still permeates election campaign periods and beyond (see Bertelsen 2004). Such rhetoric was evident in the five presidential and parlia-

mentary elections held in the post–civil war period: 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014).[15] More importantly, the civil war and its violence is seen as continuing in popular experiences of war, illnesses derived from spirits born of war, and wartime identities still in operation, negation, and contestation—as well as in the direct violent confrontations and warlike scenarios described in the opening pages of this book. Such presences evidence long-term processes of erasure and inscription of violence and I have earlier (2002, 2004) termed these "reconstructive practices."[16] Arguably, these characteristics must be understood in terms of tensions and frictions with important nonstate domains, for example the traditional field. Such antagonisms were played out and are still powerfully present in memories of the violence that characterized civil war in Honde and Chimoio, Manica Province, where we now turn.

"Leaving Culture for the Bush"

However, fronts on the Mozambican ground of the civil war were everything but "clear-cut" in a formal, military Clausewitzian sense. There was no chess-like movement by generals of pieces representing units on a board. Neither were fronts renegotiated in military theaters of war—a dominant trope in media-disseminated imageries of warfare.[17] Instead, various armed groups with shifting agendas and aims violently targeted the rural population, contributing to a complex situation in which it was difficult for ordinary people to "find the frontlines" (Nordstrom 1999) and distinguish between fighting parties.[18]

Nonetheless, juxtaposed logics of war did exist, shaping FAM's and Renamo's practices. As an opposition force, Renamo relied heavily on support coerced from the civilian population. The group's methods included widespread terror, the killing of civilians, and press-ganging young men to murder kin and family members before bringing these to their camps so as to preclude or make very difficult their future return.[19] In the rural locality of Honde where I have done fieldwork, many who stayed instead of fleeing to urban centers or participating actively in the war were abducted by Renamo. Stories of these abductions are often recounted in social settings, and one man, a local musician, shared his with me in 2000 shortly after he had resettled in Honde. He was captured when local Renamo forces entered the village one day in 1981:

> They came when I was working on the *machamba* [agricultural plot of land]. Many fled, but I just heard noise from a compound nearby. I went to see, and they were robbing goats and other things. I knew the men from before.

> They were from ———. When I asked what they were doing, they said, "War is war." They forced me to come along with them. I was six years with them in a base near Muzingaze. I was forced to play music for them on my guitar from early morning. They danced and drank. If I stopped they said they would kill me, so I played. There was very little food in the base, and I was often hungry. When I ran away in 1986 to Zimbabwe, there was very little food there as well. It was hard.

However, Renamo is not the only perpetrator in stories of abduction and forced recruitment.[20] During the civil war, the poor equipment and general state of the army was common knowledge, and it attracted few volunteers. FAM, for the most part, controlled many towns, and the Mozambican state continuously attempted to recruit young men (and some women) in them. One method, I was often told, involved the army occasionally cordoning off the cinema, when it was operating, and filtering the audience for men between the ages of 17–18 and 40. The "recruits" were immediately herded onto army trucks bound for military camps, and sent more or less directly from there to war.

Reflecting the two snippets mentioned, a trait of such post hoc stories in Honde and Chimoio is, precisely, to attribute violence to both FAM and Renamo. Often recounted in collective settings, and as Naguib (2009: 141) puts it in a recent work on Palestinian women, "stories are memories of the past merging with current life." Merging the past with the present, violence is the single most important trope in stories emerging from the experiences of war and in understandings of the present, the past, and the present past. Violence is, however, not a singular force here and crucially also includes also the fear of nocturnal attacks, coping with the sights of violated bodies, or seeing charred homesteads as images of violent attacks on sociality and the cores of meaning. This perspective is expressed also in the following excerpt of a story recounted by a young man, Younas. During a conversation with me and others in Honde in 2000, he recalled atrocities committed during the mid-1980s:

> During the war, a lot of bad things happened here, a lot of bad things indeed. If you walked down the road you would see all sorts of things. Often, you saw people who had had their heads cut off. Or people impaled with the sticks coming out of their mouths or their sides. Often they had bananas stuck in their mouths, just like animals. But no one, not even their families, dared to bury them. The corpses were left to rot. There is still a lot of problems from this. *Eh pah*! A lot of problems, my friend.

Younas's story is not unusual and reflects similar accounts circulating in Honde. As I have argued elsewhere (Bertelsen 2002), the processes of collective and individual recall is imperative to postwar reconstructive

practices addressing sociality. However, quite a number of the stories told in Honde do not only encapsulate a uniquely local perspective or situation. In keeping with its destabilization ethos, Renamo frequently wiped out visibly important physical structures that the postliberation state had constructed: rural schools, health posts, and agrarian seed and equipment shops were razed and a number of teachers, nurses, and rural shopkeepers were killed or violently attacked.[21] In one sense, Renamo's destruction effected a *deterritorialization* of the Mozambican state's visibility by erasing buildings and communication infrastructure and killing its agents. Exceeding such deterritorialization of the state, however, the violence heavily affected rural Honde where almost all inhabitants' houses had been consumed by fire, their maize mortars (*dhuli*) burned, or the main house (*muturica*) looted and razed. Understandably, many who were able to flee Honde emphasize how the violence thereby transformed the very core of being. In the voice of Ana, a middle-aged woman from Honde, in 2000:

> It was hard to know where they were, so when you heard rumors that someone was coming, you fled. You brought your *bonde* [straw mattress] and a few things and ran into the night. Sleeping in the *mato* [bush] at night, sometimes up trees. And then eating wild fruits because of hunger as we were like monkeys. Ah! It was bad, really bad. Living like that, like animals is no good. When you return home, your house would maybe be burnt, the chickens gone, the maize gone, the goat gone. All had gone. *Eh pah*! It is hard seeing that. Everything had changed.

Violence as encompassing and total, stemming from people roaming around, "someone" not necessarily identified as Renamo or Frelimo (or Southern Rhodesian soldiers or ZANLA fighters for that matter), Ana's story encapsulates not merely the acts of inflicting physical hurt but how mortal fear instilled flight. The flight is very significant in this respect, where the locus of the home is left for the *mato* (the bush) where one is turned into living like—and, thus, becoming—an animal.[22] Violence is here experienced as erasure of meaning in terms of effacing and debasing households and familiar structures—not merely in terms of aggressive and pain-provoking physicality. Most explicitly, this perspective came across to me when sitting with a friend of a friend—a middle-aged man from Honde. He had previously been a farmhand at a white-owned Southern Rhodesian farm prior to Zimbabwean independence but was now working as a peasant in Honde. He said,

> You know it [the war] started here in Manica? Ah, it was bad in the times of the war. They put children into *dhuli* [mortars for crushing maize] and the mother or father had to crush it, killing their own child.[23] They burnt the

houses, and often the *ufu* [maize meal] too. They put heads on sticks just to say "Here we kill people." Can you imagine that? They destroyed everything. I did not want that. I did not want to leave culture for going into the *mato.*

The image of "they"—contextually being Renamo—as a destructive force cannot possibly be expressed stronger than through being forced to leave "culture" (*cultura*) for the *mato.* The existence of the term *mato* habitually underlines the ongoing social and political constitution of landscape and space that allocates domains with danger, ambivalence, and relative safety. In the context of war, however, *mato* provides a particularly powerful metaphor for violence that upsets and redefines notions and boundaries of bush and culture, household and violence. In relation to war, Renamo is portrayed as belonging to the very same bush.[24] Further, the debasing effects of violence—the animal-like and bush-like behavior—is contrasted with the threatened "culture," a cherished world of houses, children, and *machamba,* the small plots of agricultural land each household or kin group cultivates. The view of "meaningless" violence (as with no intent but destruction) is dominant in this account as the perpetrators are known as "they."

Conversely, there are others who tell explanatory stories that seem to "understand" if not endorse violence, not merely as acts of utter destruction, but rather as seeming to imply a *re-inscription* of meaning through a form of violence that was necessary to readjust certain societal contexts and redress flawed politics. Such stories of how past violence redressed certain structures may be represented by what a young Honde man told me in 2000:


Figure 1.1. Layout of typical Honde household compound with a few minor surrounding *machambas.*

> Before there was an *aldeia comunal*[25] [communal village] here and Frelimo had all the power. Renamo did not want that. They wanted people to return to the *mato*. So they destroyed the *aldeia comunal*. But why did they kill people? They had to rob and loot to survive.

In this story, the violence is clearly attributed to Renamo, and their intentionality is narrated as aiming to disrupt the workings of the *aldeia comunal* and the alleged omnipotence of the Frelimo state. The use of violence represents a means to an end, and the killing of people is explained in terms of appropriation necessary for survival.

Mirroring the stories of capture and abduction, not merely "Renamo," or "they," but also "Frelimo" is invoked as *erasing* and *re-inscribing* society and the landscape with new meaning through violence. In Chimoio there is a mountain whose peak is raised some two hundred meters above the rest of the terrain. When viewed from the east and west, the mountain has the facial contours of an old man, hence the Portuguese name Cabeça do Velho, meaning "The Old Man's Head," or Bengo in chiTewe. In both Honde and in Chimoio, people's relations to Bengo are strong as the mountain is seen to be powerful in terms of *tchianhu wo atewe* ("our ways", i.e. that of the maTewe"): important ancestral spirits

Illustration 1.1. View of the mountain Bengo (or Cabeça do Velho in Portuguese) as seen from Chimoio. 2005.

inhabit the mountain, several graves for lineages of *régulos* are buried there, and a key *régulo* resides close by as to be within close proximity of the autochthons and to guard the chiefly tombs (see also Artur 1999a).[26]

Prior to the civil war, sacred goats grazed the grassy slopes of the mountain. The animals would reverently be left alone, except for ritual occasions, as they embody vital relations to ancestors.[27] But in a range of stories I heard, FAM soldiers killed the goats during the civil war and savagely devoured them. The wide circulation of the soldiers' sacrilege, thus, popularly epitomizes Frelimo's and the state's perceived antagonist role toward *tchianhu wo atewe*—the killing of goats severing or transforming ancestral relations. In the context of this story, violence amounts to erasing aspects of the traditional field and re-inscribing new meaning in the landscape: Razed of visible ancestral significance and inscribed with the death of the goats, Bengo has become, ambivalently, both *mato* and an area de-/re-territorialized by the Frelimo state. Further, these civil war acts are frequently brought up in conversations and underline, more generally, the presence of the past. The case of Bengo and the FAM soldiers' attack on it is for many both an expression of Frelimo's antagonism toward the traditional field and, also, shows how violent state dynamics can foment ambivalence within it.

Attuned to the multistranded and complex dimensions of violence in the Mozambican civil war, Carolyn Nordstrom (1997: 141) argues that the phenomenon of violence is "culturally constitutive" and that it "forges, in fact forces new constructs of identity, new socio-cultural relationships, new threats and injustices that reconfigure people's lifeworlds, new patterns of survival and injustice." She further states that both during the civil war and after, "Mozambicans are concerned not only with treating the wounds of violence, but with *treating violence itself* by defusing the cultures of violence that the war created" (1998b: 115, italics retained). This view is in opposition to what she dubs Western notions of violence where it, she claims, is entified, has a specific nature, and is *given* (ibid.). Contrarily, Nordstrom argues that "Mozambican concepts of violence" are radically more dynamic as violence is seen as *made*—a fluid cultural construct put into action by those seeking to control others (ibid.). Nordstrom's approach, being an anthropology of process rather than place and influenced by Appadurai's (1996) notion of "ethnoscape," privileges the "warscape" as an analytical entry that entails decontextualizing violence from its specific, experienced locations.[28]

Claiming a "Mozambican concept of violence" may be both reifying and "exotifying," as there are clear limits to claiming the civil war violence should be experienced as similar in Maputo, Honde, or Ilha de Moçambique. More importantly, however, Nordstrom develops a the-

oretical argument that claims violence in the context of Mozambique is dehumanizing in terms of meaning being erased by violence. While it is crucial to recognize the intensity, scale, and suffering inherent to the civil war, to a certain extent Nordstrom's position posits its violence as *un-human* or *un-social*. By extension, by allocating such un-human or un-social violence to perpetrators or actors, these necessarily come across as beastly and animal-like because of perpetrating erasing and inhuman violence. Such a reading is strengthened by a point Nordstrom, interestingly, argues, namely that violence is senseless, or that if it has "sense," it is solely within the context of being de-ordering and de-basing (1997: 166): "This is not mere disorder, for disorder is part of ontological order—a fact and a fiction appreciated in cultural lore. Worse: The world has been un-ordered. Human nature isn't. World process doesn't. Sense can't."[29]

Meaning and its erasure is, then, Nordstrom's all-encompassing focus, and within this frame of mind there neither seems to be space for assessing instrumental means and ends of violence, on the one hand, nor to see violence as, complementarily, also a force reordering and reinscribing as well as erasing. For, when the total, all-erasing violence has left its toll in Nordstrom's analysis, humans are virtually *tabula rasa* in an empty and vast landscape, in a near "cultural void." Caught between meaning and meaning, "they are left with the choice of accepting a deadened world or creating a liveable one" (Nordstrom 1997: 190).

My fieldwork data contradicts such a vision of totalizing, meaningless violence, although it is important to emphasize that the "senselessness" of violence is how, as we have seen, some interlocutors described and narrated civil war. Nonetheless, this does not preclude analytically integrating such statements in wider social and political contexts. Rather, conveying stories of senselessness is a manner in which to represent suffering or other sentiments to listeners—including the researcher.[30] Extensive suffering is evident from other studies as well as my own material through that the civil war created what Wilson (1992) calls "cults of violence." Moreover, as reflected in the previous stories, the violence wrought onto and engulfing vast tracts of the rural hinterland in Manica Province was extreme in its levels of human suffering and scale. However, it was nevertheless also frequently directed at control and capture of the civilian population, and it must therefore be seen also to constitute a dynamic of power. The violence of the war should, then, not be extracted or exempted from power or sovereignty—as might be an analytical effect privileging largely the dehumanizing and disordering aspects of civil war as well as the exceptionalizing notion of warscape and "Mozambican concept of violence" reflected in Nordstrom's anal-

ysis. Instead it should be approached as internal to adverse, different, and sometimes antagonistically positioned formations implying that violence was not randomly performed. As the case of Bengo illustrates, an important aspect of it was related to the confrontation with or violent appropriation of the field of the traditional and to the "bushification" of villages and physical structures related to the state order and society. How should, then, these wartime dynamics of violence be analyzed?

War Machine and the State

> The war destroyed a lot. When Frelimo came, they came as enemies. When Renamo came, they came as enemies.
>
> *Tchirenge* [rainmaker], Honde

The important reports of F. Legrand, made during the civil war, underline how people constantly moved between zones as well as to and from other provinces and Zimbabwe, making migration, movement, and periodic halts prominent features of the period (1993: 21). But Legrand goes further and notes that "the border between Renamo zones and Government areas has not been as 'waterproof' as we had thought and many circulated from one zone to another." Legrand's reports conform with my own findings from the area, where it is clear that zones purportedly under the domination of an armed group may not be seen as total, for instance in terms of people being identified as having singular or mutually excluding political identities. Rather, there existed (and exists) a spectrum of affiliations and in the zones, conceptual and experienced differences between being punished, enslaved, or protected were unclear. This flux may go some way in accounting for both Renamo's and FAM's often violently enforced biopolitics of herding, coercing, or kidnapping people in and between zones.[31]

Many stories encircle this theme of abduction, coercion, and, in the end, transformation to becoming "one of them," the story of the guitarist being merely one example. Another was provided by a Honde woman I will call Nzereki. The mother of twelve children, she worked hard tilling the soil of her *machambas* in Honde until she died in 2008 at more than ninety years old, her husband having passed away in the late 1960s. During the civil war of the early 1980s she was already an elderly woman and came to suffer due to her association with some Frelimo sympathizers. Together with a few of her nephews, she was captured one day by a group of Renamo guerrillas and taken to one of the camps in the Gorongosa area in neighboring Sofala Province. She recalled the

hard life in the camp numerous times and explained it this way to me during a conversation in 2005:

> N: I was taken there and we walked during the night, in the *mato*. In the camp it was very hard and little food. We had to dig up roots from the ground to eat because there was no food.
>
> B: Did you escape?
>
> N: No, after a few years they let me go. I was taken there to be disciplined [*ficar disciplinado*].

After returning to Honde, she widely supported Renamo as, indeed, the majority there did. Nzereki also regularly confirmed this support when talking to me and others.

Affiliations in Honde were, thus, the subject of violent shifts during the civil war—also due to the proximity to bases of ZANLA guerrillas.[32] The involvement of Southern Rhodesian troops, ZANLA fighters, Renamo troops, FAM soldiers, and others produced complex trajectories of war in Honde. This climate of fear and uncertainty may account for some of the punitive measures taken against "traitors" or "informers," where it was important to inscribe the bodies with violence. The corpses thus displayed along Honde's paths and roads may have also served to demarcate the zones and their borders, thus stressing what happens to traitors, squealers, and go-betweens as attempts to curb the flux of people identified by Legrand.[33] This aspect reinforces the argument that borders, zones, and bodies constituted such important domains of control.

Given these characteristics of the war, its violence also needs to be seen as a dynamic practice of power. Two of Deleuze and Guattari's (2002 [1980]) concepts, "state" and "war machine" (hereafter unemphasized by quotation marks), elucidate two modalities of power characterizing the Mozambican civil war in Honde and Chimoio. In employing the terms to the context of Sinhalese sorcery, Kapferer (1997: 284, italics retained) notes that "the war machine … and the state describe power *in its dynamic* as this materializes in a diversity of structurating processes on the ground." As with Kapferer's analysis of the Sinhalese context, the fruitfulness of the terms resides in their capacity to describe unfolding processes on the ground without reducing these to *institutional approaches*. For the notions of the war machine and the state, as argued by Kapferer, are to be seen as concepts meant to analytically capture dynamics and practices of power. These are interwoven but separate, antagonist but dependent; hence, one cannot be perceived without the other. Put differently, the *war machine* is "rhizomic," implying that it "connects any point to any other point, and its traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same nature" (Deleuze and Guattari 2002 [1980]:

21) with "no beginning or end" (ibid.: 25). This indistinct, complex shape is complemented by a fluidity and mobility, and its form is normally exterior to the state apparatus. The State (or state dynamics), on the other hand, is characterized by territorial control, immobility and hierarchy, and Deleuze and Guattari assert that "the State has no war machine of its own" (ibid.: 355).[34]

These two modalities are applicable to some of the bellicose features of Renamo and Frelimo practices. Moreover, they are applicable to appreciate the logic inherent to the violent dynamic of state formation and its relation to the domain of the social in general and the traditional field in particular in Honde.[35] Frelimo, in control of the government for most of the postliberation period, fits such a notion of state dynamics ("the State") as it sought throughout to expand its control of territory. As Deleuze and Guattari write, "One of the fundamental tasks of the State is to striate the space over which it reigns" (2002 [1980]: 385).

As we will see, a central thrust of Frelimo's postindependence politics was precisely the reordering of urban and rural space involving the transformations of communal villages (*aldeias comunais*) to protected villages. In the above, Renamo's practices exhibit war machine dynamics as these confronted and "dehierarchized" the emerging state order. In practice this was done through razing physical structures such as roads and government or Frelimo party buildings and killing state representatives in especially rural areas. In erasing visible signs of the state formation, the war machine, in Deleuze-Guattarian terms, deterritorializes through being "directed against the State, either against potential States whose formation it wards off in advance, or against actual States whose destruction it purposes" (ibid.: 359). In terms of actual warfare, Renamo also fits the notion of the war machine as "guerrilla warfare explicitly [aimed] for the *non-battle*" (ibid.: 416, italics retained).

Dynamic, powerful, and often fluid fields such as that of the traditional field—including domains of magic and sorcery—are in processes of appropriation and territorialization also "metamorphosized." During war, in their becoming integral to an expansive war machine that recruits through violence, coercion, and abduction or the subject of a state dynamic razing sites of the traditional (i.e. Bengo), the potentialities of the traditional field also arguably foment novel forms integral or antagonistic to war violence.

In Honde, upon Renamo's arrival, the *régulo* that I call João was in the same way as Nzereki captured and taken to a camp in Gorongosa under unclear circumstances. Instating a local man in his place as *régulo* and ousting the party secretary of the Frelimo state, Renamo sought to rule Honde. However, within a short period of time there were, people

agree, so many problems for the new *régulo* in terms of relations with the soil and its lack of growth (*ndimo*), bad spirits (*pfukwa*), and a general absence of ancestral protection that Renamo decided to bring *régulo* João back.[36] His reinsertion into Honde, however, was not as unproblematic as that of Nzereki: Having been forcibly relocated and having, in a sense, thereby severed his relations with soil, spirits, and *tchianhu wo atewe,* many allege that he had become *mato*—bush—by his (involuntary) affiliation with Renamo, the war, and its violence. Thus, in the case of *régulo* João, the trajectories of abduction, transformation, and return are more problematic than those of Nzereki, as his intersect with and are implicated in Renamo's tentative violent transformation of local polities. Ultimately, this was seen as challenging the forces of *tchianhu wo atewe,* thus imbuing his return with ambivalence.

Such civil war dynamics of the traditional field during were not confined to Honde. In the Zambézia Province, Northern Mozambique, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a group called Parama (or Naparama) emerged (Wilson 1992). This peasant militia group or "traditional army" (Nordstrom 1997: 57) comprised several hundred or perhaps thousands of men armed with spears and other nonmodern weaponry. They used red headbands to signify spiritual endorsement and protection of their struggle. All had also undergone rites of vaccination against being harmed by bullets or other objects of war that were, crucially, deemed nontraditional (see also Kastfelt 2005; Nicolini 2006). Socially, politically, and militarily Parama constituted a considerable force in Zambézia, troubling both Renamo and FAM in the area of its operation. Initially it also enjoyed considerable popular support as a force protecting the peasants, following a strict, ritually sanctioned code of conduct, and being directed against external violent forces. However, after some successes in attacking Renamo bases, it increasingly affiliated more closely with FAM, and its tight links with notions of ritual cleansing and taboos on rape, etc., disintegrated (Nordstrom 1997: 57–62). Parama gradually assimilated with the dominant state force, FAM, and became indistinguishable from its objectives and (violent) practices.

Further, neither did Renamo necessarily adhere to conventional guerrilla strategies nor limit its operations to the national context. In a lucid ethnographic work on the Kaerezi on the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border, Donald Moore (2005) portrays how memories of Renamo attacks are still vivid. Also, Moore (2005: 44) claims that attacks by Renamo in Kaerezi "followed kinship or political networks across the border; reprisals and the settling of old scores produced collateral damage" (Moore 2005: 44). Put differently, the civil war in Kaerezi unfolded in ways reflecting social organization and the immediacies of local politics.[37]

Both Renamo's dislocation and relocation of *régulos* in Honde, the potency (and demise) of the Parama in Zambézia, and the unfolding of the civil war in Kaerezi underline a general point: the movement and action of the war machine also follow, feed on, and transform existing social structures and orders, such as systems of kinship or religious rites. Contrary to statist dynamics, the shape of the war machine does not aim to control territory or win battles but rather exploits and is fueled by, for example, logics of kinship, the politics of traditional authority, or dynamics of magic and the religious domains.

As reflected by some of the experiences and stories told in Honde, the dynamics of the civil war are irreducible to guerrilla groups and the Mozambican state, Renamo, and the FAM. Crucially, the state *transforms* itself into a war machine as it engages in guerrilla war: appropriating capabilities of swiftness, engaging in deterritorializing practices, and engaging existing features of social order as that of magical protection against bodily harm during warfare—as in FAM's engulfing and eventual deterritorialization of Parama. By this transformation, the state form of sovereignty may be seen to expose its powerful and violent potential and practice in a situation of crisis and war. Conversely, Renamo is drawn toward sedentarization by creating permanent camps where captured— such as the entertaining guitarist, Nzereki, or *régulo* João—are held, exhibiting state dynamics in a Deleuze and Guattarian sense.

Both processes are evident in Honde where the Frelimo state rarely emerges as a form of power imposing order, stability, or peace, but is in popular discourses cast as "dirty" or "bad." Further, as demonstrated, in-war and postwar distinctions were and are difficult, and the stories and contestations reflect the opacity of the wartime practices of the now political parties (but see Emerson 2014). In Honde, the operations and practices of Renamo, FAM, ZANLA, Southern Rhodesian, and Zimbabwean troops, soldiers and armed bands entailed violence of an unending and ambivalent character. Both the metamorphosis of the war machine (as in its appropriation of the traditional authority of the *régulo*) and the transformation of state dynamics (as in the engulfing of Parama) occasioned contested processes of erasure and reinscription of meaning through violence carrying import for postwar social and political processes.

As concepts, notions of war machine and the state are ways to understand modalities of power rather than these necessarily corresponding to the sum of either Renamo or Frelimo practices. However, as concepts they serve to grasp important dimensions of power and violence that were especially visible and tangible during the period of the civil war as they unfolded in concrete settings—as that of Honde. Moreover, the civil war dynamics represent a crucial event in which the virtual of

the traditional field was actualized. For instance, this occurred through the ambiguous figure of *régulo* João, through the formation of Parama, or through the embroiling in and fueling of the Renamo war machine in kinship structures and antagonisms on the Zimbabwe-Mozambique borderland. The civil war thus provided instances wherein the traditional field was constantly reformed, highlighting its trait of perpetual emergence and openness. Let us look closer, however, at this Honde fieldwork context as well as Chimoio and the fieldwork undertaken in both.

The Rainmaker-Agronomist, or the Rural-Urban Continuum of Field Sites

My fieldwork has mainly been carried out in peri-urban and urban environments around the provincial capital of Manica, Chimoio, as well as in a nearby rural community I have chosen to entitle Honde. By following people's movements between the rural and the urban sites—visiting kin, bringing goods to the market, going to town for work, walking back to Honde to see to their *machambas* (agricultural plots)—I undertook all fieldwork in what I term a rural-urban continuum of field sites during eight periods from 1999 to 2011, totaling twenty-one months, visiting also briefly in January 2016.

The city of Chimoio is a medium-sized Mozambican city holding 170,000 to 200,000 inhabitants at the time of the first fieldwork of some duration in 1999, increasing to officially 238,976 in 2007 and probably reaching around 250,000 in 2016.[38] Reflecting the violence of the rural hinterland in Manica Province, the number of inhabitants increased rapidly during the civil war as refugees fled from the war-torn rural areas, and by the early 1980s Chimoio had doubled its number of inhabitants.[39] It is spatially organized around a so-called *bairro cimento* or "concrete quarter" with a grid of paved streets, concrete buildings housing government offices, and upper-middle-class apartments and houses—some in the old Portuguese colonial style from the time the city was named Vila Pery.[40] The *bairro cimento* is encircled—one could also say encapsulated—by poor *bairros* with only a few dirt roads providing access by car. These *bairros* are populated by the impoverished majority of Chimoio's inhabitants and sometimes also lack electricity and public lighting, most coming into existence during the rural influx during the civil war years of especially the early 1980s. Houses often bear the imprint of poverty, made as they are of (often unburned) mud bricks with only straw and plastic roofing or, more rarely, corrugated iron sheets.

Spatial organization also testifies to the predominantly hasty formation of *bairros* where households are visibly linked by paths that follow intricate and crisscrossing patterns rather than the quadrangular grid of the *bairro cimento* and the few middle-income *bairros.*

As laid out in the introduction, there is a layered structure of authority and formal political organization in the *bairros.* This includes the apparatus of the Frelimo party secretaries and their adjuncts, the recent institution of community authorities, so-called community police and community courts, as well as influential representatives of the Renamo opposition and traditional healers (so-called *n'anga* and *profete*; see chapter 4). Fieldwork, as well as the pursuit of life, in these *bairros* entails a form of "social navigation" (Vigh 2006) between the previously mentioned, often adversely positioned structures of authority and organization in a context sometimes dangerous—also for the anthropologist—in terms of levels of crime, violence, and insecurity. In socially navigating these *bairros,* I have largely developed and benefited greatly from networks of interlocutors and kin from the rural locality of Honde and their crucial relations with Chimoio.

While these relations vary in time-depth and strength between persons and households, in general relations were most strongly forged during the civil war when many fled Honde and established themselves in Chimoio. Following the war and returning to Honde from a number of localities (including Chimoio's *bairros*), many households retained their plots of land with houses in the *bairros,* often having one or several family members living in these. Much of my time during fieldwork was therefore devoted to following the movement of people in their everyday lives and through the seasons between rural and urban households—a movement imbuing the social world with the constant flow of personnel and goods. As the relations between the urban and rural settings of Honde and Chimoio are thus interconnected, this obviates upholding strict urban/rural distinctions (see also Sheldon 1999, 2003). Thus, barring their spatial location, these are not urban households in a strict sense as the majority of them enjoy long-term personal, kin-based, or economic relationships with rural households and their encompassing social organization. Crucially, a vast majority of poor *bairro* households are dependent on their sustenance and reproduction through connections (kin relations, the lease of plots of land, etc.) for the production of maize and other foods. This latter point entails a cycle of seasonal relocation between urban and rural localities that necessitates a dynamic approach to the task of mapping household memberships.

While living in several households in especially two impoverished *bairros,* I also frequently experienced the frustration at the lack of sala-

ried work and the often concomitant colonial nostalgia for a time when Chimoio was, apparently, industrialized and orderly. The latter point on industrialization might not, however, merely be cast as nostalgia: for decades Chimoio's textile factory, TextAfrica, had over four thousand workers as well as some other sites of industrial production providing wage labor opportunities prior to the destruction inherent to the liberation war (1964–75) and the civil war (1976–92).[41] The gradual shutdown during the 1980s and the lack of ordinary wage work has meant that informal businesses in the legal, semilegal, and illegal economies are important aspects of daily life. For the poor majority, a diversity of income-generating activities in these economies is central, supported by and in conjunction with a rurally based agricultural production of staple foods.

Contrasting Chimoio's *bairros,* what is striking in Honde, the rural community about a two-hour walk from Chimoio in which I have conducted fieldwork, is the way in which production and life seem to revolve around agricultural cycles: days are organized to a large extent around the work on the *machambas* (nonflooded agricultural plots of land), where staples such as maize (*magwere*), sorghum (*mapfunde*), sweet potato (*madima*), cassava (*mandioka*), groundnuts (*nyimo*), peanuts (*mandui*), and various types of beans, fruits, melons, and pumpkins are grown. This is complemented by work in the *matoro*—low-lying plots of seasonally flooded agricultural lands typically on riverbeds or close to streams or rivulets. In the *matoro* (or *baixa* in Portuguese as it is also often called), crops such as taro (*madumbe*), sugarcane (*musare*), tomatoes (*matimati*), and a wide variety of bananas (*makobo, nzarapera, verdiano, tchinakanaka, mafigo,* and *maraboa*) are grown. The annual agricultural cycle divides work into clearing, planting, weeding, and harvesting with, for example, the harvest of the main staple *magwere* (maize) in the *machamba* being roughly four to six months after its early harvest in the *matoro.* A comparatively poor community in an already poor province on a national level, Honde's agricultural cycle and its maintenance is crucial to people there.[42] Households are scattered across the landscape some thirty to one hundred meters apart where *gwanzas* (paths) connect and cross the *machambas* interspersed among households. These may be seen as etchings or engravings of the depth of social relations on and in the landscape, and the *gwanzas* least traveled between households are uniformly seen as indicating a problematic relation.

The *gwanzas* radiating from the household I lived in during most of my fieldwork in Honde were well-traveled and maintained and belonged to António and Ana while I lived there in 1999 and 2000. Staying there as a member of their household, I was accommodated not in the

muturica but in the so-called *goero* built by their second-oldest son who was then thirteen or fourteen. The *goero,* being a very rudimentary hut, is created by a male youth when he reaches the age of around twelve as one of the visible signs that he is embarking on adulthood and will, in time, create his own household (see also Suana 1999: 63). Set up in the compound of his parents, the youth will gradually start sleeping in the *goero* instead of the *muturica,* and in this case the son was accompanied by a neophyte of anthropology.

Practically, fieldwork in 1999–2000 and in consecutive periods concentrated on participating in the rural work cycles on the *machambas* and in the compounds, ritual and social life, and engaging people in conversations. As households and social domains in Honde and, also, in the *bairros* around Chimoio are often spatially segregated in terms of gender (as well as age), access to women on par with those of men remained difficult. However, by returning over a period of many years, I was gradually able to speak with and also, to some degree, follow the activities of women. An additional dimension complicating fieldwork was the attribution of the category of *muZungu,* a Shona and chiTewe word meaning "white foreigner." In Honde and Chimoio this racial conception was double informed by the context of the aid and development industry on the one hand, and by the context of white people, particularly farmers and businessmen, from Zimbabwe or South Africa on the other. Both are, mildly put, undesirable conceptual positions to hold

Illustration 1.2. The *goero* that the author shared with António and Ana's son during the 1999–2000 fieldwork. Honde, 2000.

up during fieldwork. However, as my "family" led by Ana and António had installed me in one of their son's *goero* and in all contexts referred to me as their son, the category of *muZungu* gradually gave way, at least in Honde and in parts also of the relevant *bairros* in Chimoio, to a more unclear but, for the anthropologist, more productive status of the non-insider and nonoutsider.

Nonetheless, entering the locality of Honde to undertake fieldwork is not necessarily straightforward and involves more than locating a family kind enough to host an anthropologist. In this rural environment, entries and exits are strictly governed in terms of formal permissions from local government. In order for all foreigners or professionals to enter and stay in a *zona* (literally a "zone"), one needs to obtain formal credentials, so-called *credenciais*, issued from a government or government-related body. For Mozambicans, similar procedures of obtaining permission exist for issues such as land-use or setting up houses. Thus, for the foreign anthropologist and Mozambican alike, before staying in or working in a locality, the relevant document needs to be brought before and accepted by the local party secretary, community authority, or the *régulo*. Also, beyond these bureaucratic procedures, the fieldworker's entry to stay for a longer time in 1999 was addressed through a ritual called *mhamba*—one of several types of ceremonial acts normally executed to communicate people's entries to and exits from *zonas*.[43]

In my case, the *mhamba* was conducted by a *tchirenge*—a title often translated as "rainmaker" and a figure commanding great respect.[44] In general he (female *tchirenges* are unknown) secures relations between land and soil, spirits and rain through rituals effected in front of a sacred tree, *mudoe*. For Honde, he is a man that is frequently approached also in reproductive matters pertaining to particular households—as in a man's or a woman's difficulty in conceiving. He is, moreover, a figure always included when Honde is confronted by extraordinary situations—as, for example, the return of Honde's inhabitants after the civil war. Thus, upon his and a few other households' return in around 1996–97—when people in Chimoio started trusting that the peace of 1992 actually was going to last—the *tchirenge* organized a communal ceremony that included representatives from all Honde households. Narratives of this particular ceremony include that the *tchirenge* asked all the *gombwa,* the territorial spirits of the land (see also chapter 3), to accept their return and to forgive them for the blood spilled on the soil. To everyone's mind, this was crucial to not only be able to reenter the territory of Honde and relate to its spirits but also to reengage relations postwar.

In the particular *mhamba* of 1999 I took part in—the first but not the last—around twenty elderly men and women gathered in front of

Illustration 1.3. *Mhamba* with *tchirenge* to the left and two assistants to his right kneeling in front of the *mudoe* tree. The white carton between the latter contains red wine, *portugaro* (from Portugal), signifying ancestral blood. This is mixed with a transparent homemade liquor, *nipa,* which signifies the sweat of the ancestors. The faces on the photo are obscured in order to preserve anonymity. Honde, 2004.

Honde's *mudoe* tree as *tchirenge* invoked and communicated with the powerful spirits of the land. In some sense, the *tchirenge* as a representative of the autochthons, the group identified as *aridzi wo nhika* (owners of the land), safeguarded my entry into the social world of Honde. The *mhamba* was followed by drinking traditional beer, *duro,* made of maize or sorghum, as well as festive dancing accompanied by songs about my allegedly great fertility and virility in all fields of life. During subsequent fieldworks, similar rituals have framed my (re)entry into Honde.

This ethnographic vignette—serving as a rudimentary presentation of the rural aspect of my fieldwork sites—also conveys part of my early impressions upon visiting a community such as Honde. At first, for me the figure of the *tchirenge* easily came to represent a doyen of "ancestral ways," an epitome of "tradition" in the singular. Further, it was also tempting early on in this first fieldwork to contrast the nonmechanized agricultural cycles around which the attention to *machamba* and *matoro* are organized to something other—external to the world of Honde—in, for example, the deployment of the (all too) common binary concepts of "tradition" and "modernity" in order to structure the Honde material.

Portraying Honde this way would cast it as a "traditional community" organized along ancestral ways.

However, numerous anthropological studies from the 1950s on-ward, including the works by Clyde Mitchell (1956) and Bruce Kapferer (1972) associated with the influential Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, have irrefutably established that the formal and bureaucratic domains of state formations and nonstate domains are inextricably related within the same modern field. Thus, also in the context of Honde, I soon came to see the metanarrative of modernity and its necessary composite other as nonviable, first and foremost for its tendency to project ahistorical assumptions onto complex ethnographic contexts that also all have particular historical trajectories. Such a distinction would, then, also belie the social facts and individual and communal trajectories—for example that the *tchirenge* is also an agronomist: before the civil war, he worked for several years as a teacher at a provincial college near Chimoio. Further, Rui, a man assisting the *tchirenge* in the *mhamba* ritual, is a welder and a car mechanic. Prior to the civil war, he worked twenty years in different repair shops—a point he frequently underlined by showing me his welding tools still kept in his Honde home. Also António, the man married to Ana in the household where I lived, had previously worked in Southern Rhodesia. Later on and for fifteen years he worked as a mechanic at TextAfrica—at one point Southern Africa's largest textile producer (Pitcher 2002: 107f).

Such a list could be made longer but what I emphasize here is that what *may* at first seem like a rural, "traditional" locality is molded by the long-term violent postcolonial and colonial trajectories—a process exemplified at the community level by the violent scattering of Honde's members during the civil war and its reconstitution in the years following the GPA in 1992. Thus, the simplified category of "peasant" carries little meaning beyond being an occupational status, and the category of "traditional community" similarly belies the heterogeneity of orientations, experiences, and knowledge of people living in Honde.

The Virtual and Actual of War

What do these points imply in terms of state formation and the traditional field specifically? First, one could be tempted into arguing for alternatives to the categories of "modernity" and "tradition." For this particular part of Mozambique (and, indeed, large parts of the country) one could attempt to portray such contexts as "postindustrial" due to the shutdown of key factories following the wars and partly mis-

managed privatization practices (Jones 2005; Hanlon 1996). However, the term "postindustrial" provides no explanation beyond alluding to a presumably uniform "poststate," which corresponds neither to past nor present. Moreover, it would, perhaps, serve to give credence to the brutal Portuguese colonial regime characterized to a large extent by different forms of extractive economies undergirded by violent coercion, as will be developed in some detail in chapter 2.[45]

Inherent to both notions of "traditional" and the descriptive term "postindustrial" are the fallacies characteristic of modernity's lesser Other within an optic of linear historical evolution.[46] As Latour has argued in his archaeology of the term "modern" and its implications for social science constructions of objects, subjects, and society, "modernity has never begun. There has never been a modern world" (Latour 1993: 47). What the ethnographic vignettes of rainmaker-agronomist and the periurban communities with rural-urban networks of households has indicated is the need to "debunk" (Latour 1993) the explanatory potential of employing a tradition-modernity linearity on the material at hand. Overall, the vignettes indicate the need for a theoretical framework in which the traditional field is not cast as essentialized and as harking from time immemorial by adherents thus locked up in a (likewise) traditional world—a vision that would replicate the modernist linear argument of the universal sequence: standstill—rupture—modernity. This has two implications: First, it is necessary to analyze actual practices and instances—historical and present—of how the traditional field and state formation engage, conflict, and interpenetrate. It is therefore suggested here that following the flows in the rural-urban continuum under study provides one such entry point into this conundrum. A second implication is that it is necessary to see the traditional field in terms of its *dynamic,* not its stability. To reiterate: I propose that it is analytically rewarding to conceive of the traditional field as being a domain of potentialities, in terms of becoming and *not* being, emphasizing thus its movement and changeability instead of replicating images of its presumed stasis. In this chapter these potentialities of the domain of the traditional—its *virtual*—were revealed through how Renamo and FAM, as well as the Mozambican state, became embroiled in war machine and statist dynamics that fomented, interpenetrated, and were in conflict with dimensions of the traditional field. Concretely, this materialized in terms of the rise of Parama or Renamo's trouble with replacing and reinstituting a *régulo* in Honde, the integration of local political and kinship dynamics within Renamo expansion, and warfare in Kaerezi or the FAM's soldiers razing Bengo, respectively. Arguably, the civil war as it is very rudimentarily sketched here represents an event in terms of peri-

ods of extraordinary intensity and productive transformation where the virtual potentialities of the traditional field are actualized. The unfolding of the civil war as such an event is presented here and provides an analytical approach to the violent dynamics of civil war that is also attuned to the dynamics of power and vaster social and political upheaval within which the stories of violence from Honde need to be interpreted.

Although the civil war is an exceptionally violent, destructive and formative period in terms of both processes of state formation and the dynamics of the traditional field—as has been sketched here from the perspective of the rural-urban continuum of Honde and Chimoio—we need to also turn to a longer perspective on the diverse forms and dynamics of state formation to be able to analyze these beyond the notions of war machine and state. In chapter 2, such a historically informed analysis is undertaken in regards to the spatial and territorial dimensions in Manica Province.

Notes

 1. Opello (1975) and Alpers (1979) both explore the early political shaping of Frelimo. See also Munslow (1983) and Hanlon (1990 [1984]) for overviews of early Mozambican foreign-based nationalism and Mateus (1999) for a comprehensive analysis of Frelimo's founding elites in comparison to other Lusophone liberation movements.
 2. See Nwafor (1983), Saul (1979), and Coelho (1993, 1998) for details of the early phases of the liberation war.
 3. Murdered by a letter bomb in Dar-es-Salaam on 3 February 1969, Mondlane's death is generally thought to have been orchestrated by Portuguese intelligence (Mateus 2004: 171–172). However, some also attribute his death to have been facilitated by elements within Frelimo (Newitt 1995).
 4. As with Mondlane's assassination, Machel's death in a plane crash is enshrouded in a lot of political spin, and a range of different theories exist as to why the plane crashed, as summarized by Robinson (2006). On the importance of Machel for Mozambican independence, for the Frelimo party, as a political strategist, and as president at war, see Munslow (1986), Christie (1988), Liesegang (2001), or Sopa (2001). For a helpful review of Mozambican historiography, see Pitcher (2009).
 5. For analyses of this sectioning of Mozambican society, see Egerö (1986, 1990) or Hanlon (1990 [1984]), and for critical perspectives on the Frelimo-dominated state, see esp. Cahen (1988, 1993, 2000, 2010).
 6. Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwean African People's Union (ZAPU) fought for Zimbabwean independence (Bhebe and Ranger 1995, 1996).

 7. For variations over this argument, see, for example, Isaacman and Isaacman (1983), Vines (1991), Beinart (1992: 484), Birmingham (1992), Ranger (1992), Roesch (1992), Newitt (1995: 574ff), Alden (1996: 43ff), and Hall and Young (1997).

 8. See Geffray and Pedersen (1988), Geffray (1990), Cahen (1993), and J.-C. Legrand (1993) for analyses based on such an understanding. An often over-looked early anthropological attempt at analyzing the Mozambican conflict as more than an effect of external aggression was also done by Meillassoux and Verschuur (1985).

 9. The image of Renamo as God-fearing anti-communists turned out to be a success among many extreme right and Christian organizations. It has been documented that the International Freedom Foundation collaborated with BOSS and supplied Renamo with thirty tons of weapons via Malawi in 1991 (Dinerman 1994: 570). Other US extremist organizations that supported Renamo were Christ for the Nations Inc., the Believers Church, and the End of Time Handmaidens (Newitt 1995: 570; see also Austin 1994).

10. See Müller (2014) for analyses of aid from the GDR and Vanneman (1990) for Mozambique's relationship with the Soviet Union. Sitoe (2003: 25; see also Alden 2001: 15) argues that the Soviet Union's 1982 refusal to let Mozambique join Comecon heavily influenced Frelimo's subsequent reorientation westward and led them to approach the Bretton Woods institutions that transformed economy and society from the mid-1980s onward.

11. This perspective is also supported if looking at other African states that were involved directly and indirectly. For instance, Malawi's "President for Life" Hastings Banda actively supported Renamo (Africa Watch 1992: 132; Finnegan 1992: 160f).

12. Mozambican historiography is fraught with a bitter strife about interpretations of, in particular, the "civil war." As Sidaway states, "Even now, to call it a civil war is to be seen to have accepted a particular interpretation" (1998: 246). I have extrapolated elsewhere (2002, 2004) on the definitional struggle of calling the war "civil war," "war of destabilization," or "postliberation war," and I will not deal with these here. For the sake of simplicity I will use "civil war" to denote the period between 1976 and 1992.

13. Of these, 1,058,500 were registered in Malawi in 1993; Zambia had 25,400, Zimbabwe 137,900, Tanzania 20,000, and Swaziland 24,000 (UNHCR 1993). These numbers are, however, contested: Rupiya (1998) claims 5 to 6 million refugees, while Juergensen (2000) writes what he calls "internally marooned" to have been 4.5 million.

14. The GPA followed twenty-seven months of negotiated talks initiated 8 July 1990 in Rome (Alden 2001: 19ff). Useful reviews and recollections of the Rome mediation are also given by Morozzo della Rocca (1997), Morozzo della Rocca and Riccardi (2003), and Mário (2004).

15. The 1994 and 1999 elections have generally been regarded as "free and fair" by the international community (Mazula 1995; Harrison 1996; Carter Center 2000). The 2004, 2009, and 2014 elections have attracted more critique in

terms of suspicion of different forms of electoral manipulation, ballot stuffing, irregularities in terms of funds management, illicit use of state resources, and distribution (see, e.g., Ostheimer 2005; Israel 2006; de Brito 2010; Azevedo-Harman 2015).

16. See also A. Honwana (1996, 2003), Nordstrom (1997), Marlin (2001) and Igreja (2003, 2014, 2015a, 2015b).

17. Commenting on "Operation Desert Storm," Feldman notes that "the visual mastery of the campaign pushed all other sensory descriptions outside the perceptual terms of reference [and] precluded any scream of pain, any stench of corpse from visiting the American living room" (Feldman 1994: 408; see also Virilio 2005 [1998]). Such sanitizing techniques are integral to the discourse of fronts and theaters of war and the point remains that the representational politics are as crucial in issues concerning warfare as other issues.

18. For representations of the civil war as chaotic, see Derlugian (1990), Alden (1996), and Nordstrom (1997). For an important counterargument, see Lubkemann (2008 esp.).

19. Forced conscription is widely documented (see esp. Gersony 1988; Wilson 1992).

20. FAM was Mozambique's postindependence army until soldiers from the FAM joined forces with Renamo guerrillas, comprising the new Mozambican army, FADM, as part of the GPA in 1992 (see J. Honwana 1999 for details).

21. Renamo's violence has often been interpreted in directly instrumental terms: "Officials of FRELIMO, and of the administration, are priority targets. In rural areas their physical elimination serves to isolate communities and remove them from the rival authority of central power" (Hall 1990: 52). For general analyses of Renamo violence, see also Minter (1989), Weigert (1996), Hultman (2009), Coelho (2011 [2009]), and Emerson (2014).

22. Notions of the bush, the wild, and processes of "animalization" are recurring in many conflicts as, for example, Malkki (1995), Nordstrom (1997), and Alexander et al. (2000) have all noted. Their analyses correspond with the more general argument of the bush beyond the village constituting the Other of any social organization and, as such, a center of sorcerers and destructive forces (Gluckman et al. 1949: 93).

23. "Their own" indicates here the child of their household, neighboring households, relatives, visitors, or from their *dzindza*. *Dzindza* connotes kin group or family group, normally patrilineal relations. "Their own" has, then, wider connotations to the dissociation *from* and *of* community such an act entails.

24. The image of the bush is also relevant in relation to views on contemporary politics as when one person argued that due to electoral fraud in the general presidential and parliamentary election in 1999, Renamo had really won. Therefore there was a lot of discontent among people. "But," he said, "no one wants to return to the bush. No one wants more war" (see also Bertelsen 2003).

25. The *aldeia comunal* (communal village) was a postliberation institution implemented to augment peasant agricultural production, also in Honde. *Aldeias comunais* will be thoroughly analyzed in chapter 2.

26. Interestingly, while Artur (1999a) claims that the mountain is called Chindaza in chiTewe, such a term is unknown to my Honde and Chimoio maTewe interlocutors who claim it is exclusively called Bengo in addition to its Portuguese name.

27. Most of these goats were so-called *gotokoto* in chiTewe (and Shona) that are created to contain and handle evil spirits (*pfukwa*). *Gotokoto* goats are treated especially in chapter 4.

28. For a comprehensive critical engagement with Nordstrom's argument, see Englund (2005).

29. Nordstrom's approach is effectively summarized by Löfving and Macek (1999: 5) as "'the meaning of violence' is itself a contradiction in terms; the experience of war implies a loss of the conceptual and epistemological framework that previously provided means to interpret the event of life and the death of others."

30. In this I follow Blok (2000: 24) who notes that researchers too often "speak of 'senseless' violence in cases where easily recognizable goals and obvious relationships between means and ends are absent."

31. Anthropologically, "war" has conventionally been conceived in terms ranging from "an armed contest between two independent political units, by means of organised military force, in the pursuit of a tribal or national policy" (Malinowski, quoted in R. B. Ferguson 1984: 3) to, more simply, "intergroup aggression" (Livingstone, quoted in McCauley 1990: 1). A number of these classic anthropological approaches conjure up images of structured and formalized armed conflicts that are unhelpful in terms of understanding the trajectories of war in Manica Province—as well as elsewhere. As Simons (1994: 94) points out for war more generally, "The orderly Clausewitzian connections between governments, armies, and people have largely been dissolved." This means that approaches delimiting the war to a "civil war" between two struggling parties represented by FAM and Renamo is problematic. Such distinctions are easily made by scholars, such as in Dolan and Schafer's otherwise interesting study of processes of reintegration and demobilization where they, to my mind, simplify the civil war's complexity by using a crude dichotomy of "soldiers" and "civilians" (1997: 106ff; but see also Schafer 2007). Wiegink's in-depth, grounded study of the complexity of the very notion of return and reintegration among former Renamo guerrillas is more insightful here (Wiegink 2014).

32. As previously noted, Mozambique became enmeshed in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle by accepting bases of ZANLA guerrillas in the country, who operated mainly from Manica Province and into Southern Rhodesia. As a result, Southern Rhodesian troops raided and bombarded camps as well as terrorized the rural areas of Manica, including Honde. From people recalling the presence of ZANLA guerrillas in Honde, it seems there was a great deal of ambivalence toward them. This is also corroborated by Zimbabwean memoirs where this ambivalence toward the "freedom fighters" frustrated the ZANLA—especially as these were also under attack from Renamo guerrillas: "In these accounts of MNR [Renamo] attacks, one child [i.e. child soldier] says that the Mozambican villagers were 'cheering on' the MNR while they were attacking the [Zimbabwean]

refugees, while another child says that the Mozambicans had alerted them that the MNR were about to attack" (Hayes et al. 1992: 72). Be that as it may, Manica Province—with the so-called Beira corridor where the main oil, gas, and petrol pipeline to Zimbabwe cuts across the landscape surrounding Chimoio—was strategically important: during the early 1980s, armed groups, often alleged to be Renamo, blew up parts of the pipeline numerous times purportedly to damage the Frelimo state and Zimbabwe. However, evidence suggests that the company Lonrho with interests in the pipeline in 1982 "signed a secret protection agreement with Renamo leaders covering the Beira oil pipeline" (Vines 1998: 66). On the other hand, with South Africa as a main Renamo backer in the 1980s prioritizing the destruction of the pipeline, a compromise between Renamo and Lonrho was made where "Renamo would carry out symbolic attacks on the pipeline" but not destroy it completely (ibid.).

33. The mutilated body inscribed with violence corresponds to Feldman's (1998: 229) argument that the individual body "becomes the material and visual bearer of discriminating histories."

34. Or, as Patton (2001 [1984]: 1287) puts it, "Whereas the [war machine] mobilizes an autonomous flow of violence against the State, the State itself deploys a structural, legal violence—a violence of capture, whose institutional manifestations are juridical and penal, institutions of capture and punishment, police and prisons."

35. Although applied here to look at specific war dynamics, it may be noted that the "war" of the war machine for Deleuze and Guattari is often articulated as potential (or "virtual") and as multiple.

36. In chapter 3 I also provide an analysis of these relations between people, soil, and spirits in the context of state formation, war, and deterritorialization.

37. See also, again, J.-C. Legrand's (1995) analysis of the multiple reasons for Renamo raids and forced capture of the civilian population in Manica Province supporting that these practices are irreducible to military causation.

38. INE (1999b: 3, 2007) and Martinho (2002: 13) provide the relevant numbers and projections here.

39. For an account of Chimoio's history, see Artur (1999a), which, curiously enough, avoids the civil war years altogether. However, a good account of the civil war years in Chimoio can be found in Mark Chingono's work (1994, 1996) focusing especially on the war's structural effects in terms of gender and the informal economy.

40. There is a rather large literature on various distinctions between so-called formal and informal parts of Mozambican cities, and in, especially, the literature on Maputo, the formal, concrete part is often called *bairro do cimento* or, formerly, *cidade de cimento* (see, e.g., Jenkins 2013; Bertelsen, Tvedten, and Roque 2014). In keeping with my Chimoio interlocutors' usage, however, I will employ the short term *bairro cimento*.

41. Manning (1996: 186) alleges that the end of TextAfrica's production was directly related to the civil war, as a large cell of Renamo supporters "was made up of employees of TextAfrica." While this allegation is hard to verify, it may partially explain why state support for TextAfrica's production gradually dwindled.

42. Rural poverty is dire in Manica Province, making it a poor province in an impoverished country. Manica's under-five child mortality rate was 245.8 of 1,000 births in 1997 (INE 1999a: 14), while the average for Mozambique in 2000 was 200 (Black et al. 2003).

43. As should be clear in subsequent cases and chapters, my approach to the term "ritual" is largely in keeping with the Deleuzian approach argued by Kapferer (2004b), namely seeing it as a virtual domain that eludes strict or necessary (representational and other) links to conventional or ordinary understandings of reality.

44. The spelling of *tchirenge* is chiTewe while, for example, Rennie (1984: 186) spells it *chirenje*. Hannan (1984 [1959]), however, reproduces neither spelling nor does he propose similar terms in his Shona dictionary. Interlocutors provided diverse explanations as to the term, varying from "son of kings" to "son of Mwene Mutapa"—the latter referring to Mutapa empire rulers (ca. 1430–1760) who also dominated large parts of Manica Province (Mtetwa 1984).

45. The nostalgia for the Portuguese colonialists is prevalent in many parts of Mozambique, and racialized narratives abound of the alleged inventiveness, prosperity, and productivity of the white man (*brancos* or *tugos* or *muZungos*) as opposed to assumptions of the black man's (*pretos* or *Africanos*) inertia or laziness and mere capacity for destruction. But compare also Englund (1996a) for an analysis relating this nostalgia to fertility and former patronage, and Teixeira (2003) for an analysis of how Portuguese are seen as "white vampires" with a black heart in the figure of the *chupa-sangue* (see also chapter 6).

46. While the concept of hybridity seems to overcome modernity's linearity, it nonetheless relies on a vision of a mix of two conditions where, as an intermediate condition, the hybrid in many senses remains impure and transitory.