CHAPTER 17

Unintended Consequences

Debating the Protection of Cultural Heritage during Humanitarian Crises

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In the summer of 2010, I arrived in Raqqa, Syria, located on the banks of the Euphrates River in north-central Syria, to begin archaeological excavations at the site of Tell Zeidan. Although I had worked at several archeological sites in the Middle East, this was my first excavation in Syria, and I hoped to complete my doctoral dissertation on this site. I worked for the next six weeks excavating the remains of a Late Chalcolithic (ca. 4000 BCE) settlement and cemetery with amazing preservation and materials. I grew to love the city of Raqqa and its inhabitants, despite the incredible heat and winds. After closing for the season and returning to Damascus, the team excitedly spoke about our planned return the next summer.

Instead, like many of my colleagues, I watched as the country split into factions. The initial response by myself and my colleagues at the start of what became the Syrian Civil War was a combination of confusion and cheer. We did not immediately believe the situation would become violent. In fact, the first few weeks of the Arab Spring period within Syria were nonviolent, with protesters seeking the end of martial law in Syria and new freedoms rather than the fall of the al-Assad regime. I remember and still have emails between colleagues and myself celebrating the first demonstrations, the capture of the city of Raqqa by the Free Syrian Army, and the tumbling of the statue of former president Hafez al-Assad in the central square in Raqqa. Meanwhile, archaeological groups began to plan their 2012 summer excavations seasons, includ-

ing the site of Tell Zeidan, believing the situation would calm down and work would continue.

However, as the events in Syria turned from peaceful protests to violent responses by the Syrian regime, the archaeological community began to understand the severity of the situation. International media broadcast accounts detailing great losses of life as the cities and monuments of this beautiful country were destroyed through warfare and intentional destruction. We heard even more tragic and personal accounts from our Syrian colleagues, as the city of Raqqa itself eventually became the de facto capital of the Islamic State (IS). The IS created for itself its own ideal version of Islam and Syria, one that did not allow for any dissention or alternative understandings of Islam, or how it was practiced or represented. The IS set about systematically destroying any physical representations and evidence of these alternative versions within its territories. Through a series of well-publicized videos and pictures, the regime simultaneously presented to the world a vision focused more on the annihilation of pre-Islamic materials while obscuring the violence toward Islamic sites.

As the humanitarian crises within Syria raged on, the subject of cultural heritage destruction during times of war became a major topic of conversation among concerned scholars—archaeologists, philologists, historians, and museum workers, both foreign and Syrian. Foreign archaeologists generally are in a unique position from other types of foreign scholars or employees, as we often spend many years working within a country, frequently in rural regions away from larger cities, developing long-lasting ties to local communities. With the rise of violence within Syria, these groups began to try and find ways in which they could help Syrian colleagues who remained within the country.

This situation led to a series of new initiatives across the world of Middle Eastern archaeology. These initiatives were set in place to help from outside Syrian borders, ranging from sending support to archaeologists within the country to surveying the destruction of heritage sites via the continual observation of real-time satellite photography. However, these initiatives, though undertaken with the best intentions in mind, did not always result in the projected consequences. Looking back from 2012 to today, we can now both begin to reexamine what was done by the IS and why it was done, as well as what was deemed worthy of documentation by foreign archaeologists and what were the consequences of our actions. In retrospect, while the intentions of archaeologists were laudable, the actual results have far more often been solely for the benefit of foreign archaeologists, the US State Department, and the creation of new archaeological methodologies rather than any measurable gain or help for the country for which we claimed to care so deeply.

The Televised and Invisible Destruction of Cultural Heritage within Syria

From the beginnings of the Syrian Civil War to the present, destruction of cultural heritage sites and materials have been rampant in Syria and the tolls upon the human population continue to rise. There are two separate forces at play in this destruction, the Islamic State (hereafter IS), also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Daesh, and the Syrian government, under President Bashar al-Assad. Though the IS controlled up to one-third of Syrian territory at its height, the al-Assad government continued its campaign against other rebel groups within its borders. These included Al-Nusra, the Free Syrian Army, and a growing movement of united Kurdish groups who hoped to create an independent Kurdish state out of Kurdish territories in Syria, Türkiye, and Iraq.

The continued warfare between the Syrian government and various factions led to the widescale destruction of numerous urban centers, most notably Homs in western central Syria and Aleppo near the northwestern Turkish border. Holdouts of rebel groups in the regions motivated the Syrian government to attack these centers, and both sides used important cultural and archaeological sites as places of refuge. As an example, the Syrian government attacked the Aleppo Citadel against incursions by the rebel Free Syrian Army. This important site dates to as early as the third millennium BCE and is one of the largest remaining and best-preserved medieval castles in the world. The site, located in the Old Town of Aleppo, has been a UNESCO World Heritage Site since 1986 and is one of the best known archaeological and cultural sites within Syria. Much of the site was destroyed between 2012 and 2016 as it was bombed. Both sides accused the other of being responsible for the damage. Elsewhere in Aleppo, the famous Suq (marketplace), and the Umayyad Mosque, one of the oldest mosques in the world, were both critically damaged in the fighting. In these cases, the destruction of the Old City in Aleppo was not intentional but a byproduct of the fight between the Syrian Army and the Free Syrian Army for control of the city. The destruction was often portrayed as an unfortunate casualty of the war by international media coverage. Both Middle Eastern and Western news sources reported widely on the damage of these well-known sites, while considerably less was written, for example, about the destruction of domestic buildings elsewhere in Aleppo, or damage in less prominent locations in Syria, such as Homs.

In the IS territory, destruction of cultural heritage sites was more systematic and focused. Many articles, reports, and books have been written about the rise and fall of IS, though the group still exists and exerts control globally. At the height of the IS power in 2015, the global community watched outraged and sickened as Syrian cities fell to the IS and thousands of Syrian citizens were

murdered and engulfed in the violence of the Islamic State. Entire populations were murdered by the regime, with particular violence inflicted upon minority groups such as the Yazidi.

The IS was and remains a politically savvy, twenty-first-century organization. The regime was fully aware that the eyes of the world were watching, and it created slick social media campaigns to bring awareness to its actions, seeking both to outrage and to recruit. The IS used a variety of methods to broadcast messages to the world, including publishing streaming videos, websites, and social media content on Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram. The regime even published a glossy English-language magazine called *Dabiq*.[1] These global campaigns highlighted a variety of the IS's actions, including the conquests of new territory, murders of perceived enemies, and the destruction of cultural heritage located in territories it controlled.

In many ways, the destruction of cultural heritage as it was filmed and presented on IS social media became the global symbol of the IS regime represented to the outside world. This was understandable—as the IS published viscerally violent videos that depicted graphic massacres of civilians, the destruction of a building or a statue was far easier to ingest.

Perhaps the most famous of the IS's publicized spectacles was the destruction of the large guardian *lamassu* (Mesopotamian bulls with human heads) statues that once stood at the gated entrance to the Assyrian site of Nineveh, located in Mosul, Iraq. Other videos featured the wanton destruction of objects in the Mosul Museum, and, within Syria, the destruction of Palmyra.

Palmyra is located in central Syria within the Homs Governate. While this archaeological site has habitation levels dating back to the Neolithic period (ca. 5000 BCE), it is best known for its remarkably well-preserved Roman-era settlement and cemeteries. Palmyra was a major tourist attraction before the civil war began and one of the best-known archaeological sites in the country. The IS took control of Palmyra in 2015 and shortly began destroying important buildings and statues. The IS produced videos flaunting this destruction, including of the famous Lion of Al-Lat, the Temple of Bel, and the Arch of Triumph. These recordings were professionally produced and widely distributed through international sites such as YouTube and Facebook to reach as wide an audience as possible. They were further disseminated through news programs replaying the videos and thus were a highly effective form of propaganda for the IS. In these videos, the IS labeled these objects as forms of idolatry and thus worthy of destruction.

However, these videos did not tell the entire story. While the IS did in fact destroy many artifacts and buildings, the regime often collected anything that could be moved to sell on the black market to collectors, generally in Western countries such as the United States, England, or France. So, while propogandist videos depicted cultural heritage destruction, the IS was simultaneously

collecting and selling artifacts to be sold outside of Syria to raise funds for its efforts.

Further, documents later found in former IS territories revealed that the IS was not only systemically excavating archaeological sites but also issuing official archaeological excavation permits to Syrian archaeologists for various sites within its territory. Official documents record IS laws that forbade unofficial looting of archaeological sites without IS permission, stating, "It is prohibited for any brother from the Islamic State to excavate antiquities or give the permit to anyone from the public without receiving a stamped permit issued from the Diwan of Natural Resources and Minerals-Antiquities Division."[2]

It appears that while the IS created a narrative of cultural destruction through its media-released recordings, the regime also facilitated a market for the very materials it claimed to be destroying. It was no coincidence that at the same time the IS controlled vast territories in Syria and Iraq, the international market for Levantine and Mesopotamian material exploded.[3] This market extended from online sales on e-commerce sites like eBay to larger auction houses like Christie's and the creation of larger private collections, such as the Green family's founding collections for the Museum of the Bible.[4] The IS created the crisis and then profited from it.

However, while the above crisis was being exploited, the IS was also actively destroying other cultural heritage sites and materials outside the public eye. These acts of destruction were religiously motivated and not televised or recorded. Any facet of Syrian culture that did not fit into the IS's very narrow concept of Islam were erased. Under the IS's strict conception of Islam, Christian, Jewish, Bahai, and other religions were deemed heretical, prompting the destruction of their buildings and materials. However, the largest category of cultural artifacts targeted was Islamic materials. Shi'a mosques or religious objects, or any mosque or religious building associated directly with a person, were especially endangered. For example, the Nabi Yunus Mosque in Mosul, said to be the final resting place of the prophet Jonah, an important figure in Muslim, Christian, and Jewish faiths, was completely razed. Islamic objects were destroyed rather than sold on the black market.

The IS's publicized destruction of cultural heritage intentionally obscured its own enrichment from the trade of cultural material while creating a new version of Syria that suffocated the true diversity of the region and its connections to diverse forms of Islam. The IS performed a cultural cleansing to recreate the region in its own image. It erased the past through the destruction of both the people and the physical representations of their memories. The IS crafted its agenda with the material wealth gained from international outrage over non-Islamic cultural destruction as it quietly excised large swathes of diverse Islamic culture from the landscape while the media was distracted.

The International Archaeological Response

Throughout this crisis, the archaeological community displayed a range of responses, some more helpful and valuable than others. This was not the first time that archaeologists had been deeply involved in a community at a time when war or violence had broken out. Archaeologists had been in countries during outbreaks of violence within Israel, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Turkey, to name just a few countries where this occurred within the Middle East. However, as the situation worsened, the community sought new ways to help.

Scholars with a connection to the region first sought to directly help their associate communities within Syria. This was largely done on an individual basis through the work of specific archaeological teams who assisted the Syrian community with whom they worked instead of any large, organized effort by archaeological organizations. This was achieved largely through monetary donations sent into the country via various methods to directly aid individuals or families within Syria, allowing them to buy food or supplies. Scholars also used their connections to get individuals who were in danger out of the country altogether. Many of these aid efforts were done outside of official processes, and so details cannot be ethically published here. These direct humanitarian-based efforts by scholars continued throughout the civil war.

Along with their worry over the human cost, archaeologists were also understandably concerned with the cultural heritage of Syria itself; the nature of our profession requires a passion for cultural heritage and the past. As accounts of the destruction of cultural heritage began to mount, archaeologists wondered what could be done from outside the country. This led to several official movements, often spearheaded by professional archaeological organizations, called "conflict archaeologists" by Greenland and Fabiani.[5]

Most of these efforts focused on how to track destruction within the country, creating several new initiatives based in Syria. For example, the America-based Middle Eastern archaeological association ASOR (American Society of Overseas Research) began the ASOR Syrian Initiative, which lasted from 2014 to 2017. Through this initiative, archaeologists knowledgeable in mapping program such as ArcGIS used satellite photography, often in real time, "to document, monitor, and report on cultural heritage damage in Syria."[6] The team published reports of their findings on their website and used information from local colleagues within Syria to ground truth data as much as was possible or safe.[7] Regions were selected for this detailed analysis through a combination of known areas of IS activity, known archaeological sites of importance, and what data was made available by the US State Department. A second American initiative was the UPenn Heritage Stabilization Program, which used similar methods as ASOR to oversee destruction within Syria and Iraq.

A similar international initiative was the Safeguarding the Heritage of Syria and Iraq (SHOSI) Project. Begun in 2014, the SHOSI Project fused the provision of humanitarian aid to locals within Syria and Iraq and the safeguarding of cultural heritage concepts, all through a combination of emergency funding for locals and training within the country and nearby regions for scholars and archeologists.[8] SHOSI worked at first with various groups outside of the Assad regime, such as the Free Syrian Army, in the hope that if they won control over regions they could quickly and effectively work to safeguard cultural heritage within the country through its own people.

SHOSI largely focused on in-country training within Syria and Iraq of what it called "heritage professionals," holding in-person meetings in safe regions for archeological professionals from the United States, Syria, and Iraq for further training. "Its purpose was three-fold: 1) to offer information on how to secure museum collections safely during emergencies; 2) to provide participants with basic supplies for packing and securing museum collections; and 3) to create a dialogue about emergency responses and needs."[9] This project prioritized in-country actions that addressed the specific needs of the local archaeological communities that were impacted by the conflict.

Within Europe, similar initiatives included Heritage for Peace in Spain, the Syrian Heritage Archive Project in Berlin, the Association for the Protection of Syrian Archaeology in Strasbourg, Le patrimoine archéologique syrien en danger in France, Syrian Heritage in Danger in Basel, Switzerland, and Endangered Archaeology in the Middle East and North Africa (EAMENA) out of Oxford University in England, though this is not an exhaustive list. Most often, these projects were able to do little more than observe destruction within the country and publish reports. The goals of many of these organizations were to keep a vigil over the cultural heritage of Syria and Iraq and record what was lost. The hope was that once peace was restored, such data could be returned to local groups to aid in the process of rebuilding as well as saving what was possible to salvage. The archaeologists working on these projects were a mixture of scholars, including graduate students and professors, who had previously worked in Syria and Iraq and scholars with a strong background in GIS programming. Participants, including two of my close colleagues from graduate school, worked both part- and full-time on these projects.[10]

These initiatives were all founded with good intentions and a desperately felt need to do something about the situation within Syria. However, these efforts still bring up questions: What were the priorities set by the archaeological community, and how well did it meet these priorities? It becomes harder as the years pass to know what more could have been done or what a better project would have entailed. However, we can now see that there were detrimental consequences to the well-intentioned aid efforts of foreign scholarly and archeological communities.

First, these groups often focused their efforts on famous archaeological sites, museums, or monuments, for example, the emphasis on the destruction of the site of Palmyra. The atrocities of this site were widely shared across the international archaeological communities and general news outlets. The ASOR Syrian Initiative created five reports in total on Palmyra alone. Other well-documented and well-known archaeological sites, such as Ebla and Mari, excavated in the past by Europe- and America-based archaeologists, received a large share of the coverage. Additionally, significant coverage focused on the destruction of Christian sites and monuments, such as St. Elijah's Monastery in Iraq, the oldest Christian monastery in the country. Destruction of Christian sites often monopolized these foreign aid efforts and the coverage they received.

Far less was published about smaller, lesser-known archaeological sites, especially sites from the prehistoric or Islamic period, Islamic monuments, or modern urban centers, though these were also visible via available satellite photography. The organizations' focus mirrored that of the IS and its propaganda, homing in largely on non-Islamic or pre-Islamic destruction despite the fact that the majority of the destruction targeted Islamic sites and material. The largest loss of cultural heritage went underacknowledged.

A second issue came from how this data was retrieved and stored. To get timely, high-resolution data, researchers depended on government sources. Both the ASOR and UPenn groups received data and funding—$600,000—from the US State Department. This relationship is acknowledged: the ASOR Syrian Initiative website has an American flag posted on the main page, along with text discussing the US State Department's partnership with the initiative.

Funding can be difficult to obtain, and this data was invaluable to these initiatives, but I argue that the ethical implications of this source of data and funding was not entirely well thought out, especially considering how very quickly these initiatives were put together in the early days of the war. As the State Department provided the material support and data for the project, it also set parameters for which geographical areas were allowed to be observed by the archaeological groups and when the data would be received, further limiting what could be monitored by archaeologists. While some members of the archaeological community did express concerns about the projects, they likely reasoned that the State Department money and data were necessary to sustain the project.

Other archaeological groups began efforts to recreate what had been lost. For example, projects like Project Mosul used public-sourced photographs of museums, archaeological sites, and artifacts to generate three-dimensional recreations of destroyed materials. For example, such efforts were used to recreate lost materials from Palmyra, resulting in models of destroyed monuments like the Lion of al-Lat and the Arch of Triumph. While these again seem like worthwhile efforts, what happened instead was a focus on recreating the arch,

for example, for display in locations like London and New York, whereas the original in Syria remains absent and destroyed.

Local Responses

As a foreign archaeologist myself, it is harder to evaluate the efforts led by local Syrian archaeologists and communities. These actors made many attempts to communicate the Syrian situation to rest of the world and advocate for their own local-led solutions. The stakes were quite different for Syrians within the country. If they were found to be broadcasting data to outsiders, the punishment could be torture or death.

Many archaeologists worked individually within the country both to monitor destruction of sites and artifacts and to broadcast events within the country to the outside world. For example, Adnan Al Mohamad, an archeologist from Aleppo, worked from 2014 to document the looting and destruction of Aleppo before being forced to flee the country in fear of his life and that of his family.[11]

A far more tragic story concerns the site of Palmyra. At the time that the IS took over Palmyra, the head of antiquities of the site was a Syrian man named Khaled al-Assad, who had worked at the site his entire life and for forty years as the head of antiquities for Palmyra. While he was encouraged to flee as the region fell under IS control, al-Assad instead chose to remain to protect his beloved site. He organized efforts to hide and protect as many artifacts from the Palmyra Museum as possible. At the age of eighty-three, he also believed himself too old to be of consequence to the IS. This was sadly not the case. The IS captured and tortured him in an attempt to learn where many of the smaller antiquities from Palmyra had been hidden. Al-Assad refused to comply and was publicly beheaded by the IS on 18 August 2015. The death of al-Assad, a well-loved figure in Syrian archaeology, shocked the archaeological world.

A final example was the creation of a website by local actors called Raqqa Is Being Silently Slaughtered. This was a consistently updated account from within Raqqa of the atrocities committed against the people of Raqqa, as well as to the city itself and its cultural heritage sites. The authors of this site were remarkably brave, as anyone caught running the site was sure to be executed. The site continued to be updated through the liberation of Raqqa by Syrian forces in 2016.

Unintended Consequences of the Past and Looking to the Future

Here in 2024, it is easy to look back upon the last twelve years and say what could have been done differently or better. It is important to emphasize that

this was, and remains, a difficult and stressful situation for all parties involved. Moving forward, we can use these events as a map for future humanitarian crises, asking what the best ways are to support people within a country and make sure they are being heard.

Ultimately, fewer lessons were learned from these events than one might hope. There have been great advances in archaeology and archaeological methodologies in the last ten years, especially in relation to accessibility of archaeological material to the general public. Great strides in digital humanities, 3D modeling of archaeological sites and artifacts, including of sites and artifacts that have been destroyed, and the creation of virtual tours of both existing and demolished locations have changed how the public can interact with archaeology.[12] Many of these new technologies have directly arisen from techniques developed by archaeologists in response to the Syrian crisis. However, the goals first intended by archaeologists back in 2012 have not been met, and the results have been new archaeological methodologies, not necessarily the betterment of Syria, its people, or the preservation of its cultural heritage. What started as a humanitarian response to a horrific situation largely ended advancing the technology of Western archeological organizations, and the loss of life and culture were soon overlooked as time passed and the world moved on from Syria to other crises.

By the end of 2018, the IS had lost nearly all its territorial gains in both Syria and Iraq. However, the group is not dead, and while it no longer controls the numbers of people and territories it once did, it remains a force within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and should not be underestimated. The destruction of mosques, shrines, and other Islamic material culture will haunt these regions for decades to come, if not longer. The IS successfully erased large amounts of physical evidence that represented dissenting forms of Islam, and little international money has been raised or provided to date to rebuild Shi'a shrines and mosques. This will be a costly project, as what is destroyed is often difficult to rebuild. The international response that ostensibly cared deeply at one time about the cultural heritage has largely, though not completely, been silent regarding this continued need.

Within Syria, the al-Assad government has regained control of the country, including the regions of Homs and Aleppo; rebel groups have lost most of their gains but remain in parts of the country. The Kurds in northern Syria are still working and fighting toward their goal of an independent Kurdistan and have come up against fierce and violent responses by Türkiye in the north. While the civil war in Syria has changed, the country has not regained the peace from before the war.

Archaeology within the country itself has only haltingly restarted. A small number of Syrian-led excavations have recommenced in various regions of Syria, but foreign excavations remain paused. Within archaeological organi-

zations, there remains hope for the future of archaeology and cultural heritage management within the country, but work remains limited. For example, at the fall 2021 annual meeting of ASOR, only three talks were given in the Archaeology of Syria workshop, only five at the 2022 annual meeting, and the Archaeology of Syria workshop was canceled in 2023, though a small number of talks focused on Syria were presented in other workshops. Before 2012, there would be more than twelve such talks at a single workshop. Of the talks in 2021, two were reports on materials excavated before the war began, and the third featured a Syrian archaeologist speaking about the reconstruction work at a site that had been heavily damaged by recent fighting. In 2022 and 2023, all were reports on materials excavated before the war began or focused on the future of cultural heritage within the country. It is not clear if the ASOR annual meeting will keep its Syrian workshop in future years.

Other organizations formed because of the civil war have pivoted to different projects, either within Syria or in the greater MENA region. For example, the ASOR Syrian Initiative is now known as the ASOR Cultural Heritage Initiative (CHI), focused more generally on in-country training for local archaeologists and combatting trafficking of cultural heritage materials. Nearly the entire staff of the previous Syrian Initiative has since moved on to other projects or jobs; the organization continues with little connection to its original mission. Since there are nearly no original members, there are concerns that the data collected by the original Syrian Initiative is not being preserved. While much was published and remains publicly available on the ASOR site, it remains unclear—even to those who worked for the initiative—where the collected data itself went. The US State Department reclassified much of this information, and so its final uses and results remain unshared and unavailable to archaeological and Syrian communities. This is a major issue for a project whose initial goals were to create publicly available data for the people of Syria. As projects changed scope and focus, personnel left, taking with them the institutional knowledge of a still ongoing problem. Moreover, the data once promised to the Syrian community is now held and controlled by the US State Department.

Endangered Archaeology in the Middle East and North Africa (EAMENA) has also shifted its focus. Now it is no longer focused on satellite work but has shifted toward in-country training across the MENA region. Within Syria itself, the Syrian Directorate-General of Antiques and Museums hosts and updates a website with lists of sites and damage from the last ten years as curated by the Syrian government.

Much of the focus by these groups has now transferred to the training of archaeologists in-country, a meritorious goal, as well as to rebuilding some subsection of what was destroyed. However, which sites and regions are being rebuilt is itself an ongoing question. These projects are often highly reliant

upon foreign sources of money for rebuilding, which is then contingent upon the whims of those who are financing the projects—and this presents questions regarding interests not dictated by the preference of the Syrian people. For example, the Russian government has given money for the rebuilding of the site of Palmyra, while the UAE has helped fund reconstruction of the Old Town of Aleppo. However, as these major tourist sites are being revitalized, the living neighborhoods that surround these major landmarks are still rubble. Such projects are of aid to Syria in general but do little to help those who live in these regions.

Overall, a greater number of internationally famous sites are in the process of reconstruction than local Islamic sites, largely due to higher levels of funding for the former over sites and locations of greater cultural importance to contemporary Syrians. Smaller reconstruction projects are completed in-country by heritage groups led by local Syrians or international groups training local populations.

The story of the archaeological response to the Syrian Civil War has laid bare what foreign communities think are important aspects of cultural heritage, what deserves to be preserved, and what does not. The international archaeological community often privileges sites such as Palmyra that are of greater interest to the "Western world" rather than the entirety of the rich cultural heritage of the country, as seen through Syria's strong history of cultural and religious diversity. The IS was able to destroy much of this history while the world focused on other matters.

As a final note, one lasting response to the last ten years, and perhaps a reason for hope for the discipline, is that more archaeologists have moved their focus away from excavation or museum research and now concentrate on the preservation of cultural heritage and studies into the black-market trade of cultural heritage materials.[13] This is a truly emerging field, with a growing number of scholars working in it perhaps to better rectify the shortcomings of the responses by the archaeological community. The future of archaeology is extending further beyond the scope of the trowel and the museum case. The violence of the Syrian Civil War and beyond have taught the archaeological community the importance of this, at great cost.

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Notes

1. Koerner, "Why ISIS is Winning the Social Media War," 16; Farwell, "Media Strategy of ISIS," 14; Brooking and Singer, "War Goes Viral," 2016; among many others.
2. Keller, "Documenting ISIL's Antiquities Trafficking."
3. Topçuoğlu and Vorderstrasse, "Small Finds, Big Values," 19.
4. Gerstenblith, *Hobby Lobby*, 22.
5. Greenland and Fabiani, "Collaborative Practices," 21; Greenland, "Pixel Politics," 22.
6. Prescott, "7 Things You Should Know," 14.
7. Dante et al., "American Schools of Oriental Research," 17.
8. Al Quntar et al., "Responding to a Cultural Heritage Crisis," 15.
9. Al Quntar et al., "Responding to a Cultural Heritage Crisis," 15.
10. Greenland and Fabiani, "Collaborative Practices," 21.
11. Flanagan, "Exiled Syrian Archaeologist," 21.
12. Benardou et al., "Cultural Heritage Infrastructures," 18; Early-Padoni, "Spatial History," 17; Harrison, "Computational Research," 20.
13. Brodie et al., "Why There Is Still an Illicit Trade," 22; Greenland et al., "Site-Level Market Model," 19; Mackenzie et al., "Trafficking Culture," 20.

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