Chapter 5

'A Massive Rejection of the Tutsi as Fellow Nationals'

Race, Violence and Independence

The 1954 UN visiting mission to Rwanda would be the last to observe that '[t]here appeared to be very little development of general or even local public opinion' in the country.[1] By the mid-1950s, the rapid changes of the previous years led to the emergence of a Hutu consciousness, or what has been dubbed the 'Hutu awakening'. This awareness originated amongst the new Hutu intelligentsia, as the first generation of Hutu seminarians came of age. Initially, at least, '[t]he masses seemed unaware of the changes taking place in their world'.[2] The emergent counterelite contrasted the democratic notions of equal rights, equal opportunities and majority rule with the systemic injustices to which Hutu were subject, and felt keenly the frustrations of Hutu powerlessness.[3]

In March 1957, the *Bahutu Manifesto* was published, signed by nine members of the Hutu counterelite, including future Rwandan president Grégoire Kayibanda. It has been described as 'probably the most important document in modern Rwandan political development', in part because 'it presented . . . the realization that there was an organized Hutu opposition'.[4] The *Bahutu Manifesto* challenged every facet of Rwandan society:

> Some people have asked whether this is a social or a racial conflict . . . In reality and in the minds of men it is both. It can, however, be narrowed down for it is primarily a question of a political monopoly held by one race, the Mututsi, and, in view of the social situation as a whole, it has become an economic and social monopoly. In view, also, of the *de facto* selection in education, this political, economic and social monopoly has also become a cultural monopoly, to the great despair of the Bahutu, who see themselves condemned forever to the role of subordinate manual workers,

> and this, worse still, after achieving an independence which they will have unwittingly helped to obtain.[5]

The *Manifesto* proposed a wide-ranging series of actions to address the situation. Its greatest impact, however, was in the 'psychological climate it created among the Hutu masses. The issues raised in the *Manifesto* became a staple news item in the local press and a prime subject of discussion on the hills.'[6] Slowly the message of the Hutu counterelite began diffusing throughout Rwanda.

According to Kuper, 'The Manifesto may seem to an external observer quite conciliatory in tone: it was menacing, nevertheless, to many Tutsi elite as a challenge to Tutsi privilege by a nascent Hutu political movement.'[7] That the Tutsi elite had already perceived this threat, and had formulated an approach to managing it, was evident from the *Mise au Point* (Statement of Views). Published, like the *Manifesto,* to influence the 1957 UN visiting mission, the focus of the *Mise au Point* 'was on preparing Rwanda for quick independence through proper utilization, preparation, and recognition of the elite'.[8] The *Mise au Point* called for further education of the elite and greater participation of the elite in the governing of the country, with the clear goal of a rapid transition to self-government.[9] But equally significant was that which was omitted from the document.[10] Nowhere was there any reference whatsoever to the deep cleavages between the Hutu and Tutsi subgroups. Instead, faced with a challenge to their previous hegemony, the Superior Council 'set up a characteristically mythical reinterpretation of the ancient socio-political structure of Rwanda'.[11] The Hamitic myth was replaced with a focus upon the cooperation between Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, and the essential feature of Rwandan society was recast as 'its homogeneity as a people and a nation'.[12] The Hutu-Tutsi-Twa distinctions were to be radically deemphasized in a bid for the elite to retain its power. Both the *Bahutu Manifesto* and the *Mise au Point* were key documents in that they 'provided the ideological basis for much of the political action which followed'.[13]

The report of the 1954 visiting mission to Ruanda-Urundi had completely failed to mention the problem of subgroup identity in Rwanda, and it was left to the Belgians to point this out in their response: 'The Visiting Mission . . . makes no reference to the deep cleavages which divide the Batutsi, the Bahutu, the Batwa and the Waswahili. Those cleavages are obvious . . . and they dominate the whole of social life.'[14] In 1957, the *Mise au Point* and *Bahutu Manifesto* awaiting the visiting mission ensured that these issues could not help but be noticed. Yet the only solution the 1957 mission recommended, with 'almost ridiculous optimism', was further education.[15] Rawson noted that the failure of the UN Trusteeship Council to realize 'the disintegrative potential of the traditional social stratification . . . was a crucial factor in the developmental process'.[16] In the same vein, the 1957 mission would fail to deal with the land tenure problem, despite its 'economic, social and ultimately political ramifications' being 'most acute'.[17] Yet at this stage, as many authors have acknowledged, the political ideals of the Hutu and Tutsi were being expressed in a moderate fashion,

and 'the way was still open for peaceful change and compromise in Rwanda'.[18] It is unfortunate that the UN Trusteeship Council, the Belgian administration and the indigenous authorities all failed to take decisive action in response to the *Mise au Point,* the *Bahutu Manifesto* or the rising tide of ferment within Rwanda. The *mwami* further inflamed the situation, adopting a partisan pro-Tutsi stance, which was particularly damaging in light of the *mwami*'s traditional role as the ultimate arbiter in Rwandan society.[19] Thus, it was in a climate of increasing tension and polarization that the first Rwandan political parties were formed.

There were four political parties that emerged in Rwanda in the late 1950s. The Parti du Mouvement et de l'Émancipation Hutu (PARMEHUTU; later the prefix Movement Démocratique Rwandais was added to form MDR-PARMEHUTU) was led by Kayibanda. It 'insisted on a genuine democratization of all existing institutions before the granting of independence'.[20] The party drew support from the Hutu counterelite, and from central and northern Rwanda.[21] Its program was developed on the basis of the *Bahutu Manifesto,* and it announced its goal as 'a true union of all the Rwandan people without any race dominating another as is the case today'.[22] L'Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse, or APROSOMA, was led by Joseph Habyarimana Gitera. APROSOMA sought 'to unite Hutu and Tutsi poor against Tutsi privilege', and primarily drew support from the southern regions of Rwanda.[23] According to Kuper, however, 'It developed in practice as a Hutu party.'[24] In opposition to PARMEHUTU and APROSOMA stood Union Nationale Rwandaise, or UNAR. Created by conservative Tutsi (although nominally led by Hutu François Rukeba), it espoused the 'traditionalist' view of Rwandan society.[25] Strongly monarchist and anti-Belgian, it advocated immediate independence.[26] Bhattacharyya commented:

> Although the Tutsi authorities constituted the hard core of the party, loyalty to UNAR was by no means confined to the Tutsis. It had a large number of adherents among the Hutus, explained partly by the feudal prestige and influence the Tutsi authorities still enjoyed among the masses and partly by the threats and pressure they used.[27]

The final political party was Rassemblement Démocratique Ruandais (RADER), a moderate Tutsi party advocating reconciliation and democracy, but which only ever attracted a marginal following.[28]

'Rwanda in 1959 . . . was a land of tensions, rumours, and troubles', wrote anthropologist Helen Codere, reflecting on her time in the country.[29] Tension increased dramatically when the Belgian administration announced on 13 January a plan for the decolonization of the Congo, in the wake of the Leopoldville riots.[30] The new policy had arisen from the report of the working group that had recently visited the Congo; a similar group visited Ruanda-Urundi in April. Intergroup frictions escalated as organizations representing each subgroup sought to convince the working group of their proposals for Rwanda's future. The Superior Council

petitioned the working group for autonomy and indigenous government.[31] Hutu leaders, by contrast, feared a rapid decolonization plan for Ruanda-Urundi would lead to independence 'before the Hutu were politically mature'.[32] Observer M.A. Munyangaju noted the atmosphere as these developments unfolded:

> The situation is very tense between Bahutu and Batutsi. A small quarrel would be enough for starting off a ranged battle. The Batutsi realize that after this, everything is finished for them and are preparing for the last chance. The Bahutu also see that a trial of strength is in the making and do not wish to give up.[33]

Tensions rose still further with the unexpected death of *Mwami* Mutara III on 25 July 1959. Almost immediately, wild rumours began circulating as to the cause of death—the partisan nature of these rumours revealing the deep cleavages in Rwandan society at this time. One rumour, apparently widely believed by Tutsi, claimed that the Belgians had poisoned the *mwami* in concert with the Hutu political movements and/or the Catholic missions.[34] Another rumour, believed by many Hutu, posited that he was killed by Tutsi conservatives because in the month prior to his death he had shown a more conciliatory attitude towards the Hutu.[35] With no clear succession plan in place, the atmosphere was extremely tense. At Mutara's funeral, a representative of the *abiru*—the *mwami*'s inner court and the guardians of tradition—announced that Jean Baptiste Ndahindurwa, son of former *mwami* Musinga and half-brother of Mutara, would reign as *Mwami* Kigeli V.[36] The Belgian administration was taken by complete surprise, but given the atmosphere of extreme tension and the large numbers of traditionally armed Rwandans at the funeral, had little choice but to agree.[37] The choice of Ndahindurwa was not necessarily a poor one, and it also resolved what could have been a protracted and difficult succession process.[38] The way in which the events unfolded, however, led to a significant loss of prestige by the Belgian administration. As the *Report of the Commission of Enquiry* noted: 'The population got the impression that the Trusteeship Authority was placed before a *fait accompli* and that it had to agree. Some thought, and rumours were not wanting, that the European authority had suffered a defeat.'[39] As Atterbury remarked, 'Both Hutu and Tutsi revolutionaries gained the impression that resort to violence could be undertaken with hope of success.'[40] Additionally, the manner in which Kigeli's ascension was organised and announced by the *abiru* meant Kigeli was inextricably associated with Tutsi conservatism. This precluded him from adopting the neutral role of supreme arbiter traditional of a *mwami* and undermined the *mwami*'s traditional role as a force for national unity.[41]

The Rwandan Revolution

Rwanda has been described as a 'simmering cauldron' during the period of August to October 1959.[42] Elections were due at the end of the year; however, the form

they would take had not been finalized.[43] The report of the working group was anticipated, with potentially enormous ramifications for the future of the country. Rumours abounded, creating 'extraordinary pressure and tension'.[44] The political parties commenced a period of frenetic activity. UNAR's approach, in particular, involved violence and a campaign of intimidation against opposition leaders and supporters.[45] By 1 November, it took only a spark to ignite the Rwandan revolution. An altercation in which a band of 'young UNAR militants' attacked a PARMEHUTU leader led to a Hutu retaliation that escalated into revolution.[46] Hutu-led violence and the burning of Tutsi huts rapidly spread. On the night of 3–4 November this violence first erupted in Ndiza, where the PARMEHUTU leader had been attacked; by the following day it had spread throughout the Gitarama district.[47] Incidents of incendiarism then spread throughout the country: to Ruhengeri and Gisenyi districts in the north on 5 and 6 November, then districts in the northeast and western central areas the following day. By 8 November the fires had spread to the extreme north of the country; the central districts of Nyanza and Kigali, where Tutsi influence was most predominant, were targeted on 9 and 10 November.[48] Only three districts, Astrida, Cyangugu and Kibungu, escaped significant uprisings.[49]

As the subsequent visiting mission report noted:

> The operations were generally carried out by a fairly similar process. Incendiaries would set off in bands of some tens of persons. Armed with matches and paraffin, which the indigenous inhabitants used in large quantities for their lamps, they pillaged the Tutsi houses they passed on their way and set fire to them. On their way they would enlist other incendiaries to follow in the procession while the first recruits, too exhausted to continue, would give up and return home. Thus day after day fires spread from hill to hill. Generally speaking the incendiaries, who were often unarmed, did not attack the inhabitants of the huts and were content with pillaging and setting fire to them.[50]

It is notable that, by and large, there were few fatalities associated with these attacks. Nevertheless, serious damage was done, as thousands and thousands of huts were pillaged and burnt, plantations plundered and livestock killed.[51] In some parts of the north, not a single Tutsi hut was left standing.[52]

The Tutsi reaction to the uprising was swift and far more organized than the largely spontaneous Hutu incendiarism.[53] UNAR leaders, working from the *mwami*'s palace, quickly organized commando units, and dispatched them to arrest or kill specific Hutu leaders.[54] According to the UN visiting mission report:

> Each commando party amounted to some hundreds of persons or more, and included a majority of Hutu, but the leaders were generally Tutsi or Twa. The group would set off on its mission with very definite instructions. In other cases, emissaries were sent out from Nyanza with verbal orders instructing them to bring back or kill certain persons . . . It seems to be an established fact, moreover, that in

> many cases a commando group set out with orders only to arrest a person, but in effect killed him, either because he resisted arrest or because some attackers had the instinct to kill.[55]

Well over a dozen prominent Hutu were killed in this way, including two leaders of APROSOMA. The president of APROSOMA, Gitera, was also targeted, but successfully protected by the Belgian administration.[56] As Lemarchand remarked, 'The Tutsi repression was not only better organized but more specifically related to political aims.'[57] UNAR appeared to be trying to eliminate the Hutu leadership, and thus its opposition.

The Belgian administration, despite anticipating the disturbance, took more than a week to bring the situation under control.[58] It was not until 14 November that quiet was fully restored. At least two hundred people were dead, and several hundred more were wounded.[59] On 10 November, at the height of the disturbances, the Belgian government had published a major policy statement on the future of Rwanda. Based upon the findings of the working group that had visited Rwanda in April and May—and whose report the Belgian government had possessed since 2 September but had not published—the statement announced a number of 'radical political and administrative reforms in the Territory'.[60] The guiding principle of the reforms was that '[t]he Belgian Government would first establish . . . a system of government . . . which would be given a progressive measure of autonomy subject to the general control of Belgium'.[61] To this end, the previous structure of subchiefdoms, chiefdoms and councils would be completely overhauled. Communes were to be created, with councillors for each commune to be elected through universal male suffrage.[62] Councillors would then elect a burgomaster. A new state council would be elected by the commune councils, which together with the *mwami* would progressively be granted legislative powers.[63] The *mwami* himself, however, while remaining the constitutional head of state, would largely become a figurehead. Despite the failure of their announcement to calm the violence and tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi, the Belgian administration moved extraordinarily quickly to implement the policy changes.[64]

The uprising of November 1959 has commonly been called a revolution, yet as Wagoner has noted, 'nothing was really overthrown', 'there was no violent upheaval of political institutions . . . no attacks were directed against the *Mwami's* palace or against Administration centres or officials'.[65] According to Wagoner, what was truly revolutionary was 'the changes in thought and attitude. Suddenly the Hutu in the hills learned that if he banded together he would find the courage to stand against his Tutsi overlord . . . Suddenly he was proud to be Hutu, to be short and sturdy instead of long and spindly.'[66] Given that the Hutu remained relatively powerless at this stage, perhaps what was more important was the similar change in attitude in the Belgian administration. In the course of the uprising, hundreds of Tutsi chiefs and subchiefs had fled, been killed, been forced to resign due to Hutu

opposition or had been involved in the Tutsi counterattacks and subsequently arrested or removed from office.[67] The Belgian administration filled these vacant posts predominantly with Hutu. Thus, by 1 March the number of Hutu chiefs went from 0 to 22, out of a total of 45 chiefdoms, and the number of Hutu sub-chiefs rose from 10 to 297, out of a total of 531.[68] Furthermore, in the wake of the violence, on 5 December Belgium appointed Colonel Logiest as the 'Special Civilian Resident', to ensure the maintenance of peace and order and implement the major policy changes. Colonel Logiest had 'a known leaning toward the Hutu cause', and expressed this very early in his residency:[69]

> What is our goal? It is to accelerate the politicization of Rwanda . . . Not only do we want elections but we want everybody to be aware of this. People must go to the polls in full freedom and in full political awareness. Thus we must undertake an action in favour of the Hutu, who live in a state of ignorance and under oppressive influences. By virtue of the situation we are obliged to take sides. We cannot stay neutral.[70]

Rawson has suggested that 'given the circumstances, the Administration was almost forced into a position prejudicial to the Batutsi, favouring the Bahutu'; others have posited that the administration made a more active choice to take a pro-Hutu stance at this stage.[71] Either way, as Wagoner has commented, four months after the revolution, it 'had suddenly become a smashing Hutu success'.[72]

The atmosphere remained charged in the wake of the revolution in Rwanda. Sporadic outbreaks of violence destabilized the nation throughout 1960. In March Hutu burnt Tutsi huts in Gisenyi (northwest) and Biumba (northern central), while in April similar incidents occurred in Astrida in the south.[73] Between 16 and 18 May, more than five hundred huts were set alight in the Budaha region; a local incident in Gikongoro escalated to result in over one thousand huts being burnt in the area in early June.[74] Violence was reported in Kigali in June, Gisenyi and Rubengera in July and August. In October, the Shangugu district 'went up in flame[s]'.[75] The northwest of Rwanda was subject to the harshest violence—despite its small Tutsi population, its history of relatively recent Tutsi infiltration with colonial assistance had left strong anti-Tutsi sentiments.

Such violence contributed to the growing refugee problem in Rwanda. Immediately following the November uprising, the administration reported around seven thousand refugees, with the vast majority being from Ruhengeri in the northwest. The authorities attempted to resettle some in their original districts, while others were relocated to new areas.[76] Yet each wave of violence increased the refugee problem and by 19 April, the Belgian administration reported some twenty-two thousand refugees. Lemarchand, however, has noted:

> True, a sizeable number of refugees left their homelands to escape the violence unleashed by the November riots, but the overwhelming majority began their exodus

> well after the rioting, when they suddenly found themselves confronted with Hutu chiefs and subchiefs, all appointed by the administration . . . the sheer arbitrariness, indeed the ruthlessness, with which many of these chiefs used their authority resulted in a further exodus of Tutsi families.[77]

The Belgian administration made concerted efforts to provide care for and resettle the refugees. It was hampered, however, by UNAR leaders continually politicizing the refugees' problems, and UNAR's hostile attitude towards the administration.[78] The administration reported to the visiting mission that 'it was absolutely certain that if the Tutsi leaders and the *Mwami* changed their attitude the great majority of refugee cases would be closed without delay'.[79] As Lemarchand has noted, however, 'Before long the refugees were converted into ardent supporters of UNAR.'[80] During 1960, some 14,500 of the Rwandan refugees sought asylum outside the country.[81] But this was only a fraction of the numbers that would follow.

Accompanying the violence during this period was even further polarization of the cleavages along racial lines.[82] UNAR's campaign specifically targeted Tutsi with a progressive agenda, undermining the possibility of more unifying platforms gaining currency.[83] In the wake of the revolution, there was also an 'intense politicization of the racial cleavages by PARMEHUTU'.[84] The Hamitic hypothesis was reinterpreted, and, according to Lemarchand: 'The Tutsi are [now] seen as the Hamitic foreigners who imposed their rule on the unsuspecting Bantu populations by cunning and cruelty, using their cows and beautiful women to bait the Hutu into submission.'[85] Lemarchand has posited that, while the revolution was initially motivated by the egalitarian notions of progressive Hutu, 'only through the exploitation of ethnic cleavages, that is through the politicization of clientship, could they hope to rally the support of the peasantry'.[86] According to Bhattacharyya, these processes were inexorably leading to 'a massive rejection of the Tutsis as fellow nationals' by Hutu.[87] Indeed, the first indication of this can be found in the immediate aftermath of the revolution. As the peace was restored, future Rwandan president Kayibanda published a statement in late November 1959 calling for nothing less than the segregation of Hutu and Tutsi into separate living zones.[88]

The UN visiting mission that arrived in Rwanda in March 1960 did little to aid the situation. Relations between the UN and the Belgian administration were strained, as each perceived a different route to Rwandan independence. The UN sought 'national reconciliation' in Rwanda, a general amnesty 'with regard to the events of November since it is convinced that without them national reconciliation will be difficult' and 'reintegrating the UNAR leaders into the normal political life of the country'.[89] The administration countered that the idea of an amnesty was itself not politically neutral, noting that the Tutsi had gone far beyond the Hutu in the scope of their crimes, which included assassination, torture and imprisonment.[90] Moreover, given the UNAR leadership's involvement in such crimes:

> In the present circumstances, there was reason to fear that an amnesty might be construed as an endorsement of assassinations and violence as accepted political tactics. The political ideas of the UNAR were not involved . . . If certain persons had sought refuge outside the country it was not because of their political opinions but as a result of ordinary offences under the general law.[91]

The visiting mission also examined the issue of land tenure, and made numerous other recommendations. But as Rawson observed, 'Its observations came too late to be useful in changing the political situation.'[92]

Despite the atmosphere of tension and intermittent violence, the administration proceeded with the communal elections set for June 1960. The political scene had changed considerably since the previous November. PARMEHUTU, APROSOMA and RADER adopted a '*Front Commun*' in late April, resolving to cooperate and work together towards democratization and to support the Belgian administration.[93] UNAR was increasingly isolated. Many of its leaders were imprisoned or in exile and it had lost significant political power with the replacement of many of the Tutsi chiefs and subchiefs with Hutu. The results of the elections propelled PARMEHUTU to power, with some 75 per cent of the vote.[94] The subsequent transfer of power to Hutu leaders was fraught with difficulties, however. Rather than a transition to a truly democratic local government, Lemarchand has dubbed the process as one of 'the transference of political clientelism to the Hutu stratum.'[95] First RADER, then APROSOMA deserted the *Front Commun,* and by November 1960 had formed a new *Front Commun* with UNAR. They jointly declared:

> The dictatorial regime PARMEHUTU that we are living under and we deplore, is a power held by a political party that is racial, racist and antidemocratic, finding pleasure in deliberately crushing all the other parties by methods either of corruption or intimidation. Here the bad (the Tutsi feudality) is replaced by a worse (the PARMEHUTU dictatorship).[96]

Meanwhile, groups of Tutsi refugees in the border zones of Uganda and the Congo—who came to be known as *inyenzi* (cockroaches)—instigated cross-border raids into a number of Rwandan communes. This terrorism 'at first strengthened caste solidarity among the Hutu, but in time the sheer arbitrariness of retaliative measures caused considerable disaffection among the Hutu peasantry'.[97] The power wielding of the burgomasters also led to growing popular resentment.[98] Despite these factors, the administration continued to strengthen the Hutu position of power still further. A new provisional council and provisional government were established, headed by Kayibanda and led by a strong majority of PARMEHUTU ministers.[99] *Mwami* Kigeli, who had left the country in July when it was apparent the communal elections were not going well, was prevented from returning by the administration.[100] The *mwami* and UNAR petitioned the UN repeatedly, where

they found a sympathetic General Assembly. On 20 December 1960, the General Assembly thus recommended that legislative elections planned for 15 January be postponed, to a date to be determined by a UN commission that would visit Ruanda-Urundi in late January; that an amnesty be granted; and that further work be undertaken towards 'national harmony'. PARMEHUTU responded furiously, concerned that such actions would advantage their opponents.[101] It was in this context that the Gitarama coup d'état occurred.

The Belgian government had reluctantly agreed to the UN's recommendation to delay legislative elections; however, when the Ostend conference in early January—recommended by the UN as an attempt towards national reconciliation—failed to produce a result, the administration proceeded to grant internal autonomy to the provisional government on 25 January, much to the UN's chagrin.[102] As Bhattacharyya has noted, 'The Hutu parties received the hint.'[103] Three days later, on the same day that the UN commission arrived in Usumbura (Burundi), the Rwandan interior minister called all the burgomasters and communal councillors to a meeting at Gitarama. There, in front of a crowd of thousands of people, Rwanda was pronounced a republic, a president and legislative assembly were elected, and Prime Minister Grégoire Kayibanda was charged with the responsibility of forming a government.[104] Belgium promptly recognized the powers of the Kayibanda government.[105] The United Nations was incensed, despite strenuous Belgian denials of any foreknowledge or complicity in the coup.[106] Nevertheless, a stern General Assembly resolution in April 1961 'warned Belgium that it alone was responsible for the administration of the Territory', recommended legislative elections be held in August with United Nations surveillance, demanded a referendum on the institution of the monarchy and repeated its demands for an amnesty.[107]

Following the coup, PARMEHUTU effectively took control of running the nation. Belgian administrators remained in the background, managing accounts, preserving law and order, and advising Hutu ministers.[108] Belgium also sought to follow at least some of the UN recommendations, including the enactment of a general amnesty for the period from 1 October 1959 to 1 April 1960, with the exception of certain very serious crimes.[109] The legislative elections were set for 25 September, and had two components. Not only would the forty-four seats of the legislative assembly be elected, but it would simultaneously be a referendum on the future of the monarchy as an institution, and the person of Kigeli V as the *mwami*.

The two months prior to the elections were characterized by repeated outbreaks of violence, incendiarism and a large rise in the number of refugees. In Butare (southwest of Kigali) alone, forty-four people were killed, twenty-three hundred huts were burnt and twenty-two thousand refugees wandered.[110] In Kibungo (in the southeast), an attempt was made on the life of a burgomaster, a PARMEHUTU official was assassinated, sixty-seven people were killed in the violence and a further eight thousand became refugees.[111] Belgian security forces struggled to prevent the situation from spiralling out of control. As the UN reported:

> Serious disturbances took place in several regions of the country, including the Districts of Myanza, Astrida, Gitarama, and Kiungu and some communes in Kigali and Kibuye. As a result of the incidents there, tens of thousands of new disaster victims and refugees had to leave their homes and seek refuge.[112]

Certainly both sides initiated and participated in the violence.[113] UN Commissioner Gassou clearly believed, although only implicitly stated to the General Assembly, that most of the violence was instigated by PARMEHUTU cadres.[114] He noted that:

> Curiously enough, the victims were nearly always active or passive supporters of the opposition parties, both Bahutu and Batusti . . . the areas affected were always ones in which the opposition appeared to have great influence . . . the final result of the disorders was always the violent elimination of the opposition in the areas concerned.[115]

Gassou also noted the conflict apparent in the role of the burgomasters as both authorities responsible for the maintenance of law and order, and members of political parties campaigning for electoral victory. By contrast, Colonel Logiest believed 'that it was the extremists of the Opposition who stood to benefit by provoking disturbances'.[116] According to Logiest, it was the opposition 'who always struck the sparks which provoked the mass reaction of the Hutu, a violent and blundering reaction which it was then impossible to control'.[117] The violence did not cease until 18 September, a week prior to the elections.

There was an overwhelming turnout of 95 per cent of registered voters for the election. PARMEHUTU received 77.7 per cent of the votes, UNAR 16.8 per cent, APROSOMA 3.5 per cent and RADER less than 1 per cent. This led to PARMEHUTU dominating the legislative assembly with thirty-five of the forty-four seats, UNAR receiving seven and APROSOMA two.[118] Atterbury commented upon the results: 'The Legislative Assembly thus had an ethnic composition of 84% Hutu and 16% Tutsi—corresponding closely to the proportion of Hutu and of Tutsi in the population.'[119] About 80 per cent of voters also declared a preference for the abolition of the monarchy. After much debate and vacillation, the United Nations eventually agreed to accept the results of the elections as free and fair. The final preparations for independence commenced.

Following the elections, Rwanda continued to be beset by sporadic violence and a large refugee problem. If the preelection violence had been instigated by both PARMEHUTU and opposition forces, the preindependence violence consisted largely of bands of Tutsi *inyenzi* conducting cross-border raids from bases in neighbouring countries. According to Rwandan government sources, there were no fewer than twenty-seven incidences of such violence between October 1961 and May 1962.[120] There were many acts of murder (including of Belgians), huts being set alight and pillage. Biumba in northern Rwanda was particularly targeted,

and attackers were often armed with machine guns or revolvers, as well as more traditional weapons. Biumba was also the location of a particularly harsh reprisal by the authorities, when following two raids there was a massacre of local Tutsi, further burning of huts and considerable pillage.[121] The highest estimates put the death toll at between one and two thousand.[122] The UN reported, 'The situation . . . appeared alarming to all experienced observers.'[123] Commissioner Rahnema, speaking to the UN in January 1962, went even further, accusing PARMEHUTU of 'adopting a social policy apparently designed to eliminate the opposition and the Tutsi minority'.[124] In Rwandan society he saw 'the symptoms of an explosive situation', and believed the 'social and political tension' there 'may result either in the gradual extermination of the majority of the Tutsi population, or it may at any moment degenerate into violence and, possibly, civil war'.[125]

The refugee situation was particularly problematic, difficult to quantify let alone resolve. Partially, this was due to the fluid nature of the problem. By mid-1961, a UN report noted, 'the great majority' of refugees from the November 1959 revolution and subsequent violence that continued into October 1960 had returned to their native districts and 'been reintegrated', or had resettled within Rwanda.[126] For those who had left Rwanda, the largest numbers were in the Congo and Uganda, but it was 'very difficult to obtain exact figures'.[127] The disturbances in August and September 1961, prior to the legislative elections, had created 'tens of thousands' of new refugees.[128] In November 1961, it was estimated that there were 40,000 refugees spread throughout Rwanda, while another 32,500 had escaped to Burundi.[129] A final commission had been sent to Ruanda-Urundi in early 1962, in part to address the refugee problem. Nevertheless, at independence approximately 100,000 Rwandan refugees were scattered between Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and the Congo.[130] The inability of either Belgium or the United Nations to manage the violence of decolonization that created these refugees, or to adequately resolve the refugee problem, left a legacy that would play a key role in leading to Rwanda's genocide.

The inability to resolve the refugee problem, however, did not stop the preparations for independence. Finally, after a maze of administrative matters and technicalities were sorted out, and the UN's continual push for a Rwanda-Burundi federation was quashed, on 1 July 1962 the Republic of Rwanda achieved independence.

Assessing the Risk of Genocide

It is at this juncture that the Tutsi minority can, for the first time, be properly described as an 'outgroup'. For the first time, Tutsi were now a relatively powerless minority within Rwanda. Furthermore, as a result of the influence of the Hamitic

hypothesis, they were perceived as foreigners 'outside the universe of obligation of the dominant group'.[131] Hutu-Tutsi relations had become highly politicized during the decolonization process, with lasting consequences for the Tutsi position within the new nation. The first precondition for genocide was thus met, marking Rwanda as a society at risk of massive violence. And, already, this risk had been recognized. UN Commissioner Rahnema was perhaps the first expert observer to recognize the potential for the Tutsi to be targeted in genocidal violence. His warning of the risk of the 'extermination of the majority of the Tutsi population' seems eerily prescient from a postgenocide perspective.[132]

Yet the position of the Tutsi at the time of independence was far from immediately dire. In examining the development of the preconditions for genocide in Rwanda, it is important to distinguish between pre- and postindependence violence. Prior to independence, the Tutsi were far less vulnerable than subsequently. The violence that occurred during the decolonization process had a significant element of reciprocity. Both Hutu and Tutsi instigated attacks at political and communal levels, and both groups also had sufficient capacity to coordinate reprisals in response to the other's attacks. Moreover, both groups were aware of the Belgian presence in Rwanda, and UN oversight, in conducting their actions. In the immediate wake of independence, it is significant that the Tutsi minority retained at least some political voice. Under agreements reached with the United Nations, UNAR had secured two ministerial posts in the government and some additional senior postings, which along with its seven elected seats in the legislative assembly ensured a viable opposition.[133] As Lemarchand has noted:

> What is more, UNAR was allowed to set up its own local headquarters (in Kigali), to print its own newspaper (*Unité*), and to criticize the government at will. Clearly, to use 'racial dictatorship' to describe this state of affairs [as the March 1961 report of the UN commission had] would be patently inaccurate.[134]

Whilst only the first precondition for genocide emerged directly from the decolonization process in Rwanda, almost all of the tactics of the genocidal regime of the 1990s—and most of the ideological bases upon which it would be conducted—were powerfully foreshadowed in this earlier period. At the rhetorical level alone, the similarity is profound. Thus, as UNAR leader Rukeba roared in 1959, 'He who does not belong to this party will be regarded as the people's enemy, the Mwami's enemy, Rwanda's enemy', so too would Hutu extremists in the 1990s equate support for anyone other than themselves with supporting Rwanda's enemies.[135] The *mwami* had responded to the demands of the Hutu counterelite by labelling them 'a bad tree' with 'evil fruits of discord' to be 'cut, uprooted, and burned'.[136] In the 1994 genocide, killing Tutsi would be 'tree felling' and 'bush clearing', and the killing of children 'pulling out the roots of the bad weeds'.[137] The rhetoric is a reflection of broader similarities. Rwanda's first attempt at

democratization, during decolonization, was marred by the intimidation of political opponents, violent election campaigns, assassinations of political leaders and vicious attacks upon political groups with a progressive agenda. Exactly the same can be said of the democratization process in the early 1990s. The twin themes of using violence to achieve political goals, and the desperate struggles of political groups for outright victory rather than an accommodating solution, first emerged during this period. Similarly, the reinterpretation of the Hamitic hypothesis by PARMEHUTU, and the racial paradigm within which subgroup divisions were perceived in the late 1950s, foreshadowed the propaganda of the 1990s. In each period, the extensive use of rumour featured markedly.

Perhaps most importantly, it was during Rwanda's decolonization that the political powers first perceived the impotence of international forces. Arguably, Belgium's perceived lack of control over the succession of *Mwami* Kigeli V contributed to the violence later in 1959. Belgium's response to the violence—granting Hutu more power within the following four months than they had been able to access through years of peaceable campaigning—can be viewed as a realistic response to a changing political climate, but also as rewarding violent, rather than peaceful, methods. The inability of either Belgian forces or the United Nations to arrest the ongoing intergroup violence set a precedent for violent transition within the society, which had never previously existed on such a scale. Perhaps most significant, however, was the impact of the United Nations' sustained push for an amnesty for the November revolution. That the United Nations sought amnesty for all of the crimes committed during the course of the revolution, including very serious crimes, and that it eventually obtained amnesty for all but the most serious, cannot be underestimated. Here was the international 'supreme arbiter' advocating impunity, and reintegration into the political scene, for those who had sought to achieve political goals through the most violent means. When Hutu extremists thus insisted in January 1994 that it would be perfectly possible to engage in massive violence despite the presence of a United Nations peacekeeping force, they could make this statement not only in the knowledge of a legacy of ineffective peacekeeping forces worldwide, but of the legacy of impunity left by the United Nations in their own country.[138]

The first risk factor for genocide in Rwanda—the existence of an 'outgroup'—resulted directly from the Belgian colonialist experience. Belgian colonialism also left Rwanda very vulnerable to the development of what many models consider the second precondition of genocide—that of 'internal strife'. Belgium's colonial legacy had bequeathed Rwanda with a massive refugee problem, both within the country and around its borders; an extremely limited ability for self-defence; a severe lack of infrastructure essential for rapid economic development; and the lack of an elite with the appropriate education and experience for governing the nation. In many respects, therefore, the relative peace in the immediate aftermath of Rwandan independence was surprising.

Rwanda at Independence

On 1 July 1962 the Republic of Rwanda celebrated its official independence. Yet it was beset with grave challenges from almost the first day. Two *inyenzi* incursions into Rwanda on 4 and 17 July—challenging the nation as it drew its very first breath—were unsuccessful, as the authorities had received advance intelligence warning of both.[139] Following these attacks, the situation settled, and Rwanda began the process of nation building. A number of development projects were commenced in conjunction with other nations, Rwanda sought foreign aid from numerous sources and an austerity campaign began, which included the raising of taxes.[140] A program commenced to 'democratize' education, which meant radically altering the ethnic composition of the student body to more accurately reflect that of the nation.[141] The number of students and the diversity of education available also increased rapidly. The problems of land tenure had been addressed in the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, in which Article VI proclaimed: 'Private property is inviolable. Private property cannot be expropriated if it is not for public use and in return for fair and predetermined compensation in accordance with the law.'[142] A final redistribution of cattle and land erased the last remnants of the feudal system, although not without some discord.[143] The maintenance of anti-erosion measures and coffee cultivation suffered, however, as the Belgians were no longer present to enforce these unpopular but vital measures.[144] Coffee cultivation, as Rwanda's largest export product, was essential to provide the nation with cash income. Overall, however, and despite the dire predictions of some foreign officials and reporters, the first year and a half of Rwandan independence was surprisingly calm, and surprisingly successful.

The relative peace in the immediate aftermath of Rwanda's independence was not indicative of UNAR and/or Tutsi acceptance of the new situation, but rather representative of UNAR's disorganization and factionalism.[145] A UNAR 'government in exile' underwent multiple shake-ups, and was further paralysed by a lack of fixed residence, the geographical isolation of UNAR leaders in different refugee communities and controversy over funds.[146] The *inyenzi,* while led by UNAR leaders, were never tightly organized or managed and their power to act was dependent upon their situation as refugees. Following Rwandan independence, in Uganda and Tanganyika government efforts were made to curb the *inyenzi*.[147] In the Congo, refugees became enmeshed in the ongoing civil war there, and concerns over local conditions precluded a focus upon *inyenzi* activity.[148] In Burundi, by contrast, there was some sympathy for the refugee cause. The forty-five thousand refugees were mostly located in close proximity to the Rwandan border, and administrative control was poor.[149] UNAR propaganda and activity encouraged refugees to join the *inyenzi,* although many were already predisposed to the counterrevolutionary platform.[150] As Lemarchand has noted, 'In no other country were conditions so eminently favourable to the conduct of counter-revolutionary activities.'[151] Thus,

it was from Burundi that the *inyenzi* would launch its most successful attack on Rwanda. Rwanda's risk of genocide was about to rise sharply.

The Bugesera Invasion and December 1963–January 1964 Massacres

There are conflicting reports as to the precipitants for the Bugesera invasion. The August 1963 communal elections may have inflamed the situation. In these first elections since independence, tactics such as intimidation of UNAR candidates resumed, and there were several killings.[152] UNAR responded by boycotting the elections, which only had the effect of PARMEHUTU receiving 98 per cent of the votes cast and almost total governmental power.[153] At the same time, UNAR had obtained funding from various sources, and had acquired some weaponry. Rukeba had been able to facilitate at least some organization and coordination amongst the *inyenzi*.[154]

On the night of 20 December, a major *inyenzi* attack was launched. Around three hundred refugees, armed 'with bows, arrows and home-made rifles', crossed the border from Burundi into Rwanda at Nemba, and moved into the Bugesera region.[155] They attacked and surprised a small Rwandan military camp, killing four soldiers and seizing two jeeps, some light arms and ammunition.[156] En route to Kigali, they next stopped at a Tutsi refugee camp in Nyamata, where they were reinforced by hundreds of local Tutsi.[157] It was not until the group—now numbering well over one thousand—was within a dozen miles of Kigali that it met any resistance. At the Kanzenze Bridge on the Nyabarongo River, they encountered a company of the Rwandan National Guard, and a brief battle ensued.[158] The company, under the command of a Belgian military advisor, easily repelled the invaders, and several hundred Tutsi were killed.[159] The remainder 'withdrew in full flight', and some were pursued by the National Guard all the way back to the border.[160] Accompanying this main invasion were a series of raids from other refugee centres. On 21 and 22 December a number of small-scale raids launched from the Congo were repelled by the army; on 25 December Ugandan authorities intercepted another group of *inyenzi* before they could reach the Rwandan border; a second group from Uganda, about six hundred men, managed to cross the border on 27 December but were quickly routed by the now fully mobilized Rwandan army.[161]

The reaction of the Kayibanda government was one of shock and panic. The National Guard was put on full alert, but as an army of only one thousand men, with only basic equipment and not even enough trucks to mobilize in one effort or enough radios to supply each platoon, there was little confidence in the security that the army could provide.[162] Three further actions were thus taken in response to the invasion. First, telegrams were sent to the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. As Wagoner noted, however, 'Rwanda soon learned

that despite all the ideals written into charters and protocols, if her borders were to be secure she would have to secure them herself.'[163] Second, the government sought to neutralize the threat that could be posed by Tutsi leaders within the country—potential collaborators with the external forces. A document had been found on the body of one of the invaders listing the names of Tutsi leaders and a plan for their role as officials in a new Tutsi-led government, supposedly to be installed on Christmas Day.[164] These leaders were quickly arrested, along with other prominent Tutsi. Twenty-three were summarily executed on 23 December, including leading members of UNAR and RADER; others were released after being severely beaten.[165]

But it was the third action taken by the government in response to the invasion that would have the most devastating effect. Government officials were dispatched to each prefecture to organize 'civilian defence forces' to aid the army.[166] As Lemarchand has noted:

> These arrangements were made within a few hours, in an atmosphere of panic, and therefore with little attention to procedural details or co-ordination. Meanwhile, Kigali Radio repeatedly beamed emergency warnings, asking the population to be 'constantly on the alert' for Tutsi terrorists. In this atmosphere of intense fear, saturated with rumour and suspicion, the worst was bound to happen.[167]

'The worst' began in the prefecture of Gikongoro on 23 December. In this area, with a high Tutsi population and encompassing Nyanza—the former seat of Tutsi domination—rumours circulated that Kigali had fallen, the *mwami* had been returned to power and further *inyenzi* attacks were imminent.[168] The prefect of Gikongoro responded to the government call for self-defence with a plan of attack: 'We are expected to defend ourselves. The only way to go about it is to paralyse the Tutsi. How? They must be killed.'[169] According to Lemarchand: 'This was the signal for the slaughter. Armed with clubs, pangas [a long knife used for cutting grass] and spears, the Hutu methodically began to exterminate all Tutsi in sight—men, women and children.'[170]

The violence was brutal, and the widespread use of traditional arms and farming implements led to incidents of shocking atrocities. Gikongoro was the centre of the massacres, but the violence quickly spread to other areas. It is generally accepted, however, that there was no central organization to these events.[171] Rather, 'Panic combined with local circumstances to produce mass slaughter.'[172] Indeed, fear appears to have been the primary motivator for the attacks. European observers in the nation during December 1963 and January 1964 reported an atmosphere of 'near panic throughout Rwanda'.[173] The report of the United Nations commission that investigated the massacres concluded that they were a result of Hutu 'fear and panic' following the *inyenzi* incursion.[174] Even in Kibungo prefecture, the fear was palpable. There, the Catholic White Fathers and communal leaders worked together to maintain some sense of calm, and they successfully

prevented the outbreak of violence.[175] Nevertheless, as the East African specialist Aaron Segal concluded, 'The degree of fear was such that the White Fathers were convinced that the burning of a single Tutsi hut would have prompted the entire Tutsi population of the prefecture to take refuge.'[176]

Lemarchand has commented that '[p]opular participation in violence created a kind of collective catharsis through which years of pent-up hatred suddenly seemed to find an outlet'.[177] Without central organization, however, the massacres abated relatively quickly, and had ceased by mid-January.[178] Estimates of the numbers killed vary widely. Both Lemarchand and Segal, in Rwanda in early 1964, estimated between 10,000 and 14,000 were killed, including some Hutu.[179] The Rwandan government's estimate of 870 casualties is described by Lemarchand as 'patently inaccurate'.[180] The United Nations estimate of casualties between 1,000 and 3,000 was significantly lower than that of both Lemarchand and Segal, although the difficulty of obtaining an accurate estimate was emphasized in the report in question.[181] Aside from a few sensationalist media reports in the immediate wake of the violence, there was no suggestion that this was genocide. Indeed, UN Commissioner Max Dorsinville, in Rwanda both as the massacres unfolded in late December to early January and again in February after their cessation, reported, 'There is no question of a systematic elimination or extermination of the Batutsi, or of what some sources have hastened to call genocide.'[182] Once the violence had ceased, it did not recommence, despite further *inyenzi* raids in late January and early February.[183] And whilst a number of Tutsi leaders were killed, nearly half of Rwanda's administration continued to be staffed by Tutsi, and they continued to form the majority of teachers at secondary schools.[184] Nevertheless, in the wake of the violence thousands more Tutsi chose to leave Rwanda as refugees. Estimates of Rwandan refugees in 1964 put over 200,000 in Burundi, 78,000 in Uganda, 36,000 in Tanzania and 22,000 in the Congo—a total of over 336,000.[185]

Both the international and internal responses to the massacres failed to mete out any serious consequences to those involved in the violence. The United Nations had been apprised of the situation very quickly, and a commissioner was despatched to investigate. Commissioner Dorsinville refrained from any harsh criticism of the Rwandan government or even from demanding the cessation of the violence, accepting the 'formal assurances' given by Kayibanda on 31 December that 'the local authorities had been instructed to do their utmost to avoid abuses and calm the population', and further assurances that 'those responsible for these excesses will be ruthlessly punished'.[186] Internationally, the response was delayed substantially by the lack of media in Rwanda, and the events were not widely reported until after their cessation. Of the numerous countries providing aid to Rwanda, only the Swiss demanded an investigation into the massacres, and Burundi was the only nation to officially protest the events.[187] Internally, the role of the government in stopping the violence remains unclear. At least one source reported that, contrary to the UN report, orders to stop the killing were not given until

12 January.[188] The atmosphere of fear of an *inyenzi* takeover must be taken into consideration, however. Nevertheless, Kayibanda's reaction to the first commission of enquiry into the events revealed a deep ambivalence. When this commission, set up at the request of the Swiss government, found two government ministers and a number of prefects, burgomasters and other local officials to be incriminated in the events, Kayibanda rejected its findings and ordered a second investigation.[189] The second investigation, not surprisingly, implicated far fewer individuals, most of whom received only light prison sentences. The massacres also left the UNAR leadership heavily decimated, and the UNAR newspaper *Unité* was no longer published. The UN report into the events described them as resulting 'in the silencing of the opposition'.[190] Yet Rwanda's survival in the face of invasion also served to become a source of national solidarity and pride for the Hutu majority. The crisis brought a sense of cohesion to the Kayibanda government that had not previously existed, and a resurgence of popular support.[191]

The December 1963–January 1964 Massacres and the Temporal Model

The temporal model provides a useful framework through which to analyse the Bugesera invasion and the subsequent outbreak of massacres. The *inyenzi* incursion, as an invasion attempt, simultaneously fulfilled the preconditions of 'internal strife' and 'the perception of the outgroup as posing an existential threat to the dominant power'. The invasion was clearly viewed by the Kayibanda government as posing a real threat to its survival, triggering the risk escalation process. The immediacy and severity of this threat provoked a response that was also both immediate and severe. While in international terms a massacre with a death toll of three thousand or even ten thousand may not be regarded as especially grave, it must be emphasized that in Rwanda this was an unprecedented level of violence. Both the *inyenzi* attacks in the lead-up to Rwandan independence and those immediately after independence had not provoked such a response, as they were not perceived as posing an existential threat to the nation. Prior to independence the presence of Belgium and the oversight of the United Nations offered a form of protection; the two attacks following independence were easily repelled, despite Rwanda's extreme vulnerability. Similarly, *inyenzi* attacks in late January and early February 1964—in the immediate wake of the massacres—were also relatively insignificant, thereby failing to offer sufficient threat to provoke further violence.[192]

The *inyenzi* attacks singularly met the precondition of 'internal strife' and the association of the outgroup with an existential threat to the nation, sufficient to provoke the massacres. Very quickly after the incursion, however, it began to be apparent that the threat was not an ongoing one. As this threat was perceived as having been overcome, therefore, the preconditions of internal strife and the

perception of the Tutsi as posing an existential threat to the nation were no longer operable. There was effectively a process of risk regression—a retreat on the continuum leading to genocide. Rwanda returned to a position of only meeting the precondition of the existence of an 'outgroup'. This was reflected in the climate of relative tolerance and moderation that quickly returned to the nation. By mid-1964 the Kayibanda government was again expressing its desires for peace and tolerance: 'Today more than ever, after the hard lesson inflicted on the terrorists, Rwanda wants to be a tolerant and peaceful nation. This is the will of all the people, and this is the will of all its leaders.'[193] While admittedly this tract was prepared for an international audience, the government clearly differentiated between the *petits* Tutsi refugees, whom they explicitly stated were not responsible for the 'terrorist attack', and the 'great feudal criminals' who were.[194] The Tutsi, while outsiders, were not homogenized and vilified as a group. Furthermore, there was no ongoing violence or persecution of Tutsi within Rwanda. Nevertheless, the massacres did result in an increased perception of the Tutsi as an 'outgroup'. In particular, while Tutsi continued in numerous administrative roles, the massacres led to the almost complete absence of Tutsi from political participation in the nation, a situation that would remain for the duration of Kayibanda's presidency.

There were two further outcomes of the massacres that are significant with respect to the subsequent genocide. Once again, the concept of impunity featured prominently in the wake of the massacres. The United Nations had not been heavily critical of the Kayibanda government during the massacres, nor did it insist upon the perpetrators being brought to justice in their wake. International development aid to Rwanda continued uninterrupted, even following Kayibanda's decision to disregard the findings of the first commission of enquiry. No one appeared to mind that the second was a whitewash. Indeed, beyond impunity, the massacres actually had a very positive outcome for Kayibanda's regime. Hutu pride and solidarity increased, and the government experienced a resurgence in popular support. For the second time in five years, anti-Tutsi violence had led to a desired political outcome.

Finally, it is worth examining why the massacres did not escalate into a genocide. In Rwanda in 1964, there was a very powerful restraint in operation. That is, the Kayibanda government simply did not have anything like the entrenched power required for such a course of action. With a poorly equipped army of just one thousand men, it had only halted a disorderly invasion of lightly armed refugees less than twenty kilometres from its capital. In the absence of any conceivable means to initiate a genocide, such a course of action could not even be contemplated. While there is some evidence of 'destructive communication', a further precondition for genocide, it was not at a level sufficient to meet the precondition. Chiefly, such communication consisted of panicky Kigali Radio reports of the threat of *inyenzi* attacks, and wild rumours that circulated throughout the country.

All Tutsi were not linked with the *inyenzi* in these communications, and Tutsi were not dehumanized. Yet it is interesting to note that when the first reports of the massacres reached the Western world, they were freely described as genocide. With limited and wildly inaccurate information, press reports did not hesitate to allege that a genocide was underway. Vatican Radio, with little information, even accused Rwanda in February 1964 of 'the most terrible and systematic genocide since the genocide of the Jews by Hitler'.[195] While such reports were grossly inaccurate, as later confirmed by the United Nations commission investigating the massacres, that they were made at all is still of significance. Rwanda's potential for genocide was widely and easily recognizable.

The parallels between the Hamidian massacres in Ottoman Armenia and the 1963–64 massacres of Tutsi offer significant insight into how risk of genocide develops over time. While the massacres were very different in severity, level of central organization and duration, in both cases there is strong evidence of a cyclic process of escalation and retreat underway. The process of risk escalation prior to the Armenian massacres was a long one; in Rwanda it was much more rapid, although the colonial legacy that left Rwanda extremely vulnerable to such a process has already been noted. In each instance, a triggering event led to the outgroup being closely associated with an existential threat to the ruling powers; in each instance, this provoked violent massacres of the outgroup in response. In each case, however, there were powerful constraints impinging on any possible further escalation of the violence. The Ottoman government was ever mindful of the threat of European intervention; the Rwandan government lacked the power even to contemplate more systematic violence. In both cases, therefore, there was a process of retreat following the massacres. In Rwanda in particular, this retreat to a more accommodating approach is quite marked. This highlights that the processes that lead to genocide are not necessarily linear, but rather marked by cycles of escalation and retreat.

Notes

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42. Atterbury, *Revolution in Rwanda,* 64.
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45. Bhattacharyya, 'Belgian Administration', 255–56.
46. Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi,* 162.
47. United Nations, *Visiting Mission 1960,* 73.
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54. United Nations, *Visiting Mission 1960,* 75, 77.
55. Ibid., 77.
56. Atterbury, *Revolution in Rwanda,* 71.
57. Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi,* 164; Lemarchand, 'The Coup in Rwanda', 905.
58. United Nations, *Visiting Mission 1960,* 73, 78; Bhattacharyya, 'Belgian Administration', 262.
59. According to the United Nations estimate, *Visiting Mission 1960,* 82. Hubert estimated that between 1 November 1959 and 31 May 1961, only seventy-four persons were known to have been killed (Hubert, *La Toussaint Rwandaise,* 40); Bhattacharyya estimated a total of around three hundred persons were killed during the fortnight (Bhattacharyya, 'Belgian Administration', 270).
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61. Ibid.
62. Webster, *The Political Development,* 61.
63. United Nations, *Visiting Mission 1960,* 89.
64. Ibid., 94.
65. Wagoner, 'Nation Building in Africa', 190, 193.
66. Ibid., 193.
67. Ibid., 196; Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi,* 173; United Nations, *Visiting Mission 1960,* 85.
68. United Nations, *Visiting Mission 1960,* 85–86.
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