Introduction

Cooperation and Empire: Local Realities of Global Processes

Tanja Bührer, Flavio Eichmann, Stig Förster and Benedikt Stuchtey

During the First World War the young British officer Thomas E. Lawrence played a leading role in the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire that helped the allies win the war in the Middle East. Lawrence's adventures and his open sympathy for the Arab cause earned him not only promotions but also the admiration of many Arab warriors. He became famous as Lawrence of Arabia. At the Peace Conference in Paris Lawrence served as an advisor to Prince Faisal's delegation and often sided with the Arab cause against the aspirations of the imperialistic powers who intended to carve up the defunct Ottoman Empire and distribute the spoils of victory among themselves. Some British countrymen therefore accused Lawrence of having 'gone native'.[1] Had he really abandoned loyalty to his country or did he just regard the allied policy of broken promises vis-à-vis the Arabs as shameful? Was Lawrence primarily an agent of British imperial interests, a friend of the Arab cause or something in between?

In the mid-1880s the British civil servant Wilfrid Scawen Blunt visited India. He reported on a growing conflict among the 'natives'. On the one hand 'Westernizers', though well-meaning, were all too Anglophile, almost justifying British imperial rule. On the other hand, 'traditionalists' opposed Western education as it symbolized an essentially non-religious life. Blunt, who was one of the most prolific critics of European expansionism in his time, blamed the Westernizers for accommodating too easily to Western power.[2] But were they collaborators in the sense of being traitors to their

own country or nation, who aided the British in their imperial designs in South Asia, when both concepts did not even exist at the time? Or should we rather see them as personally and intellectually flexible people who could project themselves in new contexts? Could their position even have been that of translators who helped bridge Western 'rationalism' with non-European cultures? And what about the thousands of indigenous clerks and soldiers in the service of the East India Company?

These and many similar cases raise questions of loyalty and dissent, of collaboration and resistance and of the crossing of boundaries against the background of imperial expansion and rule. Why did indigenous actors engage in negotiations with imperial interlopers at all? To what extent did their interests overlap? Was a faithful and mutually beneficial relationship possible or could empires only produce contingent arrangements? How far did these cross-cultural interactions create imperial situations on the ground, and to what extent did pre-colonial cultures, socio-political and economic realities determine cooperative structures? In any case, these encounters merit further investigation.

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

First, however, we should discuss the conceptual and theoretical dimensions of this issue. In the 1970s and 1980s, the British historian Ronald Robinson challenged the hitherto predominant Eurocentric theories of imperialism. He formulated a peripheral approach, arguing that indigenous[3] collaboration represented both a formative and continuous factor of imperialism. Robinson's theory particularly emphasized that by collaborating with the colonial state, indigenous actors contributed to the creation of empires, to their preservation and eventually to their dissolution.[4]

To some extent, Robinson's thesis may have been a truism. Yet, most historians before him had largely ignored the role of indigenous collaboration. Unlike his seminal essay 'The Imperialism of Free Trade', co-authored with John Gallagher in 1953,[5] Robinson's theory of collaboration did not provoke intense debate. Nevertheless, his peripheral turn contributed to the emergence of area studies that became the predominant paradigm in extra-European history in the 1980s, focusing on local initiatives, forces and actors. However, area studies soon became so empirically specialized and detached both from imperial centres and each other that they could no longer be combined with other case studies or incorporated into a broader context.[6] New 'grand theories' about the process of imperialism became rare and had disappeared altogether by the 1990s.[7] In addition, many

scholars shifted their focus to national narratives of postcolonial successor states.[8] Imperial history thus came to be associated with colonial rule and bureaucratic authoritarianism, narratives of Western superiority and, in some cases, even covert racism.[9] Considering the personal background of this generation of scholars – Robinson, Gallagher and many of their colleagues served in the British colonies during the Second World War – such a view on the colonial state appears to be hardly surprising.[10] Confronted with the cultural turn in the 1980s, some of them consequently even predicted the demise of their own field of research.[11]

The very end of imperial history seemed to be marked by the rise of postcolonial studies in the 1990s, which can essentially be seen as an application of Edward Said's 'Orientalism'[12] thesis from the field of literary studies to history. Scholars henceforth predominantly dealt with representations of imperialism, analysing images, symbols and colonial discourses in order to understand both how 'the other' was depreciated through the gaze of the colonizers and how the colonizers thereby constructed their 'superior' identity. This scepticism towards Western structures of knowledge, as well as the authentic perceptions of the other, runs contrary to Robinson's theory of collaboration, which presumes a mutual understanding of colonizers and colonized and at least some correct empirical knowledge of the others' socio-political situation and interests. He had already implicitly challenged this cultural essentialism by posing the question in his work of 1972 of 'how a handful of European pro-consuls managed to manipulate the polymorphic societies of Africa and Asia, and how ... comparatively small, nationalist elites persuaded them to leave'.[13]

Leading practitioners of the currently dominant fields of global studies and world history have built on exactly these insights. As Jürgen Osterhammel has pointed out, considering the generally very low material input and deployment of personnel during European expansion, it is completely implausible that such a process could have taken place in a context of socio-cultural ignorance and implemented in a one-sided manner.[14] Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper have also emphasized that 'rulers of empires could never send out enough governors, generals and tax collectors to take charge of territories incorporated' and consequently depended on 'the skills, knowledge and authority of people from a conquered society'.[15] It is not surprising then that current approaches within global and transnational history broadly agree that one of the salient issues must be the study of concrete interactions between the 'colonized' and the 'colonizers' and that particular attention should be given to the crucial figures of brokers and intermediaries, who acted as a go-between by translating and negotiating political as well as cultural compromises.[16] These figures provided access to local knowledge

about politics, economies, revenue systems, cultures, and eventually about the exploitation of these resources.[17] Intermediaries were also central to the process of decolonization. One of the main causes of decolonization, for instance, was the replacement of 'traditional' indigenous collaborators such as chiefs with a bureaucratized colonial state in the late nineteenth century, which led the colonial state to lose touch with its subjects.[18]

On closer examination, both global and transnational history, and even postcolonial studies after Said, are thus essentially dealing with similar issues as Robinson, merely conceptualizing them on a different level, from a different angle and enunciated in a different jargon. Robinson's figure of the 'Europeanized collaborator'[19] can be seen as related to Homi K. Bhabha's 'Mimic Men',[20] who served similar functions as the currently prevalent figure of the 'intermediary'. In addition, the postcolonial notion of 'hybridity' and its claim to exceed binary categories resonate strongly with Robinson's idea of collaborative systems as fields of interaction between European and extra-European components.[21] This is demonstrated by Robinson's definition of imperialism as 'an inter-continental process, [in which] its true metropolis appears neither at the centre nor on the periphery, but in their changing relativities'.[22] Similarly, approaches of global and transnational history point out the reciprocal complexities of the various transcultural encounters[23] and propose the idea of non-centred global connectedness as an alternative to the national and imperialistic narrative. Finally, Robinson's emphasis on indigenous actors opened the way for non-Eurocentric perspectives[24] and theories of indigenous agency.[25] These are central issues to the New Social History,[26] which argues that colonial subjects were not helpless victims of superior forces and institutions, but historical actors who were active agents and who acquired information, tools and resources.[27]

Given these common research agendas, combined with current pleas to recognize that the different approaches of imperial, postcolonial and global history can supplement each other rather than being incompatible,[28] it is time to revisit Robinson's notion of collaboration and thus try to overcome existing methodological shortcomings. While imperial history tends to provide a one-sided perspective of the implementation of imperial rule, the postcolonial approaches of Said and Bhabha have failed to analyse how colonialism actually worked on the ground.[29] By creatively blending the concept of imperial history with new perspectives of postcolonial and global history, *Cooperation and Empire* aims to break new ground and provide a better understanding of how empires worked in practice and how collaboration functioned as a product of complex interaction. While discourse theory should not be rejected completely, postcolonial claims and concepts need to be supported by empirical evidence. Postcolonial sensibilities for

ambiguity can help us overcome Robinson's rather binary conception of collaboration as an interaction between colonizers and colonized. This opens up new views on in-between spaces, sites of cross-cultural negotiation, where innovative socio-political, economic as well as legal realities and novel identities emerged. Similarly, Robinson's focus on high politics and collaboration between elites, his model of elite co-optation, will in this volume be complemented by analyses of subaltern transactions, non-state centred co-operative connections within 'colonial' societies and perspectives from the margins of empire.

Opening up Robinson's theory of collaboration methodologically also brings into view a considerably broader range of agents. This book thus differs from recent studies on intermediaries in the colonial context insofar as it is not only focussed on specific groups of intermediaries in specific areas.[30] Instead it takes into consideration different regions on all continents as well as a wide variety of agents such as chiefs and kings, diplomats, clerks, soldiers, native guards, interpreters, teachers, scientists, women, 'white' settlers and socially marginalized people with only limited access to the colonial state or other centres of power. In addition, this book not only revolves around individual actors or groups, but analyses these agents in the larger framework of the institutions, socio-political, economic and cultural realities in which they were embedded. Furthermore, special attention will be given to the imperial structures, networks and practices that emerged or were created by these cross-cultural interactions. Robinson's focus on political and economic fields of cooperation will be extended to include current topics of research such as education, warfare and intercultural diplomacy, and precolonial structures persisting within the colonial state that have so far often been ignored in analyses of empires. At the same time, studies of imperial administrative structures, high politics and military expansion, which have been neglected by the recently predominant cultural, global and transnational historiography, will return to centre stage – not of course as one-sided accounts of imperial impact but in the context of reciprocal encounters. The aim of this book is to examine these forms of cooperation from both sides, to uncover indigenous motives, interests and strategies in their engagement, while remaining aware that because of the prevalence of European sources, there is a danger that imperial norms and prejudices will be reproduced.

Our modifications regarding methodological approaches and perspectives also involve a reconsideration of Robinson's terminology. For native English speakers and for Robinson himself the term 'collaboration' might have had a neutral character. But for German and French readers, for instance, it is impossible to dismiss the term's pejorative connotation, given

its historic reference to the collaboration with the Nazi occupying forces in Europe. This is similar for audiences in postcolonial states, as the term, with its negative connotations, has also been applied to studies of anticolonial, revolutionary and nationalist independence struggles, more or less explicitly accusing indigenous groups of siding with imperial powers as traitors to the national cause. By considering collaboration as the very antithesis of resistance, such labelling is not only based on an anachronistic perspective of the postcolonial nation state.[31] This pejorative terminology also opens up a dichotomy, which this volume aims to replace with a more balanced view of the relationship between 'colonizer' and 'colonized'.[32]

Given these reservations, the term 'collaboration' does not seem a very viable heuristic tool at first sight. Scholars of global, world and transnational history thus tend to refer instead to the concept of the indigenous intermediary,[33] but as outlined above this exclusive figure would not cover all agents and topics addressed in this volume. Colin Newbury has suggested replacing Robinson's concept of 'collaboration' with a patron-client relationship.[34] This model might be appropriate to describe early encounters, for instance when European minorities entered as clients into a social space that was not regulated according to their norms, yet it is limited to asymmetrical and pre-modern relationships. Similarly, Richard White's famous concept of the 'Middle Ground' is only adequate for cases in which the actors involved could not expect large-scale material support from their respective bases of power.[35]

The term 'cooperation' seems to be a more promising alternative. It covers a wide range of imperial-indigenous relationships and it suggests an interaction between two equals or two parties of different standings in which even the minor partner had a certain level of bargaining power. Yet in contrast to 'collaboration' – and similar to concepts of global history such as 'non-centred connectedness' and 'mutual encounters' – it connotes a rather positive interaction (talking frequently as it does of joint efforts, alliances, exchange of services, projects, partnership) and can thus, if used in an unreflective way, obscure or euphemize unequal and exploitative relationships.[36] However, imperial coercion and forms of cooperation were often two sides of the same coin: when cooperation failed, the colonial state usually made a violent effort to enforce it. Exploitation, brute force and forms of cooperation often occurred simultaneously, yet frequently materialized on different levels and thus affected the various social classes differently. Despite such violent enforcement, the colonial state remained relatively weak, which even in asymmetrical power relationships provided room for manoeuvre for local agents. Only in extreme situations were the latter reduced to mere stooges.[37]

Nonetheless, we should bear in mind the inherently coercive nature of the colonial context and there are therefore certain limits to the concept of cooperation. In highly exploitative relationships such as slavery even the term 'forced cooperation' fails to convey the full extent of dependence, no matter how qualified the definition. In addition, we must be particularly careful with official representations of the form and language of consent, as they might hide imposed authorities. Since European imperial agents aspired to legitimize expansion and colonial rule – not only towards native peoples and rival imperial powers, but also towards the metropolitan government – they were keen to obtain testimonials of consent from representatives of indigenous societies, which were frequently gained by coercion.[38] To sum up, we have to differentiate between a wide range of cooperative relationships and structures, in which both the motives of the actors involved and the degree of imperial coercion varied greatly.

There is also another group of indigenous actors who voluntarily served the imperial project but who cannot be captured by the concept of 'cooperation'. Their behaviour is best described by the term 'collaboration', which needs to be reintroduced in our analysis here in order to adequately label their activities. It is not our intention to hereby resurrect anachronistic concepts such as the nation state or to condemn certain behaviour, such as switching allegiance from an indigenous to an imperial patron and deferring to a regionally common strategy in order to enhance one's professional position. But voluntary decisions to serve the imperial project acquire a treacherous character when indigenous actors are aware that the imperial interlopers will profoundly change or even destroy local or interregional socio-political power structures, unlike earlier conquerors who merely co-opted local structures. Many of these collaborators were perfectly aware that their actions would radically change the common people's way of life for the worse. One such example might be Ghulam Husain Khan, who like his forefathers had served in the Mughal and Bengal nawabi governments, but in the 1770s offered his services to the British. Khan described the drain of wealth of Bengal caused by the misgovernment and corruption of the East India Company officials, to the disadvantage of the local nobility, service gentry and the mass of the people. He was also convinced that the British would remain ignorant of indigenous customs and principles of government and thus would not establish a mutually beneficial cooperation with the Indian societies.[39] Christopher A. Bayly has accurately described such Indian career diplomats and experts, who switched to British imperial service at the expense of the declining centre of the Mughal Empire, as 'uneasy collaborators'.[40]

Considering cooperation as an essential structural phenomenon and an indispensable prerequisite to the creation, preservation and dissolution of empires enables us to cover and compare a wide variety of cases throughout different time periods. In this volume, we look at various histories of European-indigenous encounters in different European empires (Portuguese, Spanish, French, British and German) from the sixteenth to the mid-twentieth century in the Americas, Asia, Africa, Australasia and the Middle East. Considering all the patterns of cooperation and collaboration outlined above, the specific contexts in which the various case studies of this volume are situated will be outlined by the authors of each chapter. This study of agents, fields and patterns of cooperation engages with current debates about the impact of precolonial histories and structures on imperial projects, colonial knowledge and categorization, the invention of tradition, the overcoming of binary positions and transcultural in-between spaces, local agency, intermediaries, ambiguous and multiple identities, citizenship, cooperation and resistance, corruption and scandals, intercultural diplomacy and negotiations, regional and transnational dynamics as well as perspectives from the fringes of empires.

PRECOLONIAL STRUCTURES AND COLONIAL CATEGORIZATION

The impact of precolonial realities on patterns of cooperation has been neglected by both postcolonial studies and imperial history. While postcolonial scholars have identified colonial perceptions of the other and categorizations of their social institutions as fantasies with no relation to realities, imperial history has had a predominantly one-sided perspective of the imposition of imperial rule. The disregard for precolonial structures has also been, and still is, related to the fact that most scholars engage with the modern era of imperial and global history, when precolonial heritage had already been obscured and transformed by colonial categorization.

The formative influence of local socio-political systems and cultures on structures of cooperation was usually most apparent in the early phase of encounters between indigenous societies and European interlopers, when European representatives were tiny minorities; and the more useful local structures were for colonial interests, particularly in terms of exploiting resources such as revenue, tax and labour, the stronger this influence was. It therefore comes as no surprise that studies on the beginning of British territorial expansion in South Asia in the second half of the eighteenth century strongly emphasize the importance of co-optation of and adaption

to existing realities of sovereignty and government. The Cambridge School has argued that the British Raj originally drew on South Asian imperial structures.[41] At some point, however, precolonial realities were transformed and often simplified along colonial categorizations in order to centralize and shape them according to imperial interest, or because imperial interlocutors simply did not understand the complex structures of the societies they encountered.

The contributions of Tanja Bührer and Ralph A. Austen reflect the Cambridge School line of thought. However, in contrast to the scholarly preoccupation with British direct rule in North India, in her chapter 'Cooperation and Cultural Adaption: British Diplomats at the Court of the Nizam of Hyderabad, c. 1779–1815', Bührer explores the British relationship with a formally independent Indian state in South India. The first British representatives in Hyderabad were perceived as potential clients or, at best, auxiliaries, and in order to negotiate they had to comply with Indo-Persian forms of diplomacy and adapt to local concepts of sovereignty. The Nizam's condition for cooperation was that the British would provide him with troops that he might need to fight against his Indian adversaries. Examining the British-Hyderabad cooperation from its beginning, it thus becomes evident that the British 'subsidiary troops' permanently stationed at Hyderabad, considered a key characteristic of Governor-General Richard Wellesely's imperialistic system of 'Subsidiary Alliances' with Indian rulers at the beginning of the nineteenth century, was not borne out of an imperial vision of the 'architect of British paramountcy' over India. Rather, this institution originally emerged out of a local demand for auxiliary troops related to Mughal and post-Mughal rivalries. The British met this demand in order to participate in regional politics. As soon as the Nizam became dependent on military assistance, the British took advantage of the situation to turn this service into a tool of indirect rule.

In his broad comparative approach in 'Indigenous Agents of Colonial Rule in Africa and India: Defining the Colonial State through its Secondary Bureaucracy', Austen shows that imperial approaches to precolonial heritage varied considerably across these areas. While the British in India initially endeavoured by and large to incorporate Mughal and post-Mughal revenue systems and its agents, in Sub-Saharan Africa, which had almost no pre-existing state bureaucracy, cooperative practices of rural tax collection usually had to be 'imposed upon African polities as a colonial innovation'.

One argument put forward in the chapters by Ute Schüren and Ulrike Schaper is that colonial ambitions which sought to rely on existing polities tended to create colonial categorizations that seriously challenged the 'traditional' role and legitimacy of cooperating authorities towards their own

people. As Schüren writes in 'Caciques: Indigenous Rulers and the Colonial Regime in Yucatán in the Sixteenth Century', Spaniards perceived indigenous leadership as legitimate and incorporated it into their feudal order. Yet, contrary to the indigenous leaderships' actual positions, the Spanish conceptualized all local authorities as 'caciques' – a Hispanicized term for chiefs, transferred from the colonial context in the West Indies to the American mainland. They thus tended to impose centralized government on the various political systems they encountered which particularly undermined local authorities' role as war leaders and their ideological as well as religious legitimacy. Similarly, in 'Chieftaincy as a Political Resource in the German Colony of Cameroon, 1884–1916' Schaper argues that the Germans tried to employ precolonial structures while at the same time heavily intervening in them. In order to create a cooperative elite, they conferred the simplistic category of 'chief' (*Häuptling*) on African authorities – who in the precolonial order had held very different positions with diverse competencies – thereby incorrectly suggesting that they were heads of politically centralized societies that also held jurisdiction over their people. Due to a lack of local knowledge, German officials even struggled to identify suitable authorities. They thus sometimes had to acquiesce in the claims of communities that 'their chief', who was empowered by the colonial government, had no sufficient precolonial legitimacy whatsoever to fulfil this position.

Therefore, the establishment of cooperation on the basis of precolonial structures was not only a strategy adopted due to limited material and human resources, but was also a necessity, the only way to avoid social disruption and resistance. In addition, when the transition from precolonial socio-political structures to more colonial conceptualized polities was by and large a smooth process, as Schüren argues in her case study of Yucatán, memories of precolonial times could soon fade away, especially in everyday interaction. Against this background, the modern scholar's perception of a breach between the precolonial and colonial period appears ahistorical.

Yet, in some cases, where precolonial structures proved insufficient for imperial interests or where a break with former rule could not be avoided altogether, governance had to be built up. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence O. Ranger developed the concept of 'invented tradition' to describe a set of ritual practices intended to create social cohesion, establish and legitimize 'modern' institutions and new relations of authority within rapidly transforming European societies and empires. These procedures were thus responses to novel situations, suggesting continuity with the past in order to legitimize new governance.[42] The concept of invented tradition has been most prominently used by Bernhard Cohn to describe the representation

of new authority after the transfer of British rule in India from the East India Company to the Crown, made particularly manifest in the Imperial Assemblage of 1877. The proclamation of Queen Victoria as Empress of India, accompanied with a public display of European and Indian style rituals, established a reference to the ancient throne of the Mughal Empire. The Indian Princes were declared her Indian Feudatories and thus ranked in a linear hierarchical order according to their size, their former standing in relation to the Mughal Emperor, and their acts of loyalty towards the British central authority.[43]

After the First World War, Britain was in an even more difficult situation with regard to her mandated territories in the Middle East. Myriam Yakoubi, in 'The Cooperation between the British and Faisal I of Iraq (1921–1932): Evolution of a Romance', explores the struggle of the British to establish and legitimize the creation of a monarchy in Iraq from scratch as well as to relate this institution to their new authority as a mandatory power. Their decision to install the Hashemite Faisal from Mecca as the first King of Iraq was influenced by the successful military cooperation between British and Hashemite forces during the Arab Revolt against Ottoman rule during the First World War. In addition, due to his descent from the Prophet, Faisal was perceived by the British as the natural leader of the Arab national movement and the embodiment of religious authority. But Faisal had never set foot in the country before and the historical rupture with centuries of Ottoman rule was impossible to cover up. Thus, the founding event of the coronation ceremony in 1921 had to resort to British rituals and symbols, with a military band even playing 'God save the King' as Iraq did not yet have a national anthem.

TRANSCULTURAL IN-BETWEEN SPACES AND CONTESTED LOYALTIES

Cooperative transcultural encounters and the merging of precolonial and imperial structures and cultures opened up in-between spaces which transcended binary opposition and created innovative sites of cross-cultural negotiation, be it dialogical or antagonistic; this led to the emergence of new socio-political structures and often ambiguous or contested loyalties.[44] Several chapters in this volume engage with these questions. In her study of sixteenth-century Yucatán, Schüren claims that not only Eurocentric but also Indian-centric perspectives have prevented scholars from understanding that Indians and Spaniards were, from the very beginning of their encounters, interacting in flexible networks of kinship and clientship that

blurred the presumed dichotomy between 'colonizer' and 'colonized'. Indian agents often did not act vis-à-vis 'colonial' institutions, but as part of them. They even internalized colonial normative discourses, which contributed to the fact that memories of the precolonial area soon faded away. Yet with the example of Don Pablo Paxbolon, she illustrates the in-between situation of a border crosser on the frontier of the Spanish empire, who was acting both inside and outside colonial institutions. On the one hand, he held a colonial office, was a devotee of the Catholic faith, intermarried with the Spanish and cooperated with the colonial institutions by capturing fugitive Indians beyond the colonial frontier. On the other hand, he established flourishing subversive trade relations with people beyond colonial control and was even engaged in contraband with unpacified groups.

According to Schaper, African chiefs who cooperated with German authorities in Cameroon also found themselves predominantly in a structural as well as personal in-between situation. The coinage of their position as 'administrative chieftaincy' reflected not only a fusion of presumed African polities and German bureaucracy, but also their ambiguous situation of being colonial agents within a colonial hierarchy without actually being formal, salaried employees. This in-between position also provided them with a 'double power basis' (Schaper), enabling them to act as intermediaries. At the same time, their loyalty was often doubted both by 'their people' and the German authorities. Yakoubi argues that the British installed Faisal as King of Iraq because he was presumed to have high religious prestige within the Arab community, but was considered to depend on British advice and assistance due to his lack of a real power basis among the people of the new created monarchy. When it turned out that he knew how to use his intermediary position and his room for manoeuvre to negotiate and enhance his power, the smooth cooperation that was expected turned into a power struggle.

Cultural adaption and adoption in cross-cultural negotiations could of course also run the other way, with European interlopers complying with local regulations of diplomacy and norms of social interaction. As Bührer shows with the example of James Achilles Kirkpatrick, the British resident at the court of Hyderabad adopted Hyderabadi ways of living, intermarried into the local aristocracy and converted to Islam. Despite this, or perhaps precisely for this reason, he managed to persuade the Hyderabad government into a subordinate cooperative arrangement with the treaties of 1798 and 1800. Not only was the Resident's position queried by anti-British factions at the Hyderabad court, but Kirkpatrick also had to face an investigation of his political loyalty, conducted by the Governor-General Richard Wellesley, which almost cost him his career.[45]

Acting as intermediaries at the interface of different power structures could thus considerably enhance imperial actors' agency. Yet it was also a very risky undertaking, even more so as these key figures often found themselves in the midst of dynamic processes of empire building with changing balances of power, and not only had to deal with two parties, but also had to juggle countless mixed interest and factions within them.

The contributions of Charles V. Reed and Iris Seri-Hersch show that Western-educated intellectuals in later periods of colonial encounter also found themselves in disputed in-between situations and positions of contested loyalties. As Reed argues in 'Cooperation at its Limits: Re-Reading the British Constitution in South Africa', South African colonial subjects of colour who were fighting the exclusive South African constitution founded by the Act of Union 1910 found themselves in a political, cultural and social space between empire and nationalistic movement. They were European-educated imperial liberals but they never rejected their Africanness and claimed to represent the African communities. They used the language of loyalty and Britishness, yet were far from being collaborators, as their offer of cooperation was stipulated by the demand for citizenship, which they also pursued through their publishing activities: they took their legal claims to London and participated in global movements for civil and human rights. They not only employed British legal principles as a strategy of resistance, but also claimed to interpret the British constitution in a more authentically British way than the white settler communities of South Africa did.

In 'Collaborating on Unequal Terms: Cross-Cultural Cooperation and Educational Work in Colonial Sudan', Seri-Hersch explores cross-cultural cooperation in the field of education – in particular in teacher training, schoolbook production and school reforms – on the margins of empire and in a frontier area in-between different religions and cultures. According to Seri-Hersch, the colonial education reform was a British endeavour to prepare Sudanese society for what they considered the modern world, while Sudanese officials were supposed to convey local codes and give the project an '"indigenous" type of legitimacy'. On the one hand, the gap between the socio-cultural norms was not easily bridged and caused tensions in the British-Sudanese relationship. On the other hand, the fact that Sudanese officials integrated into the colonial state apparatus and appropriated elements of British culture and political discourse was seen as a threat to the colonial regime, which became manifest in the mockery of them as 'third-class Europeans' or 'detribalized intellectuals'. In fact, their tacitly shared belief in ultimate independence was for many patriotic Sudanese a reason to cooperate in the project of imperial education reform. However, examining the long-term development from the 1920s to the 1950s, Seri-Hersch

notices a shift in modes of cooperation from a discriminatory hierarchic relationship to a more equal interaction in the twilight of the British Empire.

Within the complex context of collaboration, cooperation and resistance, one important group of people is commonly neglected: women. There are of course a few famous exceptions, such as Lakshmibai, the Rani of Jhansi, who was one of the leaders of the Indian uprising in 1857–1858 and who became a hero in Indian memory.[46] Others like Gertrude Bell proved to be more cooperative in the quest for empire, as Yakoubi's chapter in this volume illustrates.[47] But there was more to the story than just the activities of a few female individuals. As Amélia Polónia and Rosa Capelão demonstrate in their chapter on the emerging Portuguese empire, indigenous as well as Portuguese women played crucial roles as intermediaries in all kind of ways. Many women married interculturally, some worked in diplomatic missions, while others were successfully engaged in trade and business. And of course, there were always the female members of royal courts. Most of these women were very influential in processes of cultural exchange concerning language, climate, day-to-day life, social behaviour, hygiene, medicine and politics. Religion was also an important factor. The Catholic authorities expected indigenous women who married Portuguese men to convert to Christianity. They also did their best to fight heathen practises, although they often failed. The more remote the outposts of imperial expansion, the less the authorities were able to exert control on them. Hence, on the margins of empire there was much scope for all forms of intercultural exchange. However, the full extent of the influence of women in this process remains largely unknown and much more research will have to be done in the future.

COLONIAL SCANDALS AND CORRUPTION BY COOPERATION

Corruption of power and money is one of the central topics in the history of empires. The plundering by Spanish conquistadores in the Americas set a defining example for all would-be colonial conquerors to come. It was not only colonial conquests that offered Europeans plenty of opportunities to enrich themselves, but also their employment in the colonial administration, as the endless cases of colonial scandals and corruption show. While plunder during military operations could be legitimized as the 'just spoils of war', everyday corruption and misuse of power within the colonial bureaucracy was less easy to justify in the metropolis. The trial against Thomas Picton, the first British Governor of Trinidad, in 1806, who was charged with having brutally tortured a fourteen-year old free coloured girl

named Louisa Calderon, is an instructive example of the uneasiness of the metropolitan government and the public at home when confronted with the realities of colonial rule on the spot.[48]

In the plantation and settler colonies of European empires, metropolitan governments had another reason to prevent the corruption of their men on the spot: the subversion of metropolitan authority. Colonial officials who owned plantations and participated in trade were naturally more prone to defend the interests of the colonists in defiance of metropolitan policies, which they were supposed to implement. Consider, for instance, French Governors in the West Indies during the Age of Revolutions, for whom it was normal to gain a fortune by buying plantations and participating in the flourishing contraband trade. To some extent, metropolitan authorities saw these practices as a necessary evil and tried to minimize the damage by regularly exchanging their representatives in the colonies, thus preventing too close cooperation between their agents and the colonists.[49] However, in wartime situations, the French metropolis hardly had the means to prevent such fraternization and the subsequent subversion of its authority in the colonies, as Flavio Eichmann emphasizes in his contribution on the cooperation between colonial officials and local planter elites in the French Caribbean sugar island of Martinique during the Napoleonic Wars. In their quest for more economic freedom and political autonomy the planters found a willing supporter in the colony's Governor, who ignored all orders from Paris in exchange for material rewards from the planters. His subversive cooperation with the colonial elites went so far that it even undermined the French war effort against the British Empire, with whom the planters' true loyalties lay.

Probably the most prominent scandal in the British Empire was the impeachment of the first Governor-General of British India, Warren Hastings, who was prosecuted between 1788 and 1795 by Edmund Burke, Member of Parliament for the Whig Party. Hastings became a symbol of the corrupt, scrupulous *nabob*, conspicuously wealthy men who had made their fortunes by abusing agreements and treaties and exchanging presents with 'oriental' rulers. Yet many European officials – and indigenous intermediaries – of the early colonial period considered additional profit to be a fair reward for their performance. In addition, even Burke recognized that the East India Company acted under two sorts of powers: the British Crown, authorized by Parliament, and the Mughal Emperor. In such circumstances, it was in the very nature of cooperation to adopt the others' norms and become 'corrupt'. This reveals another – moral – sense of corruption. Burke's main concern was not so much bribery, but that the public responsibility of British officials and political ethics would be corrupted by the others' differing norms and regulations.[50]

The reformist agenda of Burke was reflected in Pitt's India Act of 1784, which at its core was an effort to regulate cooperation between Company officials and Indian rulers according to British norms. It was possible to implement these governmental regulations by degree in British territories such as Bengal, which were more or less directly ruled with a considerable imperial presence. However, as Bührer demonstrates in her chapter on British residents in Hyderabad, it was far more difficult to implement them in the case of British officials who were acting as minorities on the margins of empire, where moral and material corruption presumably continued to exist until the early nineteenth century. Nevertheless, after the trial against Hastings, corruption became increasingly identified with India itself, particularly with its customs and culture. Indigenous corruption became the main justification for imperial intervention in Asia as well as later in Africa.[51] Austen thus shows that already the 'Cornwallis reforms' of the 1790s sought to reform the presumably corrupt revenue system in Bengal. In particular, the *zamindars*, tax-collecting landholders who were perceived as both defrauding the British authorities and oppressing the peasants beneath them, were transformed into landlords along the model of the English landed gentry.

Corruption and colonial scandals remained a central issue throughout the nineteenth century up to the era of decolonization and beyond.[52] According to Schaper, the double power basis of colonial authorization and local networks, a pre-condition for chiefs in German Cameroon to serve as intermediaries, was at the same time perceived by colonial officials as a dangerous source of misuse. They in particular were accused to use their new jurisdictional power to demand inappropriate court fees or defraud money. An often neglected group of African intermediaries are the subject of Alexander Keese's chapter 'Key Alliance? "Native Guard" and European Administrators in Sub-Saharan Africa from a Comparative Perspective (1918–1959)'. Keese contributes a comprehensive comparison of British, French and Portuguese native guards in colonial Africa, whose duties ranged from policing to organizing forced labour. They were often employed far from their areas of origin, they were poorly paid and their European superiors seldom backed their actions on the ground, sometimes even treating them with contempt. Thus, Keese concludes, it was not their double empowerment but rather their lack of both local networks and colonial patronage that made them prone to corruption and prompted them to resort to violence in order fulfil their colonial duties. Regular extortion scandals and killings characterized the institution of native guards; this persisted in all European colonies in Africa up to the era of decolonization.

As opposed to the native guards, Austen examines indigenous agents with high salaries who were on the secondary level of colonial bureaucracy.

Allegations of large-scale corruption were brought against indigenous government agents both in India and Africa from the colonial to the postcolonial era. Yet Austen suggests that these intermediary groups were not as prone to corruption during the colonial era, when the risk of losing a privileged position was not worth the expected illegal profits from only limited resources. However, the ubiquitous discourse on practices of abuse essentially helped to define the colonial state. Inherited colonial regimes, with their defects, were much more receptive to the high material temptations and social expectations of postcolonial development and mass politics. Austen thus concludes that there was no direct continuity of corruption from colonial to postcolonial states.

COOPERATION AND VIOLENCE

More often than not imperial expansion was accompanied by violence and war. This is almost a truism, as wars on the imperial periphery, wars of conquest, brutal violence of all kind, as well as uprisings against colonial suppression are common features of imperial history.[53] This violence has been part of transcultural warfare for the whole of its very long history.[54] However, wars on the periphery in faraway places posed specific problems for imperial powers. Metropolitan authorities were barely able to keep close control of those territories. Their representatives, soldiers, administrators, merchants and settlers therefore enjoyed a great deal of freedom to act on their own account and to pursue their own interests that often conflicted with the intentions and aims of governments at home. The conquest of India for example was orchestrated mainly by military men on the spot contrary to orders from London and against the will of the directors of the East India Company, who wanted to avoid the enormous costs of wars on the subcontinent that were to ruin the company.[55] Eichmann's contribution in this volume shows that rich planters and their political partners in French Martinique ignored orders from Paris and would rather have handed over the colony to the British than allow their personal interests to be hampered. It is therefore doubtful whether Ronald Robinson's assumption that planters and settlers were 'pre-fabricated collaborators' of imperial rule is correct.[56]

Matthias Häußler emphasizes this point in his chapter on German Southwest Africa. He demonstrates how settlers contravened the colonial authorities' attempts to spread peace. Instead they displayed aggressive attitudes towards the indigenous population and did not shy away from brutal violence, extortion and even murder. The prosecution of such crimes

was rare, as German settlers enjoyed a special status. The colonial state was weak, with little control over the settlers and little ability to protect the 'natives'. Having suffered constant violence and been driven into poverty, the Herero and later the Nama rebelled against German rule. The German government in Berlin sent troops to the colony to suppress the uprising. This resulted in a terrible war that culminated in genocide. However, the presence of the regular army that enforced colonial rule and led to the mass killing of the potential work force, also displeased the settlers. The relationship between settlers and authorities remained tense.

If imperial powers could not even rely on their men on the spot, whom else could they trust? This issue of trust posed a major problem throughout the history of imperial expansion. For financial, economic and even political reasons imperial powers were rarely able to send large numbers of regular troops to the periphery. As a result, they usually lacked manpower and firepower on the ground. The support of indigenous forces was therefore of the utmost importance for the imperial enterprise.[57] Victory in warfare on the periphery as well as the enforcement and maintenance of imperial rule was simply impossible without help from some parts of the local population. Indigenous fighters, mercenaries, irregular troops, carriers, workers as well as allies in the region played an indispensable role in enabling the outsiders to establish themselves in parts of the world that were alien to them. In addition, the intruders required supplies, orientation by local guides, medical assistance and many other things that could only be provided by inhabitants of the land. In the context of violence and war friendly interaction ranged from mutually beneficent cooperation to lopsided collaboration. But indigenous cooperation is all too often overlooked in heroic tales of imperial conquerors such as Cortez and Pizarro. This is not only unfair but also completely wrong. Tiny forces of heavily armed Spanish men would never have been able to defeat the huge armies of the Aztecs or the Inca. But they found allies among the local rivals of the enemy. As time progressed and empires grew, indigenous forces remained important. Above all they were comparatively cheap, adapted to the local climate and more resistant to disease. They also could be employed for special tasks such as counter guerrilla and dirty work such as violence against civilians. The recruitment of indigenous fighters was normally easy, as military traditions existed in many parts of the world and there were enough men ready to be employed by the highest bidder in local power contests.

The cooperation of actors of violence went beyond mere fighting. By focusing on the indigenous soldiers' role in everyday colonialism, their often pivotal contribution to colonial state-building becomes evident.[58] With the increasing establishment of a colonial state, colonial powers usually started

to differentiate between military violence and policing for which they built up special forces. Such a force were, for instance, the native guards in Africa, founded well after the establishment of empire. They performed some form of policing, especially in remote areas where the colonial powers exerted little control. It was exactly this lack of control that gave these men a certain amount of freedom to pursue their own interests. As Keese demonstrates, low pay and the neglect of their superiors induced many of the native guards to extort goods and services from the local population. They often committed brutal acts of violence and all kinds of atrocities, which gave them a rather bad reputation. But the authorities of the colonial powers involved needed them. Matters improved only slowly over time and even then, the guards were never fully under the control of the colonial powers.

In modern Maori language, the word *kupapa* stands for traitors to their own people. They are 'Uncle Toms', archetypical collaborators with the alien rulers. But as Vincent O'Malley shows, this word originally had a different meaning. It referred to people who during the New Zealand Wars of the nineteenth century preferred to remain on the sidelines, as the very notion of a united Maori nation did not exist. Cooperation with the Crown, where it existed, was selective and purposeful. *Kupapas* refused to be mere tools of the colonial authorities but pursued their own interests and sometimes switched sides if support for the resistance appeared to serve their ends better. Cooperation, collaboration and resistance therefore were just changing ways of interaction within the imperial context.

O'Malley's findings can be generalized. History is rarely black or white; it should be painted in grey colours instead. Important as indigenous support was for imperial policy, it could also serve the interests of those who were prepared to cooperate. They pursued their own agendas and thus did not always necessarily remain loyal to the imperial power. Whether cooperation with the imperial power turned into collaboration or was just a short-lived affair, beneficial to both sides, depended on circumstances and opportunities. But it was also possible for cooperation to end in hostilities, when mutual understanding collapsed. It was a telling case when the Sepoys in Northern India, who for decades had loyally served the British Raj, turned against their superiors and in 1857–1858 staged a massive revolt. Dependence on the cooperation of indigenous groups was the weak point of empire and this proved to be fatal to imperial rule in the face of rising anti-colonial nationalism.

The various case studies in this volume, largely based on primary sources, are arranged chronologically. Two chapters by Austen and Wolfgang Reinhard conclude this book. While Austen compares the colonial state's

secondary bureaucracy in India and Africa, Reinhard summarizes this volume's central themes and discusses further fields for research.

Dr Tanja Bührer is an Assistant Professor at the University of Bern, Switzerland. Her Ph.D. thesis to 'Colonial Security Policy in German East Africa 1885–1918' was awarded first prize of the *Werner Hahlweg Prize of Military History and Sciences* 2009/10. Afterwards she was awarded a Fellowship for advanced researchers from the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) to work on her *Habilitation* (post-doctoral qualification) in the United Kingdom, France and India. From 2015 to 2016 she was Visiting Professor for European and Modern History at the University of Rostock.

Dr des. Flavio Eichmann is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Bern, Switzerland. He has published several articles on war, revolution and abolition in the Caribbean during the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon. His dissertation on war and revolution in the Lesser Antilles, 1789–1815 is being prepared for publication.

Professor Stig Förster is an Emeritus Professor at the University of Bern, Switzerland. He was a Research Fellow at the German Historical Institutes in London and Washington, D.C. and Professor of Modern History at the University of Augsburg, Germany. At Düsseldorf University he received his Ph.D. and his second Ph.D. He has published widely on international, political, military and imperial history. Together with Roger Chickering and others he edited a five volume series on the history of total war that was published at Cambridge University Press. He is chairman of the Military History Association in Germany.

Professor Benedikt Stuchtey is a full professor of modern history at the University of Marburg, Germany, since 2013. Until then he was deputy director of the German Historical Institute, London, since 2004, and he has taught as Visiting Professor at the universities of Basel, Switzerland and Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He concentrates his research on the history of colonialism and imperialism from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries.

NOTES

1. See the fascinating but also openly self-indulgent work by T.E. Lawrence, *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (Oxford, 1922).

2. On Blunt see B. Stuchtey, *Die europäische Expansion und ihre Feinde: Kolonialismuskritik vom 18. bis in das 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2010), 211–15.
3. The use of the term 'indigenous' in this volume does not necessarily denote autochthonous people, but generally societies that have, in contrast to the agents of the invading empire, 'generations of experience with the local climate, terrain, and subsistence system' and 'operated according to different cultural systems'. See W.E. Lee, 'Projecting Power in the Early Modern World: The Spanish Model?', in idem (ed.), *Empires and Indigenes: Intercultural Alliance, Imperial Expansion, and Warfare in the Early Modern World* (New York: New York University Press, 2011), 9.
4. R. Robinson, 'Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration', in R. Owen and B. Sutcliffe (eds), *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism* (London: Longman, 1972), 117–42; idem, 'The Excentric Idea of Imperialism, with or without Empire', in W.J. Mommsen and J. Osterhammel (eds), *Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 267–89.
5. J. Gallagher and R. Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Free Trade', *Economic History Review* 6(1) (1953), 1–15.
6. A.G. Hopkins, 'Back to the Future? From National History to Imperial History', *Past & Present* 164 (1999), 198; P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism 1688–2000*, 2nd edn (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2000), 27–30.
7. On the 'grand theories' of imperialism, see W.J. Mommsen, *Imperialismustheorien: Ein Überblick über die neueren Imperialisinterpretationen*, 3rd edn (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987). On the reasons for their demise, see B. Barth, 'Whatever Happened to Imperialism? Wolfgang J. Mommsen und die Imperialismustheorien', in C. Cornellisen (ed.), *Geschichtswissenschaft im Geist der Demokratie: Wolfgang J. Mommsen und seine Generation* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2010), 168–69.
8. S. Howe, 'The Slow Death and Strange Rebirths of Imperial History', *Journal of Imperial & Commonwealth History* 29(2) (2001), 133.
9. D.M. Peers, 'Is Humpty Dumpty Back Together Again? The Revival of Imperial History and the "Oxford History of the British Empire"', *Journal of World History* 13(2) (2002), 452. Referring to the works of Gallagher and Robinson, P. Wolfe, 'History and Imperialism: A Century of Theory, from Marx to Postcolonialism', *American Historical Review* 102(2) (1997), 402, wrote that their 'purview remained resolutely Eurocentric, a quality reflected in their fondness for colonial boys'-club rhetoric'.
10. D. Ghosh, 'Another Set of Imperial Turns?', *American Historical Review* 117(3) (2012), 774–75; G. Shepperson, 'Ronald Robinson: Scholar and Good Companion', in A. Porter and R. Holland (eds), *Theory and Practice in the History of European Expansion Overseas: Essays in Honour of Ronald Robinson* (London: Frank Cass, 1988), 2.

11. D.K. Fieldhouse, 'Can Humpty Dumpty Be Put Together Again? Imperial History in the 1980s', *Journal of Imperial & Commonwealth History* 12(2) (1984), 9–23.
12. E. Said, *Orientalism* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978).
13. Robinson, 'Foundations', 118.
14. J. Osterhammel, 'Wissen als Macht: Deutungen interkulturellen Nichts-Verstehens bei Tzvetan Todorov und Edward Said', in E.-M. Auch and S. Förster (eds), '*Barbaren*' *und* '*Weiße Teufel*': *Kulturkonflikte und Imperialismus in Asien vom 18. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1997), 145–49, 163–64.
15. J. Burbank and F. Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). See also Lee, 'Projecting Power', 1; T. von Trotha, 'Was war Kolonialismus? Einige zusammenfassende Befunde zur Soziologie und Geschichte des Kolonialismus und der Kolonialherrschaft', *Saeculum* 55 (2004), 64–66.
16. S. Conrad and J. Osterhammel, 'Einleitung', in idem (eds), *Das Kaiserreich transnational: Deutschland in der Welt 1871–1914* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004), 7–27; Burbank and Cooper, *Empires in World History*, 13–14; Howe, 'Slow Death', 138.
17. On the importance of information gathering, see C.A. Bayly, *Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780–1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 7. Of course, information from indigenous sources needed to be true in order to be of any value to colonial administrators. See E.L. Osborn, '"Circle of Iron": African Colonial Employees and the Interpretation of Colonial Rule in French West Africa', *Journal of African History* 44(1) (2003), 29–50.
18. W. Knöbl, 'Imperiale Herrschaft und Gewalt', *Mittelweg 36* 21(3) (2012), 33–34, 43–44.
19. Robinson, 'Foundations', 130, 139.
20. H.K. Bhabha, *Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994), 85–92.
21. P.J. Cain, 'Foreword', in B. Bush, *Imperialism and Postcolonialism* (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2006), x.
22. Robinson, 'Excentric Idea of Imperialism', 271.
23. Wolfe, 'History and Imperialism', 415.
24. Ironically, in their focus on imperialistic discourses as Western monologues detached from reality and the authentic other, postcolonial studies are reifying Euro-centrism in a very extreme form. See Peers, 'Humpty Dumpty', 456; S. Conrad and A. Eckert, 'Globalgeschichte, Globalisierung, multiple Modernen: Zur Geschichtsschreibung der modernen Welt', in idem and U. Freitag (eds), *Globalgeschichte: Theorien, Ansätze, Themen* (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, 2007), 22–23.
25. J.A. Clancy-Smith, 'Collaboration and Empire in the Middle East and North Africa: Introduction and Response', *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 24(1) (2004), 126.

26. W. Johnson, 'On Agency', *Journal of Social History* 37(1) (2003), 113.
27. W. Reinhard, 'Kolonialgeschichtliche Probleme und kolonialhistorische Konzepte', in C. Kraft, A. Lüdtke and J. Martschuka (eds), *Kolonialgeschichten: Regionale Perspektiven auf ein globales Phänomen* (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, 2010), 77; Peers, 'Humpty Dumpty', 463.
28. D. Kennedy, 'Imperial History and Postcolonial Theory', *Journal of Imperial & Commonwealth History* 24(3) (1996), 345–63; Bush, *Imperialism and Postcolonialism*, 60–61; Clancy-Smith, 'Collaboration', 126; Howe, 'Slow Death', 134–35; Peers, 'Humpty Dumpty', 457–58.
29. S. Dubow, 'Introduction', in P. Levine (ed), *The Rise and Fall of Modern Empires*, 4 vols (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), vol. 2, xi–xxxi.
30. B. Lawrance, E.L. Osborn and R.L. Roberts (eds), *Intermediaries, Interpreters, and Clerks: African Employees in the Making of Colonial Africa* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006); M. Moyd, *Violent Intermediaries: African Soldiers, Conquest, and Everyday Colonialism in German East Africa* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2014).
31. See for example A.A. Boahen, *African Perspectives on Colonialism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 41; and B. Lawrance, E.L. Osborn and R.L. Roberts, 'Introduction. African Intermediaries and the "Bargain" of Collaboration', in idem (eds), *Intermediaries, Interpreters, and Clerks*, 6. Osborn, 'Circle of Iron', 32, points out that the term 'collaborator' is 'premised on a pan-African identity that flattens out the complexities of Africa's histories'. Yet, it should be noted that Robinson, 'Foundations', 131, never used the term 'collaboration' in a pejorative sense.
32. Lawrance, Osborn and Roberts, 'Introduction', 6. Some scholars emphasize the fact that many of the future nationalists would in fact be drawn from the descendants of the 'collaborators'. Other local elites, like the creole elites in Latin America and Cuba, simply exchanged one empire for another. See A.W. McCoy, 'Fatal Florescence: Europe's Decolonization and America's Decline', in idem, J.M. Fradera and S. Jacobson (eds), *Endless Empire: Spain's Retreat, Europe's Eclipse, America's Decline* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), 12–15.
33. Lawrance, Osborn and Roberts, 'Introduction'; Burbank and Cooper, *Empires in World History*, 14.
34. C. Newbury, 'Patrons, Clients, and Empire: The Subordination of Indigenous Hierarchies in Asia and Africa', *Journal of World History* 11(2) (2000), 227–63.
35. See R. White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and the Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
36. Yet as Iris Seri-Hersch notes in this volume, the term 'cooperation' can be understood as equally anachronistic because of its use by Western 'development' agencies since the postcolonial era.
37. Von Trotha, 'Kolonialismus', 60–63.

38. S. Belmessous, 'The Paradox of an Empire by Treaty', in idem (ed.), *Empire by Treaty: Negotiating European Expansion, 1600–1900* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 11–14.
39. G.H.K. Tabatabai, *The Seir Mutaqhrein, or View of Modern Times: Being a History of India*, 3 vols (Calcutta, 1789), vol. 2, 547–612.
40. C.A. Bayly, *Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 4.
41. See the pioneering studies of P.J. Marshall, *Bengal: The British Bridgehead* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) and Bayly, *Indian Society*.
42. E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, 'Introduction' in idem (eds), *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1–14.
43. B.S. Cohn, 'Representing Authority in Victorian India', in Hobsbawm and Ranger, *Invention of Tradition*, 165–210.
44. This line of thought refers to the introduction in Bhabha, *Location*, 1–2; however, the editors avoided the problematic analytical categories of 'identity' or 'subjectivity', which figure as key concepts of postcolonial studies and also of the new imperial history. See K. Wilson, 'Introduction: Histories, Empires, Modernities', in idem (ed.), *A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity and Modernity in Britain and the Empire 1660–1840* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1–26. These currently prevalent approaches suggest, as Brubaker and Cooper argue, a 'constructivist stance on identity ... to acquit it of the charge of "essentialism" by stipulating that identities are constructed, fluid, and multiple'. Yet by this proliferation the 'term loses its analytical purchase'. See R. Brubaker and F. Cooper, 'Beyond "Identity"', *Theory and Society* 29(1) (2000), 1. In addition, most contributions in this book deal with subjects and communities that did not produce the necessary ego documents such as autobiographies, memoirs or diaries to track down such a thing as identity. Thus, the editors opted instead for the quest for loyalties outlined above and extended the personal with a structural approach. On the problematic use of identity see also A. Stucki, 'Empire Light? Kooperation als Herrschaftsstrategie in den späten iberischen Imperien', in F. Eichmann, M. Pöhlmann and D. Walter (eds), *Globale Kriege und Machtkonflikte: Festschrift für Stig Förster zum 65. Geburtstag* (Paderborn: Schöningh Verlag, 2016), 328–29.
45. On James Achilles Kirkpatrick see also W. Dalrymple, *White Mughals: Love & Betrayal in Eighteenth-Century India* (London: Penguin Books, 2002).
46. S. David, *The Indian Mutiny, 1857* (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 351–52.
47. See L. Lukitz, *A Quest in the Middle East: Gertrude Bell and the Making of Modern Iraq* (London: Tauris, 2006).
48. On Picton see J. Epstein, S*candal of Colonial Rule: Power and Subversion in the British Atlantic during the Age of Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); K. Candlin, *The Last Caribbean Frontier, 1795–1815* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 118–37. After a lengthy trial, Picton was acquitted of all charges. The former Governor of Trinidad is certainly more famous for his deeds during the Peninsular Campaign under Wellington. He was the

highest-ranking officer on the British side to die at the Battle of Waterloo. A statue in St Paul's Cathedral in London commemorates him.

49. See O. Gliech, *Saint-Domingue und die Französische Revolution: Das Ende der weißen Herrschaft in einer karibischen Plantagenökonomie* (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2011), 87–92.
50. E. Burke, 'Speech on Opening of Impeachment on 15 February 1788', in P.J. Marshall (ed.), *The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke*, 9 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), vol. 6, 270–82. See also N.B. Dirks, *The Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation of Imperial Britain* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 1–5.
51. Ibid.
52. See for example F. Bösch, *Öffentliche Geheimnisse: Skandale, Politik und Medien in Deutschland und Großbritannien, 1880–1914* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2009), 225–328.
53. See for example T. Klein and F. Schumacher (eds), *Kolonialkriege: Militärische Gewalt im Zeichen des Imperialismus* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2006); T. Bührer, C. Stachelbeck and D. Walter (eds), *Imperialkriege von 1500 bis heute: Strukturen – Akteure – Lernprozesse* (Paderborn: Schöningh Verlag, 2011); D. Killingray and D. Omissi (eds), *Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers, c. 1700–1964* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999); O. Le Cour Grandmaison, *Coloniser, exterminer: Sur la guerre et l'état colonial* (Paris: Fayard, 2005).
54. H.-H. Kortüm (ed.), *Transcultural Wars from the Middle Ages to the 21st Century* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2006).
55. S. Förster, *Die mächtigen Diener der East India Company: Ursachen und Hintergründe der britischen Expansionspolitik in Südasien, 1793–1819* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1992).
56. Robinson, 'Foundations', 124–26.
57. For a general analysis of imperial warfare see D. Walter, *Organisierte Gewalt in der europäischen Expansion: Gestalt und Logik des Imperialkrieges* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2014).
58. See Moyd, *Intermediaries*; M. Thomas, *Violence and Colonial Order: Police, Workers and Protest in the European Colonial Empires, 1918–1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

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