CONTEXTUALIZING TERRITORIAL REVISIONISM IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE
Goals, Expectations, and Practices

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A few years after the coming to power of Nazism in Germany, an alliance of states and nationalistic movements formed, revolving around the German axis. The states involved in this alliance and the interplay between their territorial aims and those of Germany lies at the core of this volume. In other words, the volume deals with the phenomenon of territorial revisionism in the interwar period and in the Second World War. Our purpose is to show the usefulness of a historical approach which considers East Central Europe in the Second World War as a whole instead of narrowing the focus to the individual states involved. In our opinion, this perspective allows for a clearer understanding of some of the central topics in the history of the Second World War, which are still in need of illumination. These include:

- The interaction between Nazi Germany and its allies in reshaping East Central Europe, and the pursuit of autonomous goals by Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and so on within the framework of the German policy of *Lebensraum* ("living space")
- The parallel wars waged by Germany's allies with one another in pursuit of their own territorial goals
- The radical policies—in some cases with genocidal features—implemented by Germany's allies, and which can be likened very closely to Nazi policies[1]
- The common heritage of ethnic struggle in the multi-national empires of the region and its transformation in the framework of the post-Versailles order

Today, "territorial revisionism" does not seem to be a big issue—either in modern history or in political science. At most the term recalls the policy of the German foreign minister, Gustav Stresemann, who aimed to revise the German–Polish border after having settled controversies with France and Great Britain in Locarno in 1925. Further proof of the limited attention paid to this issue is the fact that it is not easy to find a definition of the concept in the most commonly cited lexicons of political science and international relations. At best, one finds this concise description in the German Brockhaus encyclopaedia: "Revisionism—keyword for attempts to change existing conditions, constitutions, laws or borders or to modify ideological statements."[2] Therefore we will utilize "territorial revisionism" for all manner of politics and military measures which attempted to change existing borders.

In a paper published some years ago, Robert H. Jackson and Mark W. Zacher stated that between the Westphalian Peace at the end of the Thirty Years war (1648) and 1945, the percentage of wars ending with a redistribution of territory was around 80 per cent—that is to say that most interstate conflicts were settled with the handing over of territory. The extension of territory was the first source of security and wealth for a state; therefore, the maintenance and acquisition of territory was the prime object of international politics. Apart from war, territory could be gained through such things as inheritance, marriage, conquest, colonization, and purchase.[3] But things became more complicated when sovereignty needed to be legitimized by "the will of the people"—that is, by the "nation." According to the Italian historian Rosario Romeo, since the second half of the nineteenth century, "there was a place in Europe only for those states which could claim a national legitimacy."[4] Therefore, the multi-national empires suffered from a growing lack of legitimacy, which resulted in a fatal weakness when a major international clash, the First World War, broke out. The formidable impetus of the formula of the "self determination of people" proved invincible, perhaps beyond the hopes and expectations of its proponents among the Western allies.[5]

The European Scenario in the Interwar Period

When America entered the First World War in 1917, its justification was that this was part of a struggle for human rights and democracy. Therein lay the core principle of the postwar order that the victorious allies sought to create: the people's right to political self-determination in the form of a parliamentary democracy, which at the time could only be imagined as existing within a nation-state. To establish oneself as a nation in one's own state was the focal point in most thinking about political self-determination. The end of the First World War seemed to provide the opportunity for dismantling the multi-national

Habsburg monarchy along those lines and replacing it with nation-states. With the cessation of hostilities, parliamentary democracy applied to nation-states had become the dominant constitutional model for postwar Europe. Europe now consisted of twenty-eight states, nine of which had been newly added: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia.

But, against the optimistic expectations of Woodrow Wilson, who claimed that his intention was to fight a war to end all wars and to make the world safe for democracy, the First World War introduced to Europe an era of insecurity and disorientation. In fact, for most people the war meant the end of the world as they had known it. On August 3, 1914, Sir Edward Grey had prophetically evoked the impending catastrophe: "The lamps are going out all over Europe; we shall not see them lit again in our life-time." A time of great uncertainty had begun, a time of seeking new things. Parliamentary democracies won the war, but they lost the peace, for this war destroyed the foundations of an entire century. In the search for a new order capable of replacing the vanished bourgeois world, democratic principles were seen as a spent force.[6] In most elections the liberals dissolved into small splinter groups, and new parties of the masses came into being with very different patterns of organization, mass mobilization, and other aims. The First World War increased political and social violence on a mass scale.[7] In many states—such as Germany, Italy, Austria, Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Latvia—political parties both on the Left and on the Right set up their own armed militias. The state lost its monopoly over the use of force as it was challenged by organized groups which were able to exercise violence on their own for their own aims. Political assassinations and murders were the order of the day, and in many countries the war continued in the form of a civil war. In Germany, for instance, 354 people were killed for political reasons from 1918 to 1921, while in the last phase of the Weimar Republic street fighting caused some 400 casualties. In Bulgaria, unrest in 1923 claimed at least 20,000 lives.[8] Even in Switzerland, a stronghold of political stability, there was a general strike.

In 1938, there were sixty-five sovereign states in the world, only seventeen of which could be called parliamentary constitutional states. From the point of view of types of government, Europe was divided in two: in the north and west there were constitutional states with a democratic structure, against which stood a block of dictatorships in the south and east. This block included autocracies, dictatorships in the fascist mould, and the Soviet Union.[9] It even appeared at times that fascist or authoritarian regimes might gain a foothold in the democratic heartlands of Western Europe.[10]

Dictatorship was now catching on as democracy had once done, and even a rule of terror could be based on the broad acceptance of the populace.[11] Apparently, the new totalitarian and authoritarian dictatorships managed to

address the problems of the modern age more forcefully, above all through the social and political reshaping of mass society according to radical new principles: *Volksgemeinschaft*, administration by Soviets and dictatorships of the proletariat, and pervasive fascist mass organizations and parties.[12]

With regard to international settlements, dictatorships appeared as the architects of a new European order which could improve the territorial situation established after the First World War. As the Swiss historian Jörg Fisch recently pointed out, the treaties signed at the Paris Peace Conference tried to reconcile two opposing principles: the traditional right of the victorious powers to establish the postwar order, and the new right to self-determination of the people.[13] Fisch shows how at the peace conference the victorious as well as the defeated powers utilized the principle of self-determination as a powerful rhetorical device in order to achieve the most convenient international position. The unchallenged acceptance of the principle of self-determination imposed the necessity of ethical-juridical legitimacy regarding the ceding of territory. This was something new in the history of international relations.[14] In reality, though, the right of self-determination was recognized in the Peace Treaties only for the victors and the successor states of Austria-Hungary (again without the losers: Austria and Hungary).[15] Still, as the right to self-determination appeared to be self-evident, and not in need of further justification, the defeated powers were able to put forward their revisionist claims wrapped in a highly convincing discourse.[16] As is generally known, the *Anschluss* of Austria by the Third Reich and its claims to the Sudetenland were supported by Great Britain under the "principle of self-determination."[17] Not only did Great Britain and France consent to a radical revision of the Treaty of Versailles, but this revision, carried out in the name of the defense of minorities, was acknowledged as legitimate and reasonable.[18]

It is no coincidence that the center of gravity for attempts at territorial revisionism in Europe was located in the lands of the old multi-national empires. In fact, as Hannah Arendt remarked perspicaciously, it seems that the drawing-up of boundaries for the new nation-states created in Paris in 1919 and 1920 simply served the purpose of reproducing the experiment of the Habsburg monarchy in miniature. Most of the new states were just as multi-national as the old empires had been, but in their perception of themselves they were "nation-states" in which their respective core nation was regarded as representing the whole population.[19] Therefore, the rise of Nazi Germany as the most successful revisionist power, which based its politics on the criterion of race and radical anti-Semitism, set the agenda for its neighboring countries as well. The latter enacted plans of territorial enlargement, at least a partial elimination of the Jews, and ethnic engineering that, on the whole, provided considerable destructive potential on their own. Such plans were fitted to the general framework of the Third Reich's New European Order.

Revisionism in Practice

As a consequence of the Munich Agreement of 1938, the Sudetenland was transferred from Czechoslovakia to Nazi Germany. But other states, such as Poland[20] and Hungary,[21] also demanded parts of Czechoslovakia for themselves: Poland claimed the district of Teschen, and Hungary desired Carpatho-Ukraine. Poland got the desired territory in direct negotiations with Czechoslovakia, whereas a small part of Carpatho-Ukraine together with a strip along the Slovak–Hungarian border was allotted to Hungary by Nazi Germany and Italy in the First Vienna Award of November 2, 1938.[22] After Germany destroyed the rump state of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, Hungary marched into Carpatho-Ukraine and held it until the final phase of the Second World War. The First Vienna Award, accomplished just one month after the Munich Agreement and greeted with benevolent indifference by the Western powers,[23] marked a crucial turning point in the political alliances of East Central Europe. Germany proved itself to be both the unchallenged hegemonic power in the area and the determining factor of the "new order." Alternative alliances, which were pursued up to that point, such as one between Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia under the patronage of Mussolini,[24] suddenly became pointless. Fascist Italy itself signed the unfavorable and far-reaching Pact of Steel with Germany in May 1939.

For Germany, the redrawing of borders in favor of its allies (or at least promises to do so) became a powerful tool for keeping alliances alive or gaining a new ally in the course of the Second World War.[25] Such was the case with Romania, which definitively joined the German camp after the loss of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union in accordance with the Nazi–Soviet Pact. The Romanian alignment with Germany occurred despite the loss of northern Transylvania and Southern Dobrudja to Germany's allies, Hungary and Bulgaria.[26]

Territorial gains or the recovery of territories previously lost played a crucial role in foreign and domestic policies in East Central Europe between 1918 and 1945, and even later. Territorial expansion, legitimized by more or less well-founded national claims, was a key foreign-policy issue for states like Hungary, Bulgaria,[27] and Yugoslavia.[28] Even the Soviet Union was eager to reconquer territories which the Russian Empire had lost after the Bolshevik revolution, such as Bessarabia, northern Bukovina, the Baltic states, western Ukraine, and at least a part of Finland. Others, like the Slovaks, the Croats, and the Ukrainians, took advantage of the war in order to achieve a certain amount of political independence under the protection of Germany.[29] Finally, a third pattern pertained to those states which lost territory as a consequence of others' successful revisionism and hoped to recover it thanks to Germany: these were the already mentioned cases of Romania and Finland.

To sum up, all these states (and various separatist movements) were revisionist in one way or another. All of them strived either to change the settlements agreed upon at the Paris Peace Conference, or to modify the new status quo established in the framework of the Nazi–Soviet Pact (even though, in the long term, neither Finland nor Romania achieved the revision of the boundaries set down in the terms of the Pact), or to achieve full state independence. Such goals were often pursued by these states against each other, through border infiltration by paramilitary forces,[30] through claims on their neighbors' territories, or by cooperation in seizing parts of states when they collapsed, such as Yugoslavia, which Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria carved up.[31] Extremely brutal clashes between Poles and Ukrainians occurred in the regions under German occupation (Volhynia, the Zamość area under the General Government, and Eastern Galicia). Also, the Ukrainians in northern Bukovina were persecuted by Romanians despite Ukrainian collaboration with the Germans. Therefore, we may conclude that the different agents involved in these regional conflicts over possession of an ethnically cleansed territory were fighting their own war, quite different from the one the Germans were fighting. István Deák sustains here the thesis that the allies of Nazi Germany constantly sought to push to the fore their own agenda and to engage on the side of Germany only when doing so corresponded with their own aims. This fact meant, of course, a weakening of the Axis alliance and a narrowing of its military effectiveness.

The Minorities Issue

The settlement of Versailles had assigned millions of people whose common language and ethnic self-perception were different from those of the majority population to states where they felt "foreign" or even in opposition. The most obvious cases were that of Germans, handed over to Czechoslovakia, Italy, and Poland,[32] and of Magyars, divided between Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania. Sizeable Bulgarian minorities, meanwhile, were consigned to Romania and Greece, while Croats and Slovenes came under Italian sovereignty.[33] Of course, not all people who were claimed as co-nationals shared nationalist or irredentist aims.[34] In any case, the sharing-out of the empires among would-be nation-states,[35] combined with revisionist agitation and the discredit heaped upon democracy and liberalism after the onset of the world-wide economic crisis[36] in the 1930s, helped to radicalize existing minority networks. In the first section of this volume, Norbert Spannenberger shows that among German settlements in Romania, Hungary, and Yugoslavia there was a clear orientation toward National Socialist programs, forms of organization, and rituals. The German SS could easily put the *volksdeutsche* networks under their control and utilize them as a trump card in foreign policy.[37] Franz Horváth demonstrates in his chapter on the

German minority in Czechoslovakia and the Hungarian minority in Transylvania how different factors affected the attitude of representatives of minorities towards the host state. His contribution offers evidence of the fluid character of the revisionism advocated by minority networks: in both cases, territorial revisionism was actively supported by minorities after the outbreak of the world economic crisis, and particularly after 1937/38, when it became a politically viable aspiration. In contrast, in the 1920s, many representatives of the German and Hungarian minorities accepted the status quo and took part in the political life of Czechoslovakia and Romania. Overall, in the late 1930s, asserting minority-identity and minority rights seemed to be successful and worthwhile projects.[38]

The Manifold Problems of the Heirs of East Central Europe's Empires

The states and movements involved in revisionist dynamics were without exception relatively new or only would-be states. They had appeared in the course of the dissolution of the Ottoman, Czarist, and Austrian-Hungarian Empires between 1878 and 1918/19 with no clear idea about adequate national boundaries.[39] As a rule, nationalist politicians asserted the right of their nation to the largest possible territory, making use of a highly disparate and inconsistent set of arguments, which combined such things as historical rights (sometimes dating back to prehistoric times), an alleged cultural superiority linked with an exclusive claim to exercise the civilizing function in an area, geopolitical interests, integrative achievements regarding heterogeneous populations, and a more defined cultural identity in comparison to neighboring peoples.[40] As Imanuel Geiss has rightly argued, such states utilized a "backwards projection" of nation and empire in order to justify historically their territorial claims as nation-states.[41] For instance, the territorial horizon of Bulgaria was set, as Stefan Troebst points out in his chapter, by the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878, even though the terms of that treaty were never enacted. The political elites of these states shared the conviction of the time that a state should prove its strength through territorial expansion and that war was a legitimate price to pay in order to achieve an enlargement of state power.[42]

At the same time, the new states of East Central Europe were relatively weak, non-homogeneous, plagued by dire economic and social problems (including the peasantry and land reform issues),[43] and they also had inadequate control over their border regions.[44] They were light years away from corresponding to the ideal type of a modern nation-state as described a few years ago by Charles Maier, and unable to mobilize fully the people and resources existing on their territory.[45]

Two factors primarily affected the minority question in the successor states of the old multi-national empires. First, under the Habsburg monarchy, the

different groups had undergone a process of nationalization and politicization from the bottom up. In fact, the monarchy had sponsored a process of political democratization without trying to nationalize the people. As a consequence, people nationalized themselves, claiming pre-existing ethnic appurtenances or other criteria to prove the existence of their nation.[46] Second, in the case of the Germans and the Hungarians, the minorities belonged to previous "master nations,"[47] which were not used to being nationally oppressed or dispossessed.

One of the ways the new states strived to strengthen the position of the "titular nation" was to get rid of at least some of their minorities. This objective was pursued so that the new states could establish themselves as worthy successors to the imperial order, to attain a sufficient degree of internal homogeneity corresponding to the criteria of a nation-state, and to stabilize their political power.[48]

The new states were faced with manifold concerns: border disputes, nation-building, economic problems, and an unstable international situation. The uncertainty of a significant proportion of the citizens of these states as to whether they actually belonged to the political community made things worse and created a palpable atmosphere of internal instability.[49] The territorial premise of the sustainability of a political community, whereby "identity space" should coincide with "decision space,"[50] failed to materialize in many parts of East Central Europe.

An Era of Revisionism?

In all revisionist programs, a supposedly incorrect order needs to be replaced by a correct one, which corresponds more closely to the supposedly just claims of the states or movements involved. In the end, the fulfillment of revisionist claims inevitably led to new revisionisms being created, forming a vicious circle that arose out of a desire to possess as much territory as possible.[51] Territorial revisionism became contagious: when revisionist claims were fulfilled, they made revisionists out of states that were previously territorially satisfied. A prime example is Romania, which almost doubled its territory at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919/20 and became revisionist after the Soviet Union and Hungary successfully regained parts of its territory in alliance with the Third Reich. Otherwise, successful revisionism had a demonstration effect: the handing over of the Sudetenland to Germany after the Munich Agreement of 1938 encouraged Poland and Hungary to annex Czechoslovakian territory for their part.

The contributions to the second section of this volume, devoted to "revisionism as a driving force," reveal the pervasiveness of revisionism in the interwar period and during the Second World War. Holly Case even advocates considering the period as an "era of revisionism." She states that revisionism

was an ideology, which as a guiding principle not only affected foreign policy but also internal policies, welfare, and patterns of behavior for considerable numbers of people. Elżbieta Znamierowska-Rakk and Ignác Romsics demonstrate how deeply and comprehensively revisionism was able to condition politics in Bulgaria and Hungary. In the first case it led to Bulgaria's convergence with Nazi Germany and to accession to the Tripartite Pact in March 1941, and participation in the occupation of Yugoslavia. This alliance was not supported by ideological allegiances or by traditional loyalties, which, in fact, tied the people to Russia. Hungary, meanwhile, even incurred the risk of armed conflict with Romania on the eve of the Second Vienna Award by demanding the cession of part of Transylvania and finally gave up its policy of neutrality by accession to the Tripartite Pact on November 20, 1940. Already in 1938 Hungary had made significant concessions to its German minority, entitling it to autonomous administration through the *Volksbund der Deutschen in Ungarn* and thus endangering the internal cohesiveness of the state.

A further main feature of revisionism highlighted by the contributions in the second section is its versatile nature: revisionism moved constantly in whatever might be the most promising direction. Bulgaria, for instance, desired Southern Dobrudja because it was a much easier territory to win than Western Thrace. Hungary occupied Carpatho-Ukraine in 1938/39 although Transylvania had a much higher priority in its revisionist agenda. We may add that Romania participated in the attack against the Soviet Union and hoped to get back Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, ceded to the Soviet Union in 1940, and thus did not act on a purely anti-communist impulse.[52] This does not mean that these territories were more important than northern Transylvania, which Romania had been compelled to cede to Hungary in the Second Vienna Award: they were just easier to achieve—or at least so it seemed! In the long run, Transylvania remained a non-negotiable aim for Romania and for Hungary as well. This explains why both countries could not overcome their animosity, although they were both allies of the Third Reich and members of the Tripartite Pact. Southern Dobrudja, by contrast, did not play a comparable role in relations between Romania and Bulgaria, which were not significantly affected by the handing over of the region.

The third section of the volume focuses on "practices of revisionism," with a specific emphasis on the implementation of ethnic cleansing, on sporadic mass killings of Jews and other "undesirable elements," and collaboration with the Germans in the systematic deportation of Jews to the death camps. As István Deák points out, one of the main goals of the allies of Nazi Germany was to use "the war as an effective instrument for ridding their country of ethnic and religious minorities." Nearly all of them engaged in some form of ethnic cleansing and genocide.[53] Revisionism was closely interwoven with ethno-nationalism—that is, with a conception of the nation based on supposedly "natural" and immutable features. Paradoxically, ethno-nationalism showed the

greatest diffusion and deep-rootedness in areas where national allegiances were extremely fluid or at least of recent date, as illustrated by Frank Golczewski for the borderlands between Poland and Ukraine: "When Poles and Ukrainians fought each other, they fought for their relatively new national creed. The earlier confessional diversity of these lands had given way to an ethnic one: ethnicity had replaced confession. And ethnicity was one of those things people had learned to fight for." The fatal combination of territorial revisionism and ethno-nationalism explains why the conquest of territories was accompanied in so many cases by ethnic cleansing, mass killing, and violence against the Jewish population. In the whole of East Central Europe, most political forces were convinced that having an ethnically homogeneous population was the indispensable basis of leading a nation to greatness.[54]

Mariana Hausleitner shows how a national program of "purification"—that is, of getting rid of Jews and other minorities by utilizing mass murder and ethnic cleansing as tools—gained renewed impetus in Romania after the country's territorial losses to Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union. Particularly in border areas, murderous plans of ethnic engineering were implemented. The region of Transnistria, which was part of the Ukraine, became for some one hundred thousand Jews a sort of huge open death camp. At the same time, the expropriation of Jewish property and its redistribution among Romanian colonists in the border regions was carried out to secure the country's borders, an obsession of Romanian political elites since the doubling of Romanian territory after the First World War.

Frank Grelka examines the forms of collaboration of Ukrainian nationalists with Germany's forces of occupation. Collaboration extended to the military and administrative spheres and included full participation in the Final Solution of the "Jewish question" as well as an attempt to eradicate Ukraine's Polish inhabitants. What the Ukrainian nationalists hoped to achieve was a sort of autonomous status in the framework of the "New European Order," that status to be exercised over a space which should be ethnically and racially "cleansed."

Stefan Troebst examines the role of the paramilitary terrorist organization, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), made up mostly of Bulgarian refugees from the territories ceded to Yugoslavia by the Treaty of Neuilly. IMRO was the most powerful terrorist group in the area and could rely on 5,000 fighters and additional terrorist cells. The function of IMRO in Bulgarian foreign policy was ambiguous: on the one hand, it might be utilized for dirty work under the cover of Bulgaria's attempts at "peaceful revisionism," while on the other hand IMRO was able to undermine the foreign policy of the Bulgarian government: rapprochement with Yugoslavia failed because of the paramilitary activities of IMRO in the Macedonian border regions.[55] After Italy's truce with the Western allies on September 8, 1943, IMRO even took up administrative responsibilities in northern Greece on behalf of the Germans.

In their active participation in the destruction of the Jewish population of Eastern Europe, the political elites of the countries allied with Nazi Germany behaved with ferocity combined with a pursuit of selective aims: foreign Jews and those settled in border regions or newly acquired territories were handed over to the Germans or starved to death, while Jewish citizens and Jews settled in the interiors of those countries were mostly spared deportation and death.[56] Such considerations reopen the question of the relationship between Nazi Germany and the policies of its allies in the Second World War, and the nature of authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe as well. Genocidal anti-Semitism was promoted by broad sections of the political elite in Romania and Hungary. In Poland, too, the idea of expelling all Jews to Madagascar or to other inhospitable places enjoyed great popularity.[57] According to Martin Broszat, it was "precisely anti-Semitism . . . which proved to be one of the most effective vehicles of ideological conformity."[58] Such observations must lead us to reconsider certain notions about the specific features of German National Socialism and the relationship which developed between the far-reaching goals of Nazi Germany and the more modest, but absolutely congruent, aims of its allies regarding the annihilation of Jews, the elimination of ethnic minorities, and territorial revisionism.[59] The revisionist (and expansionist) policies of the East Central European states show very similar patterns in their territorial aims and in the attempts to purge their acquisitions of those elements considered undesirable and ethnically "spurious" to the nation.[60]

Despite the evident similarities, historical research has so far mostly neglected taking a comprehensive approach to the issues of territorial revisionism and ethnic simplification in the Second World War. Even Timothy Snyder's acclaimed groundbreaking study of the "bloodlands"—that is, the disputed war zone in the border regions between Germany and the Soviet Union—interprets the atrocities perpetrated in the Polish, Ukrainian, Baltic, and White Russian territories as the result of the clash of two totalitarian regimes, without considering the possibly autonomous role of minor players driven by ethno-national ideologies.[61] The annihilation of the European Jews has up to now been treated either by an exclusive focus on Nazi Germany or has been seen within the framework of national histories of the Holocaust.[62] Very few studies have tried to interpret the destruction of the Jewish population of Eastern Europe as a common attempt on the part of the anti-Semitic elites of those states,[63] which should not necessarily be defined as "fascist,"[64] to re-establish control over territories allegedly endangered by the Jewish presence,[65] to annihilate an element considered as irrevocably alien to the state and nation, or to grab their possessions and create consensus among the non-Jewish population through the redistribution of expropriated goods and property.[66]

When we stress the great degree of political autonomy enjoyed by the states of East Central Europe and their individual responsibility for territorial revisionism,

together with the elimination of ethnic minorities and the annihilation of the Jews, this obviously does not mean that we are losing sight of the fact that it was Nazi Germany's expansionist policies and racial doctrine which first made it possible. But it is true that those policies and beliefs were used both by Germany's allies and by their conquered peoples. From the perspective of the implementation of a "New European Order," these "minor players" engaged in extremely bloody wars on their own with the aim of achieving the most favorable position in the redistribution of space and of gaining the most favorable position in the new hierarchy of European peoples. The politics of annihilation and forced population movement were implemented with the goal of achieving full control over the territory of the state, including its border regions, through ethno-national homogeneity.

In the concluding pages of his reinterpretation of the history of postwar Europe, the late Tony Judt stated, "Holocaust recognition is our contemporary European entry ticket."[67] The policy of ethnic cleansing, which already existed in the nineteenth century whenever nation-states came into being in multi-national areas,[68] has not yet been stored away in the memory of Europeans as a central part of the history of present-day Europe.

Notes

1. For some important insights, see: Christoph Dieckmann, Babette Qunikert, and Tatjana Tönsmeyer, "Editorial," in eid. (eds), *Kooperation und Verbrechen: Formen der "Kollaboration" im östlichen Europa, 1939–1945* (Göttingen, 2003), 9–21.
2. *Brockhaus Enzyklopädie* (Leipzig, 1998), vol. 18, 316.
3. Robert H. Jackson and Mark W. Zacher, "The Territorial Covenant: International Society and the Stabilization of Boundaries," Working Paper No. 15, Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia (Vancouver, 1997), 4, 2; Richard Rosecrance, "The Rise of the Virtual State," *Foreign Affairs* (July–August, 1996): 45–61, esp. 48.
4. Rosario Romeo, "Nazione," in *Enciclopedia Italiana del Novecento* (Rome, 1979), vol. 4, 525.
5. According to Jörg Fisch, Woodrow Wilson utilized the formula of the "right to self-determination" only to counter Lenin's propaganda without considering the consequences of the acknowledgment of this principle by the victorious powers. Jörg Fisch, *Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker: Die Domestizierung einer Illusion* (Munich, 2010), 156, 181.
6. Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (London, 1999), 15–23.
7. For a general overview of European history still worth reading, see: Ernst Nolte, *Die Krise des liberalen Systems und die Entwicklung der Faschismen* (Munich, 1968).
8. Günther Mai, *Europa 1918–1939* (Stuttgart, 2001), 170–71.
9. Cf. Stephen J. Lee, *The European Dictatorships 1918–1945* (London, 2000).
10. See, e.g., Andreas Wirsching, *Vom Weltkrieg zum Bürgerkrieg? Politischer Extremismus in Deutschland und Frankreich 1918–1933/39: Berlin und Paris im Vergleich* (Munich, 1999); idem (ed.), *Herausforderungen der parlamentarischen Demokratie: die Weimarer Republik im europäischen Vergleich* (Munich, 2007); idem, "Political Violence in France and Italy after 1918," *Journal of Modern European History* 1,1 (2003): 60–79; Robert Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism* (London, 2005).

11. For a trenchant contribution, see: Götz Aly, *Hitler's Beneficiaries: How the Nazis Bought the German People* (London, 2007), which is also on the participation of the occupied states of Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece in dispossessing the Jews; cf. Mark Mazower, *Hitler's Empire* (London, 2009), 416–70.

12. On "reactionary modernism" as an attitude which seeks to purify modernity from its negative, alienating effects, see: Jeffrey Herf, *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich* (Cambridge, 1984).

13. Fisch, *Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker*, 158.

14. Ibid., 159–62, 187.

15. István Deák, "The Habsburg Empire," in Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen (eds), *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-building: The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman and Habsburg Empires* (Boulder, 1997), 133.

16. Fisch, *Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker*, 186–88, 276–79.

17. Marina Cattaruzza, "'Last Stop Expulsion': The Minority Question and Forced Migration in East-Central Europe: 1918–1949," *Nations and Nationalism* 16,1 (2010): 108–26, esp. 115–17; Fisch, *Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker*, 193–97.

18. A.J.P. Taylor, *On The Origins of the Second World War* (Harmondsworth, 1965), 190–336. Both the French and the British governments had consented to German economic expansion into southeastern Europe during the Munich Conference. For France this meant the end of its ambitions in this former sphere of influence. See Christian Leitz, *Nazi Foreign Policy 1933–1941: The Road to Global War* (London, 2004), 98–99.

19. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York, 1951), 260; Cattaruzza, "'Last Stop Expulsion'," 114.

20. Anna M. Cienciala, "Poland and the Munich Crisis, 1938: A Reappraisal," *East European Quarterly* 3,2 (1969): 201–19; Zara Steiner, *The Triumph of the Dark: European International History 1933–1939* (Oxford, 2011), 686–90.

21. For a long perspective, see: István Deák, "A Fatal Compromise? The Debate over Collaboration and Resistance in Hungary," in István Deák, Jan T. Gross, and Tony Judt (eds), *The Politics of Retribution in Europe: World War II and its Aftermath* (Princeton, 2000), 39–73, esp. 52.

22. Anthony Komjathy, "The First Vienna Award (November 2, 1938)," *Austrian History Yearbook* 15/16 (1979/1980): 131–56.

23. This point is particularly stressed in: Haim Shamir, "Une modeste revanche de Trianon: L'arbitrage de Vienne du 2 novembre 1938," *Revue d'Historie Diplomatique* 104,1/2 (1990): 7–36.

24. Komjathy, "The First Vienna Award," 145, 152, 154; Martin Broszat, "Deutschland-Ungarn-Rumänien: Entwicklung und Grundfaktoren nationalsozialistischer Hegemonial- und Bündnispolitik 1938–1941," *Historische Zeitschrift* 206 (1968): 45–96, here 66, 73–74; Leitz, *Nazi Foreign Policy*, 98–99.

25. Alfred Rieber, "Repressive Population Transfers in Central, Eastern and South-eastern Europe," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 16,1/2 (2000): 1–27, here 17.

26. Broszat, "Deutschland-Ungarn-Rumänien," 82; Leitz, *Nazi Foreign Policy*, 92–104; Dennis Deletant, *Hitler's Forgotten Ally: Ion Antonescu and His Regime, Romania 1940–1944* (Basingstoke, 2006), 8–25. "On 4 July 1940, Romania joined the Berlin-Rome Axis. Hitler now cleverly exploited his position. In a letter of 13 July, he reminded Carol of his acceptance of the Anglo-French guarantee and made German protection conditional on the settlement of the outstanding territorial disputes with Hungary and Bulgaria over Transylvania and Dobrudja, which the cession of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina had triggered" (Deletant, *Hitler's Forgotten Ally*, 22).

27. See the contributions of Elżbieta Znamierowska-Rakk and Ignác Romsics in this volume. On Bulgaria, see also: Marshall Lee Miller, *Bulgaria during the Second World War* (Stanford, 1975), esp. 1–55.

28. On the strained Italian–Yugoslav relationship caused by Yugoslav irredentist agitation and the Italian repression of Slav minorities, see: Marina Cattaruzza, *L'Italia e il confine orientale* (Bologna, 2007), 168–205; ead., "The Making and Remaking of a Boundary: The Redrafting of the Eastern Border of Italy after the Two Worlds Wars," *Journal of Modern European History* 9,1 (2011): 66–85, esp. 73–75.

29. Timothy Snyder, "The Causes of Ukrainian-Polish Ethnic Cleansing, 1943," *Past and Present* 179 (2003): 197–234; Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Hitler's New Disorder: The Second World War and Yugoslavia.* (London, 2008), 22–48; Tatjana Tönsmeyer, *Das Dritte Reich und die Slowakei 1939–1945: Politischer Alltag zwischen Kooperation und Eigensinn* (Paderborn, 2003); Nevenko Bartulin, "The NDH as a 'Central European Bulwark Against Italian Imperialism': An Assessment of Croatian–Italian Relations within the German 'New Order' in Europe," *Review of Croatian History* 3,1 (2007): 49–73. As István Deák rightly pointed out: "The post-World War I arrangements failed to fulfill the political ambitions of Slovak, Croatian, Bosnian and Ukrainian nationalists. Their day would come during World War II, but only so long as their protector, Nazi Germany, reigned supreme in the region" (Deák, "The Habsburg Empire," 132).

30. On Bulgarian IMRO units, employed in the border regions between Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Greece, see the contribution of Stefan Troebst in this volume.

31. Pavlowitch, *Hitler's New Disorder*; Marie-Janine Calic, *Geschichte Jugoslawiens im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 2010), 137–79.

32. Sabine Bamberger-Stemmann, *Nationale Minderheiten zwischen Lobbyistentum und Grossmachtinteressen* (Marburg, 2000), 35–49.

33. Hans Lemberg, "Der Weg zur Entstehung der Nationalstaaten in Ostmitteleuropa," in Georg Brunner (ed.), *Osteuropa zwischen Nationalstaat und Integration* (Berlin, 1995), 45–72.

34. See on this point: Roger Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups* (Cambridge, MA, 2004), 7–27. In Bohemia, for example, Czech parents chose to send their children to German schools despite nationalist propaganda. See: S. Tara Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900–1948* (Ithaca, 2008).

35. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 260.

36. Michael Mann, *Fascists* (Cambridge, 2004), 237–95; Mariana Hausleitner and Harald Roth (eds), *Der Einfluß von Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus auf Minderheiten in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa* (Munich, 2006); Jerzy W. Borejsza and Klaus Ziemer (eds), *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes in Europe: Legacies and Lessons from the Twentieth Century* (Oxford, 2006); Erwin Oberländer (ed.), *Autoritäre Regime in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa, 1919–1944* (Paderborn, 2001).

37. On National Socialist influence on the official organization of European minorities from 1933 onwards, see Sabine Bamberger-Stemmann, *Der Europäische Nationalitätenkongress 1925 bis 1938: nationale Minderheiten zwischen Lobbyistentum und Grossmachtinteressen* (Marburg, 2000), 249–396; Martyn Housden, "Ethical Drift: Ewald Ammende, the Congress of European Nationalities and the Rise of German National Socialism," *Central and Eastern European Review* 1 (2007): 2–31.

38. See Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups*, 10, on the role of "ethnopolitical entrepreneurs" in producing a reification of ethnic groups: "By *invoking* groups they seek to *evoke* them, summon them, call them into being. Their categories are for *doing*—designed to stir, summon, justify, mobilize, kindle, and energize."

39. Cf. Aviel Roshwald, *Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia and the Middle East, 1914–1923* (London, 2001); Barkey and von Hagen, *After Empire*.

40. For a nice listing of these and similar arguments, see the contributions of Ignác Romsics and Frank Golczewski in this volume.

41. Immanuel Geiss, "Imperien und Nationen: Zur universalhistorischen Topographie von Macht und Herrschaft," *Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte* 28 (1999): 57–91, here 84. On the link between nationalism and imperialism, see also Wolfgang J. Mommsen, "The Varieties of the Nation State in Modern History: Liberal, Imperialist, Fascist and Contemporary Notions of Nation and Nationality," in Michael Mann (ed.), *The Rise and Decline of the Nation State* (Oxford, 1990), 210–26, here 220–24; for a global perspective, see Jürgen Osterhammel, *Die Verwandlung der Welt: Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Munich, 2010), 565–70.

42. James J. Sheehan, *Kontinent der Gewalt: Europas langer Weg zum Frieden* (Munich, 2008), 17, 78, 200.

43. Christian Giordano, "Réformes agraires et tensions ethniques en Europe centrale et orientale," *Etudes Rurales* 62 (2001): 205–28; id., "Ruralité et nation en Europe centrale et orientale," *Etudes Rurales* 63 (2002): 45–66; id., "Land Reform and Ethnic Tensions in South East Europe," in Jan Koehler and Christoph Zürcher (eds), *Potentials of Disorder* (Manchester, 2003), 75–90.

44. See Carlyle A. Macartney, *National States and National Minorities* (Oxford, 1934), 415–19. On the consequences of agrarian reform on minorities in border regions, Macartney states: "Meanwhile, various 'land reform' acts have been used to break up the solidarity of the minorities by settling among them, and on land to which they often had a better claim in equity, immigrants from the interior, who have too often been desperados of the worst character (since few but the toughest would undertake to settle thus in the midst of a hostile population)" (ibid., 417).

45. Charles S. Maier, "Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era," *American Historical Review* 105,3 (2000): 807–31; id., "Transformations of Territoriality 1600–2000," in Gundula Budde et al. (eds), *Transnationale Geschichte: Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien* (Göttingen, 2005), 32–55; Dieter Langewiesche, "West European Nationalism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," in Egbert Jahn (ed.), *Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe*, vol. 1: *The Failed Nationalism of the Multinational and Partial National States* (Baden-Baden, 2008), 82–96.

46. Pieter Judson, *Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria* (Cambridge, MA, 2006), 1–18; Cattaruzza, "'Last Stop Expulsion'," 111–13.

47. On Namier's concept of "master nations," see Andrea Graziosi, "Il mondo in Europa: Namier e il 'Medio oriente europeo', 1815–1948," *Contemporanea* 10 (2007): 193–228; Linda Colley, *Lewis Namier* (London, 1989); Amy Ng, *Nationalism and Political Liberty: Redlich, Namier, and the Crisis of Empire* (Oxford, 2004).

48. Norman Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-century Europe* (Cambridge, MA, 2002), 136–37.

49. Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics* 2,3 (1970): 337–63, esp. 350–52.

50. Maier, "Consigning the Twentieth Century to History," 823.

51. Holly Case, *Between States: The Transylvanian Question and the European Idea during World War II* (Stanford, 2009).

52. Dieter Pohl, "Unter deutscher Hegemonie: Revisionismus, Rassismus und Gewalt bei den osteuropäischen Bündnispartnern des Dritten Reichs 1941/42," in Lutz Klinkhammer, Amedeo Osti Guerrazzi, and Thomas Schlemmer (eds), *Die Achse im Krieg: Politik, Ideologie und Kriegsführung 1939–1945* (Paderborn, 2010), 244–54, here 250.

53. Wolfgang Benz and Brigitte Mihok (eds), *Holocaust an der Peripherie: Judenpolitik und Judenmord in Rumänien und Transnistrien 1940–1944* (Berlin, 2009); Radu Ioanid, *The Holocaust in Romania: The Destruction of Jews and Gypsies under the Antonescu Regime, 1940–1944* (Chicago, 2000); Christian Gerlach and Götz Aly, *Das letzte Kapitel: Realpolitik, Ideologie und der Mord an den ungarischen Juden 1944/1945* (Stuttgart, 2002); David Bankier and Israel Gutman (eds), *Nazi Europe and the Final Solution* (Jerusalem, 2003); Tönsmeyer, *Das Dritte Reich und die Slowakei*, 137–62; Miller, *Bulgaria during the Second World War,* 93–106.

54. See, e.g., Marius Truda, "'Rasse,' Eugenik und Nationalismus in Rumänien während der 1940er Jahre," in Benz and Mihok, *Holocaust an der Peripherie*, 161–71.

55. The fascist government in Italy was also confronted with similar problems when searching for a rapprochement with Yugoslavia: see Cattaruzza, "The Making and Remaking of a Boundary," 73–77.

56. See Deletant, *Hitler's Forgotten Ally*, 102–229; Viorel Achim, "Die Deportation der Juden nach Transnistrien im Kontext der Bevölkerungspolitik der Antonescu-Regierung," in Benz and Mihok, *Holocaust an der Peripherie*, 151–60; Randolph Braham and R.L. Vago (eds), *Holocaust in Hungary: Forty Years Later* (New York, 1985); Frank Golczewski, "Die Kollaboration in der Ukraine," in Dieckmann, Quinckert, and Tönsmeyer (eds), *Kooperation und Verbrechen*, 151–82.

57. Carla Tonini, *Operazione Madagascar: la questione ebraica in Polonia 1918–1968* (Bologna, 1999); ead., "The Polish Plan for a Jewish Settlement in *Madagascar* 1936–1939," *POLIN* 19 (2006): 467–77.

58. Broszat, "Deutschland—Ungarn—Rumänien," 93.

59. Dieter Pohl, "Unter deutscher Hegemonie," 254, reaches similar conclusions in a recent contribution on revisionism, racism, and violence on the part of Germany's allies: "It seems clear that wide-ranging murder does not need totalitarian policy as a premise."

60. Michael Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* (Cambridge, 2005) 61–69; Dieckmann, Quinkert, and Tönsmeyer, "Editorial."

61. Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin* (New York, 2010).

62. Rare exceptions include: Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy*, 279–317; Bankier and Gutman, *Nazi Europe and the Final Solution*; Dieckmann, Quinkert, and Tönsmeyer (eds), *Kooperation und Verbrechen*.

63. Among them, Christian Gerlach, "Annexations in Europe and the Persecution of the Jews, 1939–1944," *East Central Europe* 39,1 (2012), 137–56.

64. On the differences between fascist movements and authoritarian regimes in Eastern Central Europe, see Mann, *Fascists*, 261–352. Antonescu (Romania) and Tiszo (Slovakia) also developed their partially genocidal politics from the alleged "needs" of their country and not as an adaptation to Nazi Germany. See Jean Ancel, "The Opposition to the Antonescu Regime: Its Attitude towards the Jews during the Holocaust," in Bankier and Gutman (eds), *Nazi Europe and the Final solution*, 339–60; Tönsmeyer, *Das Dritte Reich und die Slowakei*, 137–62.

65. Bogdan Musial, *"Konterrevolutionäre Elemente sind zu erschiessen": Die Brutalisierung des deutsch-sowjetischen Krieges im Sommer 1941* (Berlin, 2000), 147–295.

66. Aly, *Hitler's Beneficiaries*; Christian Gerlach, *Extremely Violent Societies: Mass Violence in the Twentieth-century World* (Cambridge, 2010).

67. Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York, 2005), 803.

68. A significant, though provocative, assessment can be found in: Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821–1922* (Princeton, 1995). See also Ulf Brunnbauer et al. (eds), *Definitionsmacht, Utopie, Vergeltung: "Ethnische Säuberungen" im östlichen Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Münster, 2006).