Introduction
New Promises, Old Problems

On 28 July 2006, the Indigenous Dani people of Wamena, the main town in West Papua's central highlands, received their first-ever presidential visit, some four decades after West Papua was handed to Indonesia by the United Nations.[1] Despite the heavy police and military guard that surrounded Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a modest turnout of Indigenous highlanders gathered on a sunny hillside in Honelama, on the city outskirts, to see the President. In order to hear his speech, some highlanders had walked for up to two hours from other parts of Wamena because the roads to the site were blocked, except for vehicles carrying government employees and Indonesians.[2] Upon arrival at the site, Dani and other Indigenous attendees were directed by police officers to climb across a ditch and through a large break in a chain-link fence to a grassy area that faced the side of the main stage, where Indonesians and their guests sat in chairs facing the stage. Fenced in on all sides, people told me that the hills behind us were full of soldiers. In case of any unrest, there would be no way out of the enclosure. Perhaps not surprisingly, the crowd around me was subdued and quiet, and seemed to come to life at only two moments – first, during the opening prayers and, second, when the President announced that there had been much talk about 'progress' (*kemajuan,* which may also be translated as modernity or advancement) with few tangible results. This time, he said, things were going to be different. There was shouting and applause from the crowd. Perhaps it was the acknowledgement of their feelings that modernity has not yet come to the highlands despite decades of rhetoric, or hope for a better future based on the President's promise to 'accelerate development' (*mempercepat pembangunan*). Of course, the attendees might have read such statements any day in the newspaper, but there was cultural significance attached to coming face to face with the national leader, even behind a fence and from an awkward angle.

Reports were that the reason the President had travelled to the highlands at all was because he wanted to visit a remote area that had suffered a devastating famine a few months earlier. The famine, like other human crises, briefly sparked national conversations about the apparently shocking extent of poverty and hardship in remote Papua. Indonesians on the populous main island

Figure 0.1. Dani and other highlanders at President Yudhoyono's speech. Photo by author

of Java could see that Papuans are poor in ways that seem vastly different from the slums of Jakarta, the national capital of Indonesia. Local conversations surrounding the presidential visit and views in the media (particularly the national radio station, which was the most popular source of news at the time) focused anew on 'underdevelopment' in the central highlands. Why were people so poor, 'backward', 'illiterate' and hungry? Was it geographical isolation and lack of telecommunications? Were the Indigenous people not growing gardens anymore? Which problems could be blamed on Indigenous officials in the highlands? Whose fault was it if teachers did not teach school and students did not study? Though some of the streetside conversations blamed the Indonesian government for treating Papuans with violence and repression, many Indigenous people were also questioning themselves. 'We are low-quality human resources (*sumber daya manusia,* often abbreviated as SDM)', some said. 'We are still backward', said others.

I take these comments as an indication that highlanders find themselves problematized by dominant national and popular Indonesian perspectives (see Lattas 1998: 314). Tania Li (2007) has developed the concept of 'rendering technical' to describe the process by which complex dimensions of human problems are reduced and simplified in order to produce generally applicable,

uncontested approaches that fit the agendas of state governments and international organizations (cited in Munro and Butt 2012: 335). Jenny Munro and Leslie Butt (2012: 335) write that 'as part of improvement schemes, those development objectives are characterised in technical terms, carrying with them forms of judgement, vocabularies of implementation, and ideas about human abilities, all simplified in the service of getting the job done.' For decades, Indonesians, foreigners and coastal Papuans have stigmatized highlanders (especially men) as primitive, unsophisticated, backward and violent. Martin Slama and Jenny Munro (2015: 3; see also Stasch 2015: 77–79) draw attention to the 'remarkably persistent association of Papuans with primitivism, especially with the "stone-age" as the ultimate realm of the primitive other'. This study asks: when people (their constitution, lifestyles and capabilities) are deeply problematized or, to use another concept that will be elaborated throughout the book, 'diminished', in this way, what dreams emerge and why? How are these dreams continually reshaped? The study addresses these questions by looking closely at one way that Dani see themselves moving forward, namely, education.

It is no coincidence that after his promises on the hill, President Yudhoyono sped through the main street in a heavily guarded motorcade, with

Figure 0.2. Crowd of onlookers during the presidential visit, Wamena, 28 July 2006. Photo by author

his window halfway down, to the cheers of neatly organized and uniformed school students as if showing the way forward to a better, albeit securitized future, or that he went to a local school, which attracted the following media report (*Cenderawasih Post,* 28 July 2006):

> President SBY pays great attention to children's education. This was demonstrated yesterday when, on his way to Kurima, he found the opportunity to drop in on Junior High School Number Three in Wamena . . . The president gave a lesson on the importance of loving one's country and requested that the students study well. 'All of Indonesia's children are the same, because of this Papua's children are also Indonesia's children and so they all need to study diligently . . . I am proud of Papua's many high achieving children . . . so you must study diligently so you can become intelligent people and useful people.' The president asked one of the students what he dreamed of becoming in the future, and the student said he wished to become a doctor. The president stated that all of Indonesia's children have the same chance to achieve success, including children of Papua . . . The president also taught children about school manners, which require students to always respect their teachers and their parents . . . he also asked for the children to sing songs, such as 'Fly My Flag', 'Indonesia Raya', and 'From Sabang to Merauke'.

The President seems to acknowledge that Papuans do not feel much like Indonesians, but he argues that they should, and the way that they can become equal and Indonesian is through education. Education is, more than any other development project, about children's dreams and, by extension, the dreams of parents, clans and nations. Education is a long-term project of cultivation and improvement by which, through diligence and submission, children overcome the ignorance and laziness they are presumed to possess. Education promises to close the gap. Education is a process of remediation for 'stone-agers' to catch up with cultural, racial and intellectual 'moderns'. Moreover, the political power of Indonesians is, according to Dani, at least in part due to knowledge and cleverness that has allowed them to take over Dani lands and domains of authority. Dani experiences of education, charted through this study, produce feelings of inadequacy, vulnerability and smallness, alongside cultural pride and political critique. Dreams of education are reconfigured by various kinds of violence, but other dreams are clarified or consolidated. This introductory chapter lays out the key ethnographic and conceptual terrain of the book, focusing first on local cultural, racial, political and historical configurations that have shaped projects of education for Dani highlanders, then explaining concepts of racialization, diminishment and technocratic racism that I use to make sense of dreams that emerge from stigmatization.

For the last half a century, Dani and other Indigenous inhabitants of West Papua have struggled with the oppressive and violent conditions of Indonesian rule. On 1 May 1963, the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority transferred authority over West Papua to the Indonesian government, on the basis of the 1962 New York Agreement signed by the Netherlands, Indonesia and the United Nations, subject to a self-determination plebiscite to be held before 1969. After a sham referendum in 1969, the United Nations ratified Indonesian control in spite of Indigenous opposition, leading observers to describe Indonesian rule as 'colonial' from the start (Budiardjo and Liong 1988; Drooglever 2009; Osborne 1985; Sharp 1977). Indigenous resistance and aspirations have persisted (Giay 2000, 2001; Lawson 2016; Raweyai 2002), and have typically been repressed by the state through violence, killings, arrests, harassment and intimidation (Braithwaite et al. 2010; Franciscans International and Asian Human Rights Commission 2011). Beyond the historical act of incorporation and violation of Papuans' right to self-determination, scholars also point to the violence perpetrated by Indonesian state forces instructed to enforce settlement, migration, patriotism, development and order (see, for example, Elmslie 2003; Giay 2000; King, Elmslie and Webb-Gannon 2011; Kirsch 2007: 54). Military forces continue to murder, rape, torture, detain, disturb and intimidate the Indigenous population with impunity, particularly in the highlands (Farhadian 2007; Haluk 2013; Human Rights Watch 2007, 2014; Komnas Perempuan 2010). In 2012, when I was in Wamena, Honelama (the village where Yudhoyono gave his speech in 2006) was burned to the ground. A Dani man was killed and about a dozen others were stabbed by Indonesian soldiers. Earlier in the day, Indonesian soldiers on a motorbike sped down a road in the area, striking an Indigenous child. His relatives, attending a funeral, believed the child to have been killed, and attacked the soldiers. One soldier was beaten to death on the roadside. Hearing of this, two trucks of soldiers from the nearby army battalion attacked Honelama (see International Coalition for Papua 2013). State violence in West Papua relies on a racialized logic of Indonesian superiority. This book demonstrates that the racialized everyday violence of Indonesian rule is as important as state violence for understanding Papuans' experiences and aspirations.

The possibility of a return to power is proving highly attractive to those Indigenous men and women who are able to complete secondary school and secure the funds to embark on postsecondary studies. The Indonesian national census of 2010 suggested about four per cent of youth in Papua (including Indigenous Papuans and Indonesians) make it to postsecondary studies (Badan Pusat Statistik [BPS] 2010). More recent surveys suggest that 15 per cent of youth aged 19–23 are at university in Papua (Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Papua (BPSPP) 2013). About 2.4 per cent of women and 3.7 per cent of men in Papua are university graduates (BPSPP 2013: 50). These achievements must

be set against limited to no education among many people in Papua and high rates of illiteracy. In Jayawijaya, the regency around Wamena, 31 per cent of males and 56 per cent of females aged ten years and older have never been to school (BPSPP 2013: 47–48). The illiteracy rate among men and women aged twenty-five and older in Wamena is about 10 per cent, but 63 per cent for areas of Jayawijaya outside the city (BPSPP 2013: 63–64). It is not only the older generation who cannot read or write, as 12 per cent of males and 37 per cent of females aged 15–24 are also reportedly illiterate (BPSPP 2013: 56–57).

As discussed later and in the next chapter, education aspirations are coming out of powerful constructions of Indigenous inferiority, Indonesian colonialism, Dani traditions around knowledge and power, and Christian emphases on knowledge and writing. The result is Dani desires for cosmopolitan cultural connections in a place that appears increasingly connected, but, as Jacob Nerenberg (cited in Slama and Munro 2015: 11) points out, where so much of daily life unfolds in missed connections, delays and trucks stuck in the mud. Very few Dani have the resources to study overseas, but some, mainly because of critically timed injections of cash that sustain educational participation, are able to go to other parts of Indonesia for a few years before they hopefully return home to look for employment. This book follows a cohort of students in their late teens and early twenties from the highlands to North Sulawesi and back home again to Papua. It is based on sixteen months of ethnographic fieldwork in Wamena and North Sulawesi (another province of eastern Indonesia) that began in October 2005. In North Sulawesi I first lived with students in a Dani dormitory on the campus of the National University of Manado for about seven months, then spent two months living with a family in Wouma, on the outskirts of Wamena, and then returned to live in a different dorm that included Dani as well as Indonesian students in Manado, the capital city of North Sulawesi, until the end of December 2006. In addition to participating in everyday activities and informal conversations (in Bahasa Indonesia, the national language), I went to campus, sometimes attended classes, observed student seminars and examinations, and accompanied students around town and to visit their friends and relatives. Attending church services with students was an important research method. I learned about their interactions with each other amidst Indonesians, as well as their relationships with Indonesians. Students welcomed me in their group meetings, discussions and social organizations. To understand their academic pursuits, I also read their organizational documents and theses. I held some group discussions to focus on topics such as experiences on campus and experiences of early schooling in Wamena. Students appreciated the formality of these small-group activities. I employed a questionnaire in the later stages of my fieldwork to elicit anonymous descriptions of experiences of bribery and discrimination on campus to complement the first-hand information from key informants. In Wamena

I lived in a garden hut near the We river and participated in everyday life, as well as funerals and marriage celebrations. I returned to Wamena in 2009 to follow up with some students and graduates who had returned home, and I have been back to Wamena and other cities in West Papua almost every year since 2011.

Highlanders have been travelling to North Sulawesi to attend institutes of higher education since the late 1980s. This is around the time when the first students began to complete Indonesian secondary school in the highlands. Papuans see studying outside Papua as more prestigious, and universities are seen as better quality than universities in Papua. Experience abroad is a compelling draw for young people from small remote towns such as those found in much of Papua. Papuans also go to other areas of Indonesia for university studies, but this province, on the island of Sulawesi, attracts more Papuan highlanders to its higher education institutes than any other province. Students say they are attracted to North Sulawesi because it provides an affordable educational experience in a Christian, modern, safe atmosphere. They say they want to get away from negative influences in Papua. Today, students are also following the paths set by their kin and sponsors, and are attracted to the security of living where there are other highland Papuans. There are approximately three thousand Papuan students in North Sulawesi.[3]



Map 0.1. Eastern Indonesia showing Papua/West Papua and North Sulawesi. © Australian National University, College of Asia and the Pacific, CartoGIS

Dani students hope that going to university outside Papua will facilitate mixing with cosmopolitan Indonesians and an educational engagement with modern ways of being. The acquisition of knowledge will enable them to contribute to development, have new authority and status, and do 'good things for others' (Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1997: 110) when they return home to the highlands. This is not only because of the potent national and local association of education with power, but because Dani leaders and elders in general expect young people to bridge the gap between Dani and Indonesian systems, and to help return Indigenous people to power. Young educated Dani go away with aspirations for belonging as well as transformation, for recognition as well as power. They end up feeling heavily confined by the continuity of racial formations in North Sulawesi and return home after a few years with a new understanding of their inability to belong with, and be accepted by, Indonesians. They may come back newly dedicated to highlands culture, have different perspectives on living in Wamena, or redouble their efforts to build connections with other Dani. Education processes, meanings and practices are thus not neutral. Schooling seems a mundane activity, but this study shows that education is an important site of racialization, regulation, diminishment and resilience. Following Amanda Lewis, racialization is a process that 'draws on old notions of race as a biological characteristic' and 'new notions of culture as a marker of difference' (Lewis 2003: 877). Genetic presumptions are enacted and reinforced (Bridges 2011). Racial logics link identity markers with negative practices and values (Al-Faham and Ernst 2016), and enable local social, political and economic hierarchies.

Since I began my initial fieldwork, ten years of President Yudhoyono's period of 'stability and stagnation' (Aspinall, Mietzner and Tomsa 2015) has come to end. A new President, Joko Widodo, has emerged with a flurry of promises for Papuans. So far he has failed to control conservative, capitalist and pro-military agendas (Munro 2014a, 2015a), and the human rights situation has deteriorated throughout Indonesia (Human Rights Watch 2017). There is growing evidence of the power that racialized views of Papuans have in shaping acts of state violence by police and military, particularly towards groups of unarmed, agitated Indigenous men (Human Rights Watch 2014). Sadly, violence towards Papuans in the rest of Indonesia continues, including in Manado, the city with the motto 'we are all family', where I began my research in 2005 (see Berita Kawanua 2014; Kompasiana 2014).[4] Anti-highlander and anti-Dani sentiment is on the rise in Papua, and it is coming from coastal Papuans as much as Indonesians. Racialization, and the political mobilization of 'racial' difference, is on the rise. Papuans increasingly talk of 'saving Papuans' from extinction, and the young generation is seen as particularly threatened by state violence, poverty, alcohol and HIV/AIDS (Berita Satu 2016; Munro 2019). Violence breaks out along the cultural lines that people increasingly

see as important and firm. Perhaps above all, as the Special Autonomy Law passed in 2001 provides (in theory) more opportunities for Papuans in governance and politics (see Chauvel 2011), including the first highlander Governor, Lukas Enembe, highlanders are increasingly blamed for failures in these domains. They are said to be demonstrating 'tribal' or 'clan' mentalities and practicing 'wantok-ism'. Marcus Mietzner (2007: 13) refers to Enembe's election campaign's 'appeal to politically archaic tribal communities'. But this book reveals, first, that these 'failures' are a continuation of Indonesian and foreign racialization of highlanders, and, second, that if they exist, these failures are as much created in the Indonesian education system and via Dani experiences of it than anything that supposedly lurks in Dani or highland cultural traditions. Dani experiences with Indonesians and their systems and institutions, which are also shaped by global forces, teach 'wantokism' and facilitate 'clan' allegiances. 'Underdevelopment' in the highlands has now been laid at the feet of the Indigenous inhabitants, especially the few (mostly men) who have acquired education, a government or entrepreneurial position, and perhaps a modicum of wealth. This book is important for understanding those men, even though the vast majority of Dani graduates are not, and do not become, elites.

Indeed, in many ways this study is much more about men than about women. Male students outnumber female students considerably, and reports are that the numbers of female students from the highlands in North Sulawesi are now lower than when this study took place. Racial stigma is gendered towards Dani men much more than women. It is the 'penis-gourd', for example that symbolizes 'primitive' highlands culture in the Indonesian imaginary. It is mainly men's bodies that are stigmatized as violent, drunken, hypersexed, resistant and physically strong. Women are stereotyped as having loose morals, but duped or dominated by men into 'shameful' situations like premarital pregnancy, explored later in the book. Indonesians do not see Dani women as serious students, but not for the same reasons that they question Dani men. Men's intellect, commitment and diligence are questioned by Indonesians, where Dani women are presumed to be distracted by hypersexed men into premarital relationships and childrearing. That Dani women have the gall to be pregnant and studying, to have children and still be out and about finishing their degrees, stuns the local (evangelical Christian) population in North Sulawesi. Women are assumed not to be political or activists, though they are. Men are more numerous in education and employment, and are positioned by and seeking to recover traditional male domains of authority in leadership, territory and people. Desires for and the right to pursue education are not seen as the sole prerogative of men, but women have to work to maintain this right by reminding men and challenging gender unfairness when it arises.

This study is situated in relation to several sets of questions and themes, which I discuss in the rest of this introduction. As mentioned above, I am

interested in how women and men live with stigma, how it is produced, racialized, gendered and resisted, and what is created from these experiences. Fine studies of Papuan nationalism focus on government policies, historical events or human rights (Chauvel 2005, 2011), but do less to capture the day-to-day experiences and understandings that contribute to Papuan desires for a sovereign Papuan state, described locally as *merdeka* (independence or freedom). To understand this decades-old conflict better, we must consider how racial and other conditions shape highlanders' views of the present, the future, themselves and others. Next, I aim to shed light on schooling in contexts of violence, regulation, suspicion and racialization. In this case, education fails to cultivate nationalistic political sentiments or a feeling of connection and belonging within the nation. The third theme that this study speaks to is political conditions in West Papua, and particularly Indigenous understandings and experiences of colonialism from everyday vantage points and at the level of daily and sometimes intimate forms of engagement with Indonesians. Finally, this study is also an ethnography of urban, educated Dani youth who are today's political leaders, government officials, rebels, activists, parents and survivors. For them, what, indeed, does freedom look like?

Who is Who: Racial, Temporal and Cultural Configurations

In this section I pause to introduce many of the relevant categories of ethnic geography and ethno-racial taxonomy that appear throughout the study. I also delineate important inequalities and social dynamics in West Papua that form the context in which young people come to desire and pursue education.

'Race', 'Tribes' and 'People'

In Indonesia, the concept of race (*ras*) was banned from public and media discussion during the administrations of Sukarno (1949–65) and Suharto (1965–98) as a controversial subject likely to incite conflict. Race does not officially exist, and the term is rarely used in local discourse. Yet ideas like *suku* (ethnic group or tribe) or *suku-bangsa* (ethnic nation) do the work of racialization, tying traits, tendencies and capabilities to skin colour and cultural heritage. There is a word for white people – *bule* – and there is certainly quite a bit of popular focus on skin colour and facial features. In my North Sulawesi field site, the majority cultural group is Minahasan, and people speak of the traits of *suku* Minahasa or Minahasa tribe/ethnic group. At another level, there are also 'people' (*orang-orang*) – Indonesian people and Papuan people, for example. *Orang* links a person and his or her population to a place, an identity, an ethno-cultural background. In North Sulawesi, locals who live in the capital

city sometimes refer to themselves as 'Manado people' (*orang Manado*). Similarly, students from the central highlands of Papua sometimes call themselves 'Wamena people' (*orang Wamena*). Two very important categories of people in this study are 'Indonesians' (*orang Indonesia*) and 'Papuans' (*orang Papua*). I have been asked a few times: are Papuans not also Indonesians? In terms of citizenship, the answer is yes. But in terms of how people talk about one another, Papuans talk of 'Indonesian people' (*orang Indonesia*), while Indonesians and Papuans talk of 'Papuan people' (*orang Papua*). I have never heard anyone refer to Papuans as 'orang Indonesia'.

These conceptualizations have historical roots that relate to what Europeans thought they were observing in the region and how they depicted the local populations in their writings. 'Racial' observations and representations were, and continue to be, tangled in ideas of primitivity and the politics of territorial expansion and defence.

'Papuans' and 'Indonesians'

Chris Ballard notes that the concept of *orang Papua* (Papuans) and their supposed distinctiveness from Malay people emerged as a subject of interest for explorers and naturalists as far back as the sixteenth century (Ballard 2008). While initial presumptions and definitions of 'Papuan' varied in terms of name and content, by the nineteenth century, a pervasive, if inconsistent, colonial racial logic had developed (Ballard 2008; Giay and Ballard 2003; Ploeg 1995). This racial thought was initially influenced by a science of race in which key external diacritics came to stand for morality, intelligence and abilities (Giay and Ballard 2003). These observations positioned Indigenous populations 'within a gradient or hierarchy of value' (Giay and Ballard 2003: 2). Perhaps the most significant legacy of these early writings is the emphasis on the racial difference of Papuans and Malays (Ballard 2008: 187). George Earl, a British anthropologist who wrote several volumes on Papuans but never visited New Guinea (cited in Ballard 2008: 173–74), stated: 'The physical characteristics of the Malayu-Polynesians are so distinct from those of the Papuans, that a single glance is sufficient to detect the difference between the races.' Moreover: 'The Malayu-Polynesians had left their influence even in New Guinea in a "line of improvement" that extended along the northern coast and eastwards into the Pacific' (Ballard 2008: 174). Later, the Dutch and other European explorers in the highlands in the 1920s–1930s were interested in assessing the capacities of 'the natives' for labour, just as they wished to learn of the region's exploitable natural resources. They based their assessments in part on so-called racial characteristics (Ploeg 1995) that were thought to reveal Papuans' innate qualities, and thus their suitability for labour, and whether they were hostile or submissive. The earliest research in the highlands, undertaken as part of European

explorations, focused on assessing the racial characteristics and capacities of highlanders (Ploeg 1995: 231).

West Papua in the 1930s was seen as the final frontier of the Dutch East Indies colony, the last place where officials could experience isolation and 'strange natives', and bring peace, order and law (Rhys 1947). Dutch and Indonesian constructions of Papuans intensified in the post-World War II period. Though the rest of the colony formally gained independence in 1949, the Dutch argued that they could not give up West Papua, then called Netherlands New Guinea, to Indonesia. From 1949 to 1962, the Netherlands was in a dispute with Indonesia over the territory of present-day Papua (see Penders 2002; Saltford 2003). The Dutch side argued: 'Any form of Indonesian influence . . . will lead to infiltrations and agitation in a region which needs a complete and undisturbed tranquillity in view of the stage of development of the population' (Lijphart 1966: 161–62). Danilyn Rutherford (1998: 268) also suggests that the Dutch desire to retain West Papua was influenced by plans to provide a homeland where colonial racial hierarchies could be safely maintained.

During the Dutch administration, the government enabled racialized inequalities between Indonesians (of Malay heritage) and Papuans (of Melanesian heritage), giving tangible meanings to representational discourses. Education was an early site of racialization. For example, teachers from the Kei Islands located west of Papua were employed in the Timika area. Coming from highly stratified societies that even included Papuans as slaves, these teachers reportedly treated the local population with contempt (Suwada 1984 [1971]). Richard Chauvel (2007: 33) also suggests that Indonesian settlers were a small but influential part of society in West Papua under the Dutch colonial administration.

Ideas about the categories of Papuan and Indonesian evolved further as Indonesia took possession during the early 1960s. Under former dictator Suharto's New Order government (1965–98), the government enforced development programs throughout Indonesia (Heryanto and Lutz 1988; van Langenberg 1990). The military provided 'order' so that development could proceed unhindered, ostensibly in the name of progress for all Indonesia's citizens. This ideology had particular implications for so-called tribal populations, referred to as 'isolated tribes' or 'estranged populations' (*masyarakat terasing*). They were denigrated as 'different and deficient' (Li 1999: 3). According to Gerard Persoon (1998: 281, 289):

> The government looks upon these groups as deviating from the cultural mainstream, and policies are aimed at bringing these people back into the mainstream of Indonesian life . . . The official view is that for a variety of reasons and at various stages in history these groups have lost touch with the main processes of social, religious,

> political and economic change, and it is the obligation of the state to help them return to the mainstream.

Most of Indonesia's *masyarakat terasing* are in fact, according to the government, located in Papua (Lenhart 1997). Christopher Duncan (2004: 90) proposes that the concept has had a significant impact on mainstream Indonesians. But where other 'isolated populations' are arguably able to overcome their primitive conditions and capabilities and become part of the Indonesian *bangsa* (race-nation-people), because of racialization Papuans have never been afforded this possibility. In West Papua, racialized identities like *rambut lurus* (straight hairs, a reference to Indonesians) and *rambut keriting* (frizzy hairs, a reference to Papuans) are prominent. The Indonesian government initiated migration programs to bring Indonesians from other parts of the country to Papua to ostensibly contribute to development and cultural improvement (Gietzelt 1989). Thus, Papuans refer to Indonesians as 'newcomers' or 'migrants' (*pendatang*). Dale Gietzelt (1989) refers to this migration as an attempt at 'Indonesianization' of West Papua, and many Papuans continue to point to in-migration (both government sponsored and unofficial) as an attempt to displace their control over land and cultural identity (see McGibbon 2004; Richards 2015).

It is one of the key demographic features of Papua today that Indonesians are the majority in the major cities, notably Jayapura and Merauke, in Papua province, and Manokwari and Sorong in West Papua province (Ananta et al. 2016: 470–72), while the majority of Papuans reside in rural areas. Not all Indonesians are recent migrants, and in some communities there is a distinction drawn between Indonesian who are 'old people' (*orang lama*) and 'new people' (*orang baru*). Indonesians are economically dominant, especially in terms of commercial enterprises, professional, technical and service jobs, and in many aspects of government administration, despite an emphasis in recent years on Papuan employment in the public service and in promoting Papuan private sector activities. The majority of Papuans are rural-based farmers, gardeners or fishers of some sort. Those who are employed in the formal economy are concentrated in the public service.

The category of 'Papuan' is generative of positive sentiments, not just negative assessments from Indonesians and others. Sarah Richards (2015) describes a growing sense of 'Papuan' identity that unites people of considerable cultural, geographical and linguistic diversity. She writes: 'Papuanness is a sentiment of pan-tribal identification that is generated through histories of perceived cultural and racial oppression and relies on stereotypes to position Papuans as a collective that is distinct from Islamic Indonesians' (2015: 146). In contrast to migrants, Papuans might also be referred to (and claim titles such as) as 'sons/daughters of the place' (*putra/putri daerah*), Indigenous peo-

ple (*orang asli*), traditional or customary community (*masyarakat adat*), or landowners (*tuan tanah,* literally, masters of the land).

The definition of who is 'Indigenous Papuan' (*orang asli Papua*) has become the subject of more debate in recent years. The Special Autonomy Law of 2001 prescribed affirmative action provisions for Papuans and Papuan empowerment as a guiding principle. It defined Papuans as people of Melanesian racial heritage who are descendants of the Indigenous tribes of Papua, or those recognized by traditional communities.[5] The latter category might potentially include long-time migrants or their descendants. However, because the identity now enables preferential access to government positions such as Regent and Governor, and preferential access to programs like the 'Healthy Papua Card' (*Kartu Papua Sehat*), some Papuans have argued that the criteria needs to be more restricted, tied to racial features, and should exclude the descendants of Indonesian fathers and Papuan mothers (see International Crisis Group 2006: 8; Slama 2015: 263–64).

With identity categories having real implications for interactions with Indonesians in Papua, it is not surprising that Dani students are aware that, in North Sulawesi, they are the 'migrants'. Dani students abroad sometimes refer to local Indonesians as 'masters of the land' (or the house, *tuan rumah*). This designation acknowledges the power of being Indigenous to a place and the broad consensus among students that they can learn something from the locals, their institutions and their city. It also reflects the fact that students are ultimately not treated as equals regardless of what they learn or achieve. Dani students also call people in North Sulawesi 'locals' (*orang sini*), 'the community' (*masyarakat*) and variations on 'Manado people' (*orang Manado*). Students also become aware of local understandings of ethnic and cultural difference, including racial ideas about 'whiteness' (*putih*) that have particular salience. In North Sulawesi, locals express that the presence of Portuguese and then Dutch activities, including intermarriage, has contributed to the presence of white skin colour. Being 'black' (*hitam*) attracts criticism ranging from denigration to teasing, for Papuans as well as some locals. However, being Papuan is a certain kind of 'black' that comes with its own set of stigmas. In North Sulawesi, locals mostly do not differentiate between Papuans from different cultural groups, calling them all 'Papuan' or 'Irianese' (*orang Irian*) after the former name of Papua until 2001, Irian Jaya. Locals who have closer relationships with Dani students, such as church ministers with small congregations or some of the university professors, may refer to students as 'Wamena people', and some of them do develop particular notions of what that means.

Locating 'Wamena People' in the Baliem and Other Valleys

My focus in this book is mainly on Dani students from the Baliem Valley and the Wolo Valley, which connects to the Baliem Valley in the northwest. Because



Map 0.2. Central Highlands of Papua, including Wamena and Baliem Valley.

of its size, about 80 km long and 20 km wide, the Baliem Valley was first described as the 'Grand Valley' (Heider 1979; Ploeg 1995, 2004). Anton Ploeg (2004: 291) uses 'Grand Valley' to mean 'the lower reaches of the Baliem River where it flows southeast through a wide Valley with a relatively flat floor before it leaves the Highlands via the Baliem Gorge' and denotes this as the habitat of the Grand Valley Dani. To refer to themselves, Baliem Valley Dani use the term 'Valley people' (*orang lembah*), among other possibilities such as 'Dani', 'Indigenous Wamena people' (*orang asli Wamena*), or *Hubula, Nayak* or *Balim meke,* which are Valley Dani words.[6] The students from Wolo identify themselves as Walak, and they speak a different Indigenous dialect from the Valley students. The perspectives and experiences of other central highlanders, namely Lani and Yali, also appear in this study. 'Lani' refers to people originally inhabiting areas west of the Dani; thus, they are called 'Western people' (*orang barat*) or 'Western Wamena people' (*orang Wamena barat*). At the same time, these 'tribal' (*suku*) designations and identities are also broken down into clan groups and with reference to particular areas of the central highlands. 'Yali' people originate from areas to the southeast of the Baliem Valley and speak a different language from the Dani and Lani, although all of the young adults in this study and most youth in the highlands also speak Bahasa Indonesia.[7] Together they may be described as central highlanders, or just highlanders (*orang gunung*), though there are also highlanders to the west in the Paniai Lakes region. Most of the students in my study have spent at least some time in the city of Wamena, and thus they also sometimes refer to themselves as 'Wamena people', including while living in North Sulawesi.

It is a testament to the significance of administrative boundaries and bureaucratic channels for the group of 'Wamena people' in this study that they also refer to themselves using the names of their home districts (*kabupaten,* usually translated as 'regency'). This is less so for students from Jayawijaya regency, the oldest regency in the central highlands, but during my research students often described themselves as Puncak (from Puncak Jaya), Yahukimo or Tolikara, after highlands regencies. As will become clear later on, these identities are reinforced in North Sulawesi as district governments provide crucial financial support and fund student dormitories.

As this study demonstrates, highlanders continue to deal with stigmatization. From the early days of 'discovery', the Baliem Valley was described as peopled by 'stone-age' tribes and cultures that were soon to be 'lost' to modern influence (i.e. Matthiessen 1962). The Archbold Expedition first sighted the Baliem Valley on 21 June 1938, but throughout the early twentieth century, Dutch, American and British expeditions reached other parts of the highlands and encountered Dani people and other highlanders (Ballard, Vink and Ploeg 2001; Heider 1970: 303). During World War II, Japanese forces occupied parts of coastal Papua, imprisoned administrators in camps and put Papuans to

work as labourers under the watch of Indonesian supervisors (Pouwer 1999). In 1954, the Christian and Missionary Alliance (CMA) landed some of its personnel on the Baliem River (Naylor 1974: 11). The first Dutch administrative post was established in the Baliem Valley in 1956. This marked the first permanent presence of foreigners in the Valley. Christian missionaries established the first schools (Lake 1989; Naylor 1974), and today, education still retains connotations of moral goodness and modern progress even though it is now also associated with Indonesian colonization and violence.

Some of the earliest descriptions of the Indigenous inhabitants of the Baliem Valley were produced by missionaries (Bromley 1962, 1972; Larson 1987) and Dutch administrators (Broekhuijse 1967; Pospisil 1962; for a discussion of this work, see Jaarsma 1991). The Dani became iconic in the ethnographic record as tribal warriors in Robert Gardner's (1963) film on warfare, *Dead Birds* (see also Gardner and Heider 1968). More broadly, Dani, Lani and Yali are still sometimes referred to (and refer to themselves) as '*koteka* people' (*masyarakat koteka*) after the penis gourd (*koteka* in Indonesian, *holim* in Dani) traditionally worn by men. In the Indonesian era, these people are still considered to be among the most 'primitive' of Papua's 'tribes'. Conditions of discrimination and violence are intense in the highlands (Butt 2001; Mote and Rutherford 2001). Nation-state institutions and ideologies attempt to force the Dani to become more Indonesian (Naylor 1974; Soepangat 1986). At the same time, the 'primitive' is part of what draws both domestic and international tourists to the Valley. A number of tour operators provide guided treks around the valley and nearby areas, stopping in villages, while the annual Baliem Valley festival showcases tribal dance, singing, dramatic performances, mock battles and pig races. At a Baliem Valley festival I attended in 2013, the overwhelming majority of onlookers were Indonesians and highlanders. These dynamics affirm the importance of Rupert Stasch's (2015: 62) project of examining how Papuans 'take up the category of the primitive as a self-understanding, acting toward and through this category in their relations with outsiders'. My study shows that educated Dani resist racialization as primitives by Indonesians, in part because discrimination and exclusion encourages processes of questioning and defending cultural values.

In this study I ethnographically explore current social formations, as well as everyday life among (mainly) educated Dani. But their contemporary experiences and values are very much shaped by the ongoing cultural significance of, among other things, land and gardening, control of territory and securing the future of Dani populations, social reproduction and relations of reciprocity, including leadership that is generous, hardworking and accountable. Dani scholar (and until his sudden death in 2011, head of the Papuan Peoples' Assembly, or *Majelis Rakyat Papua*) Agus Alua (2006: 154–56) describes the Dani 'big man' as having good hands, a good heart, a good voice and good

behaviour. This means he demonstrates his ability to work hard on collective activities, his generosity and his ability to speak the truth and compel followers. These understandings of leadership are incorporated into Dani students' aspirations for education and leadership. Dani have used sophisticated agricultural techniques to turn a variety of marshy, rocky or steep landscapes into fertile gardens (Heider 1970; Sugandi 2013). They grow sweet potatoes as a staple food and raise pigs for ritual, exchange and economic purposes (Alua 2006; Heider 1979; Ploeg 1965, 1966, 2004). Even Dani university graduates will sometimes refer to themselves as 'gardeners', whether to show how far they have come, to explain their relative lack of material wealth or to assert their capacity for hard physical work. Pigs continue to be significant in competitive exchanges and social events such as weddings or funerals, as well as in bride-wealth and compensation payments (Butt 1998; Farhadian 2003). Raising and selling pigs is one of the main ways that young people acquire enough money to depart for university abroad, while the work of their mothers and sisters growing and selling garden produce frequently provides them with money while they are at university. Eating *bakar batu* (literally 'stone cooking', referring to the technique of using heated rocks to steam pork, sweet potatoes and greens under banana leaves) together is an essential part of all celebrations, even among students in North Sulawesi. Dani societies have traditionally been relatively egalitarian in terms of male social hierarchies, with men improving their social standing and leadership status through achievements in warfare and their ability to attain and redistribute wealth (Alua 2006; Heider 1979; O'Brien 1969; Peters 1975). Young people view education and employment through this cultural lens that emphasizes tangible results (*hasil*) that should also benefit others (see also Glazebrook 2008). In the past, clan leaders tried to control marriages and fertility, including through supernatural and spiritual means, to ensure healthy future generations and build economic and political alliances (Butt 1998, 2005a). Today, 'saving Papuans' is a common goal among young Dani.

Yulia Sugandi (2013) argues that Dani elders in particular are focused on recovering collective dignity that has been lost during the Indonesia era. According to Sugandi (2013: 34) they feel 'made naked' or 'stripped' and 'dishonoured' by the impositions of the Indonesian state, including being treated as inferior and manipulated by outsiders, being kept in a subordinate position (Naylor 1974: 237), and being excluded from land and development decisions (Farhadian 2005: 42). Sugandi (2013: 42) focuses on the loss of control over sacred and taboo knowledge that is essential for good relations with the ancestors and continued fertility. Thus, Dani experiences and values today cannot be understood without acknowledging the effects of an equal number of Indonesians who now live alongside them in Wamena.

The term 'migrant' (*pendatang*) does not reflect the fact that some Indonesians are long-term settlers. Most of the migration of Indonesians to Wamena is not part of official transmigration programmes that funnelled Indonesians into rural areas to develop rice paddies and other similar activities. Migrants in Wamena are rarely engaged in farming or rural activities, but work in the private sector, in professional jobs, and in government and military roles. Indonesians tend to be comparatively wealthy and own consumer items like cars, which Dani rarely own. Even though Indonesian migration is associated with the spread of Islam in Papua (Richards 2015), there are Christian migrants too, and some of them live in Wamena. Because of their association with the Indonesian government and national culture, Indonesians in Wamena are differentiated from the Indigenous population (Butt 2005a: 164). Although there are indications of the emergence of Papuan elites in Wamena (Butt 2008: 118), it is still the case that most Dani men and women work in their gardens and sell produce to migrants to earn a living, while migrants who do not work for the government, the military or the police typically operate eateries, shops or market stalls. The streets of Wamena are usually full of Dani going about their business on foot, though possessing a motorbike is becoming increasingly common. Migrants tend to drive cars, motorbikes or ride in pedicabs (*becak*) driven by Dani youth. These are just some of the everyday manifestations of inequalities that give expression to racial boundaries between Indonesians and Dani, migrants and Indigenous people.

These distinctions have been raised and affirmed through violence, mostly towards Indigenous Dani at the hands of the Indonesian military and police, but on rare occasions amongst civilians. The time during which Dani students I describe in this book were abroad in North Sulawesi was perhaps a particularly difficult time to form bonds with Indonesians, learn from others or feel safe. Most of the students were in the latter stages of high school or had just left the highlands for university around 2000, shortly after the end of the 33-year Suharto dictatorship and at the height of subsequent reformation (*reformasi*) efforts. In Papua, critiques of Indonesian governance, expressions of independence desires and public talk about suffering were flourishing (Giay 2000). Papuans felt political change was coming, especially when leading Indonesian political figures conceded some political liberties to Papuans, including permission to raise the Morning Star independence flag. Others issued decrees denying such liberties. This, among other factors, contributed to a rare incident of violence from Dani towards Indonesian migrants on 6 October 2000. Police violently raided and destroyed a series of makeshift Indigenous community posts (*posko*) where the Morning Star flag was flying, killing one man, shooting ten others, and arresting and beating dozens (Human Rights Watch 2001; Mote and Rutherford 2001). A riot ensued, and by the end of the day,

nine Indigenous Papuans were killed by Indonesian police and twenty-six Indonesian civilians were killed by Indigenous Papuans (Human Rights Watch 2001: 12). Octavianus Mote and Danilyn Rutherford (2001: 115) write that:

> Armed with spears, bows, and axes, local tribesmen set fire to houses belonging to traders, teachers, and bureaucrats from outside the Valley, then slaughtered their occupants as they fled. In a scene reminiscent of other Indonesian trouble spots, refugees flooded the police station, churches, mosques, and the airport. Most vowed they would leave the town of Wamena and never return.

Some Dani informants of mine were involved in the fighting, which they referred to as a battle or war (*perang*). Other people recalled hiding or fleeing home from school in terror to help evacuate their young and elderly relatives from the area.

Identity and ethnic categorization are inseparable from inequalities, violence and domination structures in Wamena. Shaped by these cultural, political and social conditions, Dani youth in this study set out on journeys to Manado, one of eastern Indonesia's most 'modern' cities, in search of new relationships, cultural connections and achievements. Their experiences reveal, among other things, new ethno-racial taxonomies and racialized challenges.

'Diminishment', Education and Racialization

Diminishment, as I use the term in this study, refers to Indigenous experiences of being rendered smaller (in land, in power, in physique or constitution, in confidence, and in networks and relationships) by processes and encounters that encourage people to question their cultures, commitments and capabilities (Clark 2000; Robbins 2004, 2005; Sahlins 1992; Tomlinson 2002). Matt Tomlinson's (2002: 237) work on Fiji, a context where there are some parallels with West Papua in terms of historical in-migration and resulting dominance of a non-Indigenous ethnic minority, explains that Indigenous perceptions of a diminishing *vanua* (land and people) are implicated in Indigenous politics to take back control, and in particular have been manipulated by elites in favour of military rule. In Papua New Guinea, Urapmin described in Joel Robbins' (2004) work feel racial, religious and moral failures in relation to colonization and globalization, but these feelings are very much based on their own moral logics and values. For them, diminishment inspires and shapes efforts at recovery and improvement, particularly Christian improvement and connections with global Christian moderns. Jeffrey Clark's (2000) analysis of Wiru 'madness' and narratives of 'shrinking men' in the southern highlands

of Papua New Guinea suggests that Wiru are processing the inequalities and disjunctures of colonialism in their own ways, via their bodies. In a sense they are responding to, and taking back their bodies from, new forms of knowledge and power inscribed by colonial and missionary regimes.

In this study, I explore the contours of diminishment at different scales. To be clear, diminishment is the analytical frame I employ to make sense of interlinked Dani experiences, concepts and words that include, but are not limited to, reduced bodily size and clan numbers, newfound shyness and inadequacies, loss of power over population and territory, and limitations on relationships with Indonesians. There are diminishing hopes, as well as experiences of new feelings of inadequacy, including shame and a lack of confidence. These relate in part to the intense experience of being watched by Indonesians in North Sulawesi. Dani also express ways that they used to have better morals and stronger, healthier bodies, and how they feel they have changed because of Indonesian rule, especially the loss of control over land, goods and people (Munro 2019; Sugandi 2013). A deep examination of Dani understandings of the body, and how these have changed during colonization, is beyond the scope of this study, but in general Dani understand that bodies reflect social, spiritual and political conditions. The particulars vary among Dani from different parts of the Baliem Valley. Sugandi's (2013) work explores the collective social body and shows that in the highlands the body holds a prominent place in social relations. Bodies are 'made up by others' (Butt 1998: 115) and their wellbeing 'depends on a cosmological balance, particularly the relationship with the ancestors' (Sugandi 2013: 75). As bodies incorporate political inequalities, the issue of diminishing numbers arises – Dani students talk about the importance of pregnancy, for example, for avoiding Indigenous extinction. This comes up most clearly when they face the pressure to 'study first' and have children later, and they ask why not do both at the same time? Reproduction and education both 'save' Papuans. Diminishment might motivate education in the first place, and it certainly persists through experiences of education, but it also foments political critique and mobilization. Moreover, the sorts of diminishment at play shape what freedom looks like, and how and from where it can be sought.

Racialization is crucial to both the diminishment that occurs through becoming educated Dani and the forms of resistance that they most strongly articulate. Highlanders' sense of diminishment arises in relation to Indonesians and Indonesian rule, whether in face-to-face encounters, in their assessments of how they lost power, in the pursuit of closing the gap with Indonesians or in the assessment that they are losing a demographic battle. One of the pursuits of this study is to trace how racism operates towards Papuan highlanders today and to draw some conclusions about its effects. Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-

Davis (1992) define racism as the discourses and practices by which people are inferiorized, excluded and subordinated. Naomi Priest and colleagues (2013: 116) describe the effects and operation of racism as:

> A phenomena that results in avoidable and unfair inequalities in power, resources and opportunities across racial or ethnic groups; racism can be expressed through beliefs (e.g. negative and inaccurate stereotypes), emotions (e.g. fear/hatred) or behaviours/practices (e.g. unfair treatment), ranging from open threats and insults (including physical violence) to phenomena deeply embedded in social systems and structures.

Observers, both foreign and Indigenous, have long described racism in West Papua. Indonesians tend to regard Papuans as 'primitive, stupid, lazy [and] drunk' (Koentjaraningrat and Ajamiseba 1994: 434). Racism underpins political violence (Butt 2012; Kirksey 2012; Kirsch 2002). The report *Stop Sudah! Testimonies of Papuan Women Victims of Violence and Human Rights Abuses 1963–2009* documents stories of sexual and political violence perpetrated by soldiers towards women as well as police violence towards intoxicated young men (see also Haluk 2013). Racism features strongly in acts of state violence, and relations between soldiers and Papuans are characterized by 'prejudice, distrust, disgust and frequently arrogance and hostility' (Hernawan 2015: 202). Racism, particularly police fears of angry Papuan males, has also been revealed in a number of recent shootings in the highlands. In Enarotali in 2014, Karubaga in 2015, and other places, reports suggest that police responded with deadly violence to the presence of an angry Papuan crowd (Human Rights Watch 2014).

While it is very difficult to generalize, Papuan women are racialized as objects of/subservient to Papuan men's passions, violence and power. For example, as I discuss later in the book, Indonesians in North Sulawesi spoke about young Papuan women who were pregnant and unmarried with a mixture of judgement and pity, and some young women described struggling with the expectation that they should be ashamed of their pregnancies (Munro 2012). Sexuality is always central to racialization (Stoler 2002), as Leslie Butt (2012) has demonstrated by looking at the state and political violence meted out to Indigenous highland women sex workers under the guise of health services. Racialization, put simply, produces desires for political independence from Indonesia and intensifies highlander identities and networks. In West Papua, the politics of cultural momentum are clear: as David Webster (2001: 508–10) proposes, West Papuan nationalists do not reject their own traditions; in fact, West Papuan political identity has always been shaped by cultural forms and local identities (see also Kirksey 2012: 179).

However, throughout this study I develop the argument that highlanders today also face 'technocratic racism'.[8] What I mean by this term is racism that is developed around, meted out through and more or less hidden behind the seemingly objective and neutral language of expertise, skills, capabilities and, in particular, the idea of human resources. Christoph Marx (2011) has used the term to describe how racism was produced and entrenched bureaucratically during apartheid in South Africa. Racial inequalities were hidden behind the seemingly rational and neutral language of social planning and administration; put differently, racial logics were 'rendered technical' (Li 2007) policy matters to be managed by siloed experts in the bureaucracy.

Sulfikar Amir (2013) argues that, in fact, high-tech bureaucracy is central to Indonesian state power. In Papua, and Indonesia more broadly, the concept of 'human resources' and the agenda of human resource development articulate young peoples' obligation to cultivate technical skills, expertise and knowledge. Gordon Means (1985) indicates that Indonesia's interest in human resource development started to evolve when international experts identified rural isolated populations as an impediment to national progress. The World Bank concept of human resource development locates 'the explanatory weight of why economies grow [in] personal qualities, social institutions . . . or people's capacities, attitudes, values, and beliefs' (Toye 1987: 62), and 'human beings are understood as resources in need of modification, adaptation and change – in other words, development' (Du Bois 1991: 10). Looking after the human resources begins with having fewer children, which is promoted by initiatives on 'high-quality' families (*keluarga berkualitas*). Once they are born, babies become the human resources of the future. Even kindergarten children and their parents are called to this agenda.

In Indonesia, the concept of developing good quality human resources or SDM (*sumber daya manusia*) means more than the technical development of a skilled workforce. Achmad Yahya (1997: 43), for example, describes physical, mental and spiritual qualities of human resources such as discipline and having the right culture.[9] He describes good quality human resources as 'enthusiastic, tested, idealistic, productive, creative, and patriotic' (Yahya 1997: 43). He notes physical qualities such as 'health, posture, abilities, with a minimum height of 170 cm, well-nourished, energetic' (Yahya 1997: 44–45). Various threats and potential disturbances to the 'human resources' are also identified in government and religious discourse, including HIV, alcohol, traffic accidents and pregnancy, to name but a few. The notion of 'study first' (*kuliah dulu*), explored later in this study, is a moral construct that Dani students encounter in North Sulawesi that encourages youth to avoid marriage and sex until after they graduate (Robinson and Utomo 2003; Smith-Hefner 2005) for the sake of human resource development.

How young people should change, and what their 'inadequacies' are, relies on political and racialized interpretations of culture, lifestyle, intellect and capabilities. The ways in which outsiders have assessed highlanders' expertise and systems contrasts sharply with most ethnographic accounts and Indigenous perspectives on Dani society. Koentjaraningrat (1994: 288–89), an Indonesian anthropologist, asserts: 'There is no system of leadership.'

Throughout the 1990s and 2000s in particular, a great deal of commentary focused on explaining ethnic inequalities in West Papua through reference to a lack of technical skills and unemployability (i.e. Bandiyono 1996; Rusman 1998; Suparlan 1997, 1998, 2001). A government official (cited in Munro 2004) is quoted as saying:

> The weakness of the human resources in Irian Jaya [Papua] is the major problem faced by the local government. The lifestyle, ways of thinking, and a variety of local cultural practices have hindered their ability to follow the agenda of development . . . Because of that, the local government must make bigger sacrifices to improve the human resources of the young generation. It is not easy to guide and educate the young generation of Irian Jaya [Papua], but it must be done.

Regarding the highlands, Koentjaraningrat (1994: 458) argues:

> The interior is the most 'poor' in terms of workforce, and is the area most difficult to develop. In the central highlands, there are no traditional skills and abilities or natural resources that can be used as a basis for development 'from below'. Thus, the most important effort for development in the area is the increase in the quality of the human resources, meaning increasing education and health of the population.

Representations of primitiveness in Papua are longstanding and always serve a political agenda (Ballard 2002; Kirksey 2002; Kirsch 2002). In West Papua, an alleged lack of human resources features in pro-Indonesia rhetoric that asserts that Papuan human resources are not yet ready for independence from Indonesia. Other arguments suggest that Papuans are marginalized because Indonesians are better-quality human resources. For example, a typical report on development in Papua concludes that migrants possess characteristics that are more modern than Indigenous Papuans in social, economic, demographic, physical and household environment dimensions (Bandiyono 1996). Suko Bandiyono (1996: 80) further concludes that:

> Non-migrants [i.e. Papuans] need to accelerate their self-adjustment in the process of modernization so they are not left behind. If they are incapable of eliminating their left-behindness then they will be increasingly marginalized in the city.

Towards the objective of clarifying Dani educational aspirations amid contexts of diminishment, in this study I track Dani understandings of 'human resources'. Tracking the 'human resources' concept reveals how technocratic racism, as a form of diminishment, originates in internationally sanctioned and ostensibly apolitical development perspectives, and becomes a prominent feature in relationships and encounters between Indigenous highlanders, Indonesians and the state. Ivan Karp critiques human resource development on the grounds that: 'These subjects are called to account in a discourse that defines them as failing to exhibit in their cultures or persons the qualities of developed persons' (Karp 2002: 82). This study goes further to show that 'developed persons' are expected to exhibit technical expertise and knowledge. It also extends our understanding of the possible range of moral and intimate interpretations of a technocratic agenda like human resource development. Technocratic racism is a different kind of diminishment from denigration that is rooted in religious or moral failures. This kind of diminishment encourages Dani to attain more skills and training to overcome alleged inadequacies that cannot be addressed through conversion, piety or even embracing certain cultural styles and tendencies that are marked as 'Indonesian'. Indonesians deploy these discourses about Papuans, but highlanders also apply some of the same assessments to themselves or other highlanders. Highlanders also grapple with what sort of 'human resources' they would like to become in ways that do not always align with, and in fact sometimes depart significantly from, dominant Indonesian perspectives. They question and consider what skills, values and attributes are needed in highlands Papua in ways that reflect the ongoing, perhaps even gathering, significance of Dani cultural values. These cultural sensibilities surrounding 'human resources' become clearer through students' experiences living abroad, feeling uncomfortable in Indonesian domains, facing up to Indonesian bureaucrats and professors, evaluating one another's habits and mistakes. These experiences promote a clearer sense of what moral, social and political principles they hope to foster back home.

If understanding diminishment is my main objective, and racialization is an important way that diminishment occurs, education is, in a sense, an important context in which diminishment occurs and is challenged. Formal education is a compelling but often overlooked social context, especially where schooling is a relatively recent development (Knauft 2005; Pomponio 1990; Sykes 1995, 1999). In Indonesia, culture and genetic heritage are widely seen as determinative of development levels, outcomes and achievements. These are not the only factors – piety and religious commitments are also considered important, and this is certainly the case in the Christian communities where Dani students become situated. In short, education promises to close the 'racial', 'stone-age' gap. Education is not just a project of improving knowledge but also a project of cultural and racial (or embodied) improvement. In fact,

during the Dutch colonial period in Indonesia, 'education was the pathway through which native Indonesians sought to place themselves on an equal footing with their Dutch colonizers' (Nilan et al. 2011: 714). As President Yudhoyono implied, education makes Papua's children more like, and equal to, the rest of Indonesia's children. Education is a context for the testing of this proposition, where efforts at improvement and recognition, or the denial of it, are most strenuously contested and thus revealed.

Schooling also positions young people at the forefront of new forms of mobility that may entail living some distance away from home and their closest kin. Questions of education are also deeply gendered. Should girls and young women be encouraged to pursue education to the same extent as boys and young men? Should their objectives the same? What different risks are involved? Moral, cultural and religious concerns over women's independence, mobility, sexuality and marriageability come to the fore (see Stasch 2015: 80). In Melanesian societies, this also occurs at a time when new opportunities for women draw reactions from defenders of 'tradition', changing gender dynamics elicit forceful attempts to reassert men's control over women (Spark 2011), and women's mobility is morally suspect (Butt, Munro and Numbery 2017; Wood and Dundon 2014). At the same time, the commoditization of traditional norms may enable women to be violated even by those closest to them (Wardlow 2006). In Indonesia more specifically, Ariane Utomo (2016: 422) notes that 'the Reform era has also provided an opportunistic platform in both national and local politics, for the reawakening of traditional customary law, religious bias, and stereotyping heavily founded on a patriarchal perspective.' Pam Nilan and colleagues found that the vast majority of female university students expected to work outside the home, but that 'even working women focused primarily on their identities as wives and mothers' (Ford and Parker 2008: 9, cited in Nilan et al. 2011: 719), and 'neo-traditional ideals' of men as the breadwinner and women as secondary earners are prevalent (Utomo 2012).

Yet at another level, schooling is said to be constitutive of new identities and feelings of belonging or exclusion for both males and females, not least because it is linked to 'nation making' (Foster 1997), 'inculcating a national consciousness' and 'creating a common frame of reference for the young generation' (Jourdan 1997: 127). School is a place to learn, if not always take up, the rules, ideals and understandings of the nation-state (Bjork 2005; Parker 2003; Shiraishi 1997). Education in Indonesia is still strongly associated with processes of 'drawing in', 'homogenization', and 'national culture' (Parker 2003: 256). According to Nilan and colleagues (2011: 714),

> [E]ducation was the foundation for building the Indonesian nation. Even today, a well-educated person is respected for his or her assumed

> knowledge and wisdom. The most commonly recommended remedy for widespread corruption and cronyism in the country is inevitably education. In other words, education is regarded as a social 'good' in itself. Education is understood as not only cultural capital that connotes the productive and authoritative citizen, but represents a means of ensuring ethical practice, order, harmony and consensus through the getting of knowledge and wisdom

Education teaches and elevates the national language, Bahasa Indonesia, as the language of modernity.[10] Related to this process, scholars suggest that education tends to deterritorialize or disconnect youth from their natal cultures and rural communities (Amit and Wulff 1995). Wayne Fife (1994) proposes that in Papua New Guinea, teachers promote a new moral order that celebrates the modern life of urban values and the cash economy at the expense of a village way of life. To the extent that students internalize this moral order, they are developing an urban consciousness (Fife 1994: 160). This makes it difficult for them to fit back into life in the village, but limited employment also keeps youth from achieving urban lifestyle goals. Dani students and the people they leave behind do experience some 'disconnection', 'discord' and disappointment (Powell and Wilson 1974; Sykes 1995, 1999; Weeks 1987). Disappointment relates to not finding a place amid an educated, modern, Christian population in North Sulawesi and not finding superior educational institutions or lessons. Disconnection is largely related to what is lost by not being part of social and economic activities in Wamena, but may become a matter of life and death if young people return home HIV positive (see Butt, Munro and Numbery 2017). Networks and partnerships develop, projects and funds are disbursed, and weddings and funerals (with pigs given and received) go on without students.

Educational opportunities obviously do not always translate into employment, prestige, social capital or political power, and instead generate rebelliousness, or even crime and 'anti-social' behaviour among disenchanted youth (Jeffrey et al. 2004; Jeffrey et al. 2005; Sykes 1995, 1999). But that education contributes to a growing sense of national identity, belonging and cultural cosmopolitanism is less questioned (although see Mains 2007, 2012). Where scholars agree is that formal education is always a political project and is itself a form of contact. Ann Stoler (2002), Edward LiPuma (2000) and Wayne Fife (1995), for example, by considering the colonial and missionary roots of formal education in Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, alert us to the ways that becoming educated is already racialized and politicized. The experiences of Dani students show that schooling abroad is racializing because it fosters a sharpening and politicizing of cultural and ethnic differences, and ultimately recommitments to the highlands social and cultural context. This is different

from what Thijs Schut (2016), for example, finds for youth from another rural, but less politicized area of eastern Indonesia (the island of Flores), where unemployed, educated returnees are much less certain of the value of cultural forms of interdependence and collaboration. Still, like Dani graduates, they are nonetheless committed to volunteerism and community wellbeing.

Besides what education represents in the contest over 'modern' status, a close examination of Dani experiences reveals that education may also be an important site of regulation and surveillance – by Indonesians, Papuans and other Dani – and impression management. Schooling often entails living in dormitories that are divvied by cultural groupings, or in boarding houses where a 'house-mother' (*ibu kos*) watches over the inhabitants to ensure their morality and protect her own reputation by extension. Campus is a defined space with its own local government status, where the appearance of mixing and connecting glosses over the zoning of particular corners, fields and computer labs along ethnic, gender or cultural lines.

The Chapters

As the title *Dreams Made Small* suggests, I am interested in how the dreams (educational, political, social and personal) of university student migrants are refashioned, indeed constrained, in the face of multiple limits, and how they also test and push back against those limits. In Chapter 1, I begin the story not in North Sulawesi with Dani university students, but in Wamena with parents, schoolchildren and traditional leaders. In Wamena there are important social, political and gendered imaginings of education to consider. Education is at the centre of choices – marriage or school, gardens or town – that link to broader questions about identity, power, Indonesians, hope and the future.

Chapter 2 takes us to North Sulawesi, where both the anthropologist and Dani students are 'newcomers' (*pendatang*) relative to local 'masters of the land' (*tuan tanah*). This chapter situates Dani migrants within the local cultural, economic and political context of North Sulawesi Indonesian communities in Manado, the urban provincial capital, and in Tondano, the rural site of the National University of Manado (Unima). There are various ways that Dani students almost immediately stand out as 'strange' and 'backward' in their host communities, and may even distinguish themselves from other Papuan students. With minimum financial support from their relatives or from the government, Dani students live an exposed lifestyle, both in terms of the danger of quitting school and in the way that they traverse local communities on foot in search of jungle produce, towards taro gardens they tend, or to bathe and wash clothes in riverine areas. They live in the most haphazard of mixed-gender dormitories that are viewed with some suspicion by Manadonese as hotspots

of sinful activity according to local religious morals, in huts they have built at the edges of rice paddies or in virtually abandoned housing complexes on university campuses. Experiences of social, economic and cultural difference become more acute as students enter into more intimate daily relationships with local Indonesians, especially authority figures.

Chapter 3 builds on this context by focusing on racial dynamics and constructs that occur in Dani encounters and relationships with Indonesians in North Sulawesi. Racial formations contribute to stigma and fear, as students are also branded as separatists and potential threats to local security. I discuss students' experiences with local communities as well as authority figures, police and intelligence agents. A particular focus of this chapter is the affective concept of *malu,* an Indonesian word which translates into shame, shyness and embarrassment. In addition to fear and anger, Dani encounters with Indonesians bring about feelings of shame, shyness and embarrassment. Through case studies, this chapter explores these situations in depth to understand what they tell us about broader racial formations. I find that when Dani students assert themselves, they challenge dominant views of them as 'dumb' (*bodoh*) and the hierarchy that puts Indonesians in positions of authority. The reaction from local society is largely to quash these assertions. In some cases the experience of stigma prevents students from wanting to assert themselves or speak publicly in front of Indonesians in the first place.

Chapter 4 focuses on the university campuses as sites of aspirations, educational goals, stigma and bureaucratic constraints where an economy of friends and favours dominates and largely leaves Dani students vulnerable to exploitation and dropping out. Racism is apparent, as university professors express that 'Wamena students are slow' and expect that Papuan students will not wear their hair in braids or dreadlocks. I show that ad hoc bureaucratic practices affirm experiences of differential treatment and the power of Indonesians to dominate and exclude Dani students from recognition as educated equals. Learning to navigate administrative structures and requirements, including paperwork and procedures, becomes an important part of a university education that is ultimately used back in Wamena.

If earlier chapters focus on how Dani students come into contact with local Indonesians, Chapter 5 delves ethnographically into the social world of 'Wamena people' that is a partial response to conditions of stigma and the myth of cosmopolitan mixing. Students relate to one another in ways that emphasize kinship and respect as well as hierarchies. Their student organization activities are a microcosm of aspirations for certain skills that are culturally valued and largely denied to them by society at large. But there are also divisions and deep challenges that students, who often come from backgrounds saturated by violence and alcohol (Munro 2014b; Munro and Wetipo 2013), are facing in North Sulawesi, where alcohol is cheap and flows relentlessly from local

producers. This chapter examines the notion that in light of their experiences with local people and institutions, Dani students are drawn more closely into the dynamics of their own communities populated by 'Wamena People', that is, not only Dani, but also Lani and Yali students who originate from the western and eastern regions of the Baliem Valley and other subsidiary valleys. It examines what principles, activities and aspirations motivate, and sometimes disrupt, relationships and activities in the community. It draws attention to formal student organizations as sites where students seek to develop particular values, skills, expertise and morals associated with a Dani modernity in the absence of Indonesians, and yet also shows how these efforts sometimes falter in the face of difficult living conditions, including family conflict, altercations and alcohol abuse.

Chapter 6 focuses on students' experiences of sex, marriage and pregnancy/childrearing away from the watchful eyes of parents, amidst discourses that stigmatize Papuan sexuality and frown on starting a family while still at university. In this domain, Dani political views sometimes come together with cultural ideals that favour large families to push back against national and local admonitions to 'study first'. On the other hand, not having access to birth control limits their options and some pregnancies lead to a great deal of shame and disruption. In explaining the common occurrence of premarital pregnancy, students invoke the current political and cultural significance of reproduction and education in Papua, where Indigenous survival is understood to be threatened by violence and marginalization associated with Indonesian governance. Within specific parameters, some Dani women experience premarital pregnancies that are not dominated by feelings of shame or failure, but are seen as evidence of adulthood and as positive contributions to Dani cultural and political agendas. This chapter also shows that there are limits on the prominent experiences of humiliation and shame described by students. Confidence emerges somewhat unexpectedly against the backdrop of cultural, religious, national and local prohibitions on premarital sex and pregnancy.

Finally, Chapter 7 sees Dani students graduating and finds some of them back home in Wamena again to ask what their education has done for them, what has happened to their political and racial struggles, and how they are relating to their own kin as well as Indonesians. It explores how they struggle to do good things for others, even though 'Everything is back to normal', as stated by a male university graduate who returned to Wamena and found himself living again in a traditional hut with his family, eating sweet potatoes and bathing in the river. It contrasts ethnographic and personal accounts of graduation and hopes for the future with the political conditions that constrain graduates' achievements back home. It focuses on forms of employment, volunteerism and other social works that graduates engage in, particularly their roles as intermediaries between less educated and village-based Dani and

Indonesian institutions such as government offices, schools and public health clinics. Graduates use their education to help other Dani avoid experiences of humiliation, being judged uneducated or ignorant, and from having to see themselves in such negative ways. In doing so, they partially interrupt power-laden encounters that underpin marginality. Finding Dani at home again reveals some of the reorientations and rediscoveries that have occurred as a result of their education abroad.

This study shows the context of 'diminishment' that Dani students live with, including racial structures that they find confining and frustrating. It details what a lack of recognition from Indonesians looks like for educated Dani. It also documents affirmations of culture and identity in this context. There is a political critique, derived from feelings of inequality, oppression, injustice and being unfairly stigmatized, that cuts through 'diminishment' and inspires particular commitments. Feeling at best uncomfortable and at worst under siege amidst racialization fosters tenacity, a fomenting of highlander cultural values, and urgency around the notion that Indigenous survival is at stake as long as Indonesians are in control.

Notes

1. This book uses the term 'West Papua' to refer to the western half of the island of New Guinea, which is nowadays comprised of the two easternmost provinces of Indonesia (Papua province and West Papua province). West Papua is the English designation preferred by most Papuans, is the most commonly recognized term for the area internationally and conveniently distinguishes it from Papua New Guinea, the independent country immediately to the east. However, it should be clear that this research took place in the central highlands of Papua province, not West Papua province, as per Map 0.1.
2. I use the term 'Indonesians' to refer to non-Indigenous inhabitants of Papua. Some Indonesians are long-term settlers, while others are recent migrants. Indigenous Papuans are 'Indonesian' by citizenship, but in pertinent local cultural-racial designations 'Papuan people' (*orang Papua*) are differentiated from 'Indonesian people' (*orang Indonesia*).
3. I became interested in an in-depth study of Dani students' experiences in North Sulawesi after spending two months with Dani students in Manado in 2003 doing research for my masters' degree (Munro 2004). I had intended to go to Wamena, but in April 2003 the atmosphere in Wamena and the surrounding villages was tense. In raids by the military, at least seven people were killed, forty-eight were tortured and some 7,000 others were forced to flee after guns were allegedly stolen from a military base (Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization 2004). Manado was known as a common destination for Dani university students, so I went there instead. With students in Manado, I was intrigued by their seeming commitments to 'development', even dominant discourses that accused them of 'primitiveness', which were particularly evident when they spoke of how they understood the emergence of high rates of

HIV in Papua (Munro 2004). The students I met were also, it seemed to me, openly criticized by, and living mainly in silent avoidance of, local Indonesians. This situation was worth investigating. It was also more possible to investigate racialization in North Sulawesi because unlike Papua, it is open to long-term social research by foreigners (see Butt 1998: 41–47; Cookson 2008: 6–9; Rutherford 1997: 103–5; and Timmer 2000: 14–15 for discussion of barriers to research in West Papua). Living with Dani as a minority among the Indonesians of North Sulawesi thus gave me the opportunity to learn about racism, stigma and vulnerability based on long-term participant observation that is not yet permitted in the equally, if differently, racialized setting of highlands Papua. However, the continuity of racial formations across these diverse spaces is a key finding of my study.

4. The author of this internet post argues that once again, Papuan students have been terrorized by locals who take the law into their own hands to avenge the death or injury of Indonesian military personnel in Papua, and that this violence is covered up by the authorities, who accuse drunk Papuans of causing conflict with locals.
5. Article 1(t) of the Special Autonomy Law 2001 states that: 'An Indigenous Papuan is a person originating from the Melanesian race, comprising native ethnic groups in Papua Province and/or a person accepted and acknowledged as a Papua native by the Papua traditional community.' Retrieved 1 August 2017 from http://papuaweb.org/goi/otsus/files/otsus-en.html.
6. Yulia Sugandi's (2013: 36) work with Valley Dani elders suggests they prefer to refer to themselves as *Hubula* or people of the Palim, but in my experience with the younger generation, these other terms were also used and considered acceptable.
7. Colloquial Indonesian varies regionally, and people speak of a Bahasa Papua or a Papuan style (*logat,* dialect). The style is different in coastal versus highland areas. As discussed later, being able to speak Bahasa allows entry into bureaucratic, educational and Indonesian worlds. Yet there is tension in North Sulawesi between Papuans and Indonesians over which group speaks proper Bahasa. Highlanders, more so than coastal Papuans or Indonesians elsewhere, are likely to know their local language.
8. While it goes beyond the scope of this study, in other work (Munro and McIntyre 2016) I have demonstrated that international aid agencies also perpetuate technocratic racism in West Papua when they facilitate, or fail to challenge, the exclusion of Indigenous Papuans in development work on the grounds that they lack capacities or skills.
9. For more conceptualizations of human resources in Indonesia, see Danim (1995) and Tjiptoherijanto (1996).
10. In Jayapura, the capital of Papua province, a roadside sign from the government states: 'Let us prioritize Bahasa Indonesia and preserve local languages.'