Introduction

In his history of the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE), the Attic contemporary witness and historian Thucydides described the consequences that the civil war in Hellas had for political life. The conflict extended into the Greek cities, and the strife between the different camps and parties poisoned everyday life. 'In self-justification, men inverted the usual verbal evaluations of actions', Thucydides reported;

> Irrational recklessness was now considered courageous commitment, hesitation while looking to the future was high-styled cowardice, moderation was a cover for lack of manhood, and circumspection meant inaction, while senseless anger now helped to define a true man … For the leading men in the cities, through their emphasis on an attractive slogan for each side – political equality for the masses, the moderation of aristocracy – treated as their prize the public interest to which they paid lip service.

Thucydides saw a lust for power based in 'greed and ambition' to be the cause of the perversion of concepts, which gave way to brutality and violence.[1] His historical work thus also served to return the concepts to their proper place and meanings, and thus to write history as it actually unfolded.[2] A world descended into disorder was to be returned to a healthy order through the power of language.

Philipp Lord Chandos, who was created by Hugo von Hofmannsthal as a literary figure in 1902, also longed for such an ancient 'harmony of clearly defined and orderly ideas', for concepts as a means of addressing the modern fragility of self and the world. Chandos, a person of the early modern era, describes in his fictive letter to Francis Bacon how abstract concepts 'crumbled in my mouth like mouldy fungi':

> For me everything disintegrated into parts, those parts again into parts; no longer would anything let itself be encompassed by one idea. Single words floated round me; they congealed into eyes which stared at me and into which I was forced to stare back – whirlpools which gave me vertigo and, reeling incessantly, led into the void.[3]

The world could no longer be put into words; it could not be grasped using the language of what had occurred, of what was remembered and experienced. The individual was lost in traditional language. This was now a different sort of speechlessness from that which plagued Thucydides, and it was paradoxical that it was described with such precision in an artful language rich in metaphor.

CSU chairman Franz Josef Strauß also lamented a loss of language.[4] He urgently warned the parties of the European Democratic Union (EDU) in 1978 of 'denouncing their traditional conceptual world and ultimately relinquishing it, because the loss of the concepts [entailed] the loss of the language and thus a loss in the political struggle for the majority'.[5] Strauß held political opponents responsible for the deprivation of the language, for the meaning of political concepts being changed, rendering them useless as a means of describing one's own political standpoint. The loss of linguistic sovereignty here implied a loss of political power.

These three very different men – the Attic historian of the fifth century BCE, the fictional correspondent invented by Hugo von Hofmannsthal, and the West German politician – were all united by their understanding of the significance and power of language. The loss of language lamented in each case was, however, linked to different layers: in the case of Lord Chandos, it was described as radically individualized; in that of Thucydides it affected society as a whole so that understanding was impeded, descending into an orgy of violence and the revaluation of values; and in the case of Strauß it involved the capacity to act in a political arena dominated by the mass media. The three men were connected in yet another matter. Even as they lamented the loss of language, they worked to overcome it, and ultimately did so through their own linguistic powers: Thucydides through the medium of historical narrative; Lord Chandos with his artfully written letter; and Strauß in his relentless rhetorical struggle over political concepts. As much as they viewed language from the point of view of doubters and admonishers, and from a standpoint of desperation, they also clearly spoke to the manifold dimensions of language: language as a medium for communicating about and grasping the world; language as a form of individual expression; language as a constituent component of society; language as a guarantee for its stability; and language as a political instrument.

'The path to a poem is a linguistic path, it leads straight through the language', Ingeborg Bachmann once remarked, who, as a writer, had an extremely reflective relationship with language.[6] Historians are also well aware of the significance of language both for the path to historical knowledge as well as in historiographical practice. The path to history is a linguistic path, leading straight through the language, we could say, thus adapting Ingeborg Bachmann's phrase. This linguistic path to history begins as a path to the historical sources and back again. Linguistic forms of evidence indeed predominate among the wide variety of testimony passed down from the past. Images, architecture and other material

artefacts can of course also speak of the past, although written records – in purely quantitative terms – make up the largest part of the source material. Language is also mostly passed down in written form, and the language in which sources are written is itself part of the history. The sources speak to us in the language of their time. The path to history leads historians straight through the historical language of their sources.

The path to history also leads through the language of the historical depiction itself. Historians write in the language of their particular times, and grasp and understand history in the concepts of their day. This provides, on the one hand, the necessary distance to the historical subject and allows for the understanding of historical phenomena that could not be grasped in the language of the period in question. On the other hand, the current language is also bound in terms of space and time so that it is important to grapple with historiographical concepts through which we are able to understand history in a reflective manner. The concepts used by historians also have their own histories, which need to be revealed and processed.[7] This is particularly the case for contemporary history. As Anson Rabinbach put it, 'the entire ideological weight of the twentieth century poured into the writing of history as well'.[8]

The path to history is a linguistic path, it leads straight through the language – and this book attempts to take this insight seriously. It analyses the historical change in the political languages of conservatism in the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany between 1945 and the early 1980s, while reflecting on the historiographical concepts for the description of the phenomenon. This two-levelled reflection is of particular importance for the concept of conservatism, as one of the most difficult concepts in both the political and historiographical vocabulary of the German language. This volume will demonstrate that the path to the history of conservatism does indeed lead straight through the language.

Concerned about his sovereignty when it came to conceptual definitions, Franz Josef Strauß joined the powerful chorus of intellectuals and politicians who complained of an interpretative monopoly over the concepts of political language on the part of 'the Left'. The suspicion made the rounds of magazines, academic conferences and party conventions that 'the Left' used targeted conceptual politics to manipulate the interpretation of concepts holding up the democratic constitutional order, in order to realize their socialist dream by stealth. Elected to be leader of the Conservative Party in 1975, Margaret Thatcher used this argument in the United Kingdom, and saw her own efforts to reform the party and the country as being part of a 'war of words'.[9] In the 1970s, conservatives in both countries addressed the significance of language in politics, practically catapulting themselves into the political conceptual struggle and taking up a position dedicated to the protection of political concepts. They viewed themselves as being the 'guardians of the concepts'. The political

scientist Wilhelm Hennis coined this self-descriptive phrase in the early 1970s, a phrase that expressed the self-image of his contemporaries who viewed themselves as being part of a conceptual struggle.[10] In both countries, it was only conservatives who were concerned with the loss of concepts. Does this point to a specific relationship between conservatism and language?

If we follow the linguistic path to the history of conservatism using the West German and British examples, we rapidly come across a linguistic problem of an entirely different nature: what does the political concept of conservatism signify, what does it involve, what does it describe? If we look towards Britain, we discover an influential, powerful party, the Conservative and Unionist Party, which held governmental responsibility throughout long periods of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, playing a large role in determining the fate of the United Kingdom. Conservatism, along with liberalism and socialism, constitute the three dominant and competing political and ideological currents in modern history. This interpretation has been repeatedly underscored by historical research. With a view to the Federal Republic of Germany, however, historians can find nothing of the sort. According to the common interpretation, a conservative party was not able to succeed after the demise of the *Deutsche Partei* (German Party, DP) in the early 1960s, as conservatism had outlived its purpose after its catastrophic alliance with National Socialism. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU) were formed as Christian Democratic and not as conservative parties. A West German conservatism could only persist in the closed-off world of intellectual discourse, if adopting a technocratic stance to find reconciliation with modernity, but continuing to maintain a sceptical distance to democracy. A school of liberal-conservative thought only arose in the orbit of the Münster-based philosopher Joachim Ritter.[11] Conservatism in West Germany was, in this interpretation, a 'cropped alternative', an intellectual grouping of the illiberal Right, as Frank Lother Kroll argued.[12]

This interpretation becomes difficult when placed in a broader international context, especially when developments in West Germany and Britain are interrelated. That which is generally understood as 'conservative' in the political language of West Germany, and which also plays a leading role in historiographical analysis, has little to do with British conservatism. With this, a wide conceptual chasm becomes evident. The Conservative Party and CDU/CSU were, upon closer scrutiny, not as diametrically different as the national historical narratives of the countries would have it; they advocated similar ideas and projects in many areas of politics while, of course, diverging in others. This was, however, the case for many Christian Democratic parties in Europe as well. The established interpretative model becomes particularly fragile when those distinctive moments of cultural and political change are taken into account that shaped both West German and British history after the early 1960s. What

influence did secularization, liberalization and Europeanization have in the development of conservatism in the two countries? Did a transatlantic neoliberalism prevail in Britain under Thatcher as many would claim? Is Thatcherism even to be characterized as conservative? Did West German conservatism evade 'Westernization'?[13]

Those posing this sort of question, as Jörn Leonhard put it, find themselves upon the 'cliff of semantic nominalism'. The divergent interpretations of conservatism in the United Kingdom and West Germany derive from very different histories that the concept of conservatism passed through in the two countries. Historiographical interpretation and conceptual history are interwoven here. The 'unreflected adoption of a concept from the political-social vocabulary of one country and its semantic equation with the supposed equivalent word from the political discourse of another country' hence led most generally to the skewing of historical understanding.[14] The problem of nominalism is, however, greater with regard to the concept of conservatism than with any other basic concept of the post-1945 European political vocabulary. Comparative historians thus find themselves in an 'aporetic situation', as described by Reinhart Koselleck, Ulrike Spree and Willibald Steinmetz. Every semantic comparison is – expressed figuratively – caught within the language, as it depends on 'the linguistic translatability of differently stored experiences, which however remain experiences bound to the unique nature of the individual language'. These historical conceptual layers are lost in translation, and thus need to be rendered transparent. Historians can only resort to the common language here, which itself is attached to its own history. A 'metalanguage' would be needed to avoid this.[15] While literature can in fact embark on a search for a 'new idiom' and can provide it with a new 'bearing that it can receive nowhere but in the art of language', as Ingeborg Bachmann once wrote,[16] historical writing does not have recourse to this. The only feasible avenue out of this aporetic situation lies in the ongoing reflection on and historicization of concepts – both regarding concepts found in source materials as well as the analytical concepts that provide the basis required to begin to understand historical phenomena.

This book takes its cue from there, and consistently analyses the concept of conservatism as a historical concept. At the same time, it seeks to describe the phenomenon of conservatism and to understand its historical development in a German–British comparison between 1945 and the early 1980s. For this, a model is needed that is able to explain how this form of political thinking and acting remained recognizable throughout the decades, and how consistency and continuity could be maintained, while also helping to understand how a large degree of variation, flexibility and change could be harmonized here as well. What models of conservatism are on offer in the research?

All models attempt to explain, for one thing, the continuity of conservative thought and action since the emergence of modern conservatism at the turn

of the nineteenth century; they focus on the question of the elements that provided for constancy and recognizability, which foresaw conservatism with its characteristic traits. For another, they attempt to explain the breadth of variation of conservatism, which was considerable, especially when viewed from an international perspective. They hence take a position against interpretations that paint conservatism as a primarily national phenomenon. John Pocock, for example, views British and US conservatism as being incompatible;[17] Michael Oakeshott cultivates the thesis of the exceptionalism of British conservatism;[18] Martin Greiffenhagen points to the blatant differences in the constitution of conservatism in Britain and Germany in order to derive from them the specificity of a 'German conservatism';[19] and Klaus Epstein presents his scepticism towards the project of a European history of conservatism due to the individual paths taken in individual national histories.[20] This doubt is grounded in an understanding of conservatism as a phenomenon bound by tradition and chiefly reactive, and thus removed from theory. As the historian and Prussian politician Heinrich Leo argued in 1864: 'Conservation is indeed different for each people just as each people is itself different'.[21] The models, by contrast, assume a core that is the same for all variants of conservatism, understand conservatism as both an integral part of Western modernity and as a phenomenon that can be theorized. They therefore refute the thesis of Panajotis Kondylis, who interprets conservatism as a premodern phenomenon that he believed to have vanished with the end of the *ancien regime*.[22]

Two variants of theoretical modelling need to be distinguished. The first takes Karl Mannheim's idea of a 'morphology of conservative thought' as its starting point, which Mannheim disseminated through his study of conservatism within the framework of the sociology of knowledge in 1927. Mannheim sought to grasp the 'essential characteristics' of conservatism, which he identified as 'clinging to what is immediate and *concrete* in a practical way' within an experience of time that had its starting point in the past.[23] Only once the past conditions were called into question would 'conservative thinking and experiencing' become 'self-reflexive' and 'conscious of its own nature',[24] and conservative thought would then 'emerge as a distinguishable entity' and 'dynamic structural configuration'.[25] Conservatism was thus constituted in opposition to 'bourgeois revolutionary' thought and 'natural-law thinking', and was characterized, among other things, by focusing on 'history', 'life', 'nation', the 'irrationality of reality', the 'qualitative', the organism idea, a '*mode of thinking* which starts *from a standpoint of totality*' and a '*dynamic conception of reason*'.[26] Mannheim attributed firm and unchangeable substance to conservative thought.

Countless interpreters of conservatism have since followed him in this through our own day. One of the most internationally influential of these was Russell Kirk, who defined six basic principles or 'canons' of conservative thought in 1953: first, a belief in a transcendent order or a corpus of natural

law in the form of 'an eternal chain of right and duty which link great and obscure, living and dead'; second, a belief in the endless 'variety and mystery' of human existence, which defies all abstraction and uniformity; third, a belief in the hierarchical order of society and a fundamental inequality; fourth, the idea that 'property and freedom are inseparably connected'; fifth, a trust in emotion, tradition, convention, prejudice and established rules; and sixth, doubts with regard to uncalculated reform and an excess of innovation.[27] Research provides many such catalogues of the definition of conservatism in a wide variety of lengths and forms. In his penetrating study on German conservatism, Axel Schildt presents 'religiosity in opposition to an emphasis on earthly rationality, the transcendent legitimation of political power, the defence of existing social and political inequality and the "organically" emergent in state and society in opposition to rationalistic construction principles and revolutionary change', which itself stood in opposition to the 'affirmation of God-given and historically emergent hierarchy and authority, in contrast with the liberal principle of popular sovereignty, and scepticism towards the consequences of social modernization'.[28] Kurt Lenk compiled a catalogue of conservative 'axioms and topoi'[29] that was considerably more nuanced, as was the list of 'assumptions, predispositions, arguments, themes and metaphors' with which Jerry Z. Muller sought to capture the essence of conservatism.[30] Departing from the British example of conservatism, Robert Eccleshall, by contrast, reduced it to a sole core of substance: the subscription to inequality and the consequent concept of 'ordered liberty'.[31] The form of modelling through the definition of substance-related criteria has been established in both historical research and political science, and has spread widely through its repetition in encyclopaedia articles.[32] It is, however, also the preferred manner in which conservatives of all stripes describe their thinking themselves, and attempt to foresee it with historical depth.

The British political scientist Michael Freeden opts for a different approach, one that has yet to be adopted into historical research. He understands conservatism as a linguistic structure, as a network of concepts with its own characteristic 'morphology'. This forms the basis of Freeden's theory of ideology, built on a neutral concept of 'ideology', as is often used in English and generally applied to systems of political thought. As Freeden defines it: 'Ideologies are complex combinations and clusters of political concepts in sustainable patterns'.[33] Political concepts receive their specific meaning through the particular morphological structures that they are placed within. The centre of Freeden's theory is indeed shaped by the observation, as informed by Walter Bryce Gallie, that the central concepts of political vocabulary have a wide range of meaning so that they are vague, imprecise and ultimately indefinable. Their meanings are an ongoing point of contention – concepts are 'essentially contested'.[34] Those involved in political discourse, in order to clarify their own positions, therefore strive to nail down the interpretation of concepts, and strongly reduce the breadth of their

meaning. This interplay of 'contestation' and 'decontestation' predominates in political communication. As Freeden summarizes: 'An ideology is a wide-ranging structural arrangement that attributes *decontested* meanings to a range of mutually defining political concepts'.[35] It is these semantic structures that ensure constancy and recognizability. At the same time, they guarantee a considerable range of variation – Freeden uses the metaphor of 'ideological families' for this, understanding conservatism to be one such diverse ideological family.

Freeden views its morphological structure, 'the law of Conservative structure', as being constituted by four core components: first, a resistance to change that is not perceived as organic and natural; second, the belief that the laws and forces that affect people are of 'extra-human origins' and beyond human influence; third, the creation of relatively stable concepts as a reaction to all forms of progressive thinking; and, fourth, a high level of flexibility in the use of concepts in order to protect, under changing conditions, the specifically conservative conception of change. He hence finds that conservatism is characterized by a high degree of adaptability. This, however, is undermined by the dependence on its progressive counterpart; the stronger the conservative counterreaction, the more precisely its concepts are defined and the less flexible its semantic structure becomes in the face of new challenges.[36] Freeden, to a certain extent, follows Karl Mannheim in his definition of conservatism; the first two of his four basic elements of conservative morphology mark positions concerning substance, while the third involves the thesis of the dominantly reactive nature of conservatism. As Freeden himself dealt first and foremost with liberalism,[37] it is undoubtedly necessary to review his definition of conservatism using a historical, source-based analysis.

The present book will, nonetheless, be oriented towards Freeden's theoretical approach. It understands conservatism as a linguistic structure determined by characteristic structural principles, which provided conservative thought and action with constancy and ensured that it was recognizable. Its wealth of variants, from this perspective, is also primarily expressed through language so that – especially in an international comparison – we can hardly propose the existence of one single political language of conservatism. Although a number of different political languages of conservatism do indeed exist, they all share the same morphology, the same inner structuring. It is therefore more appropriate to speak of 'conservatisms' in the plural or of political languages of conservatism. This book is built on the hypothesis that four morphological structural principles are decisive in shaping the political languages of conservatism: first, the structural principle of temporality, which provides for a balance of the three temporal dimensions – past, present and future; second, the structural principle of balance and synthesis, through which the conservative striving for *moderation* and the *centre* are realized in language; third, the structural principle of repetition and application to the present, which corresponds with the conservative

principle of conservation and guarding of concepts; and fourth, the structural principle of the formation of opposites, which derives from both a stance of resistance against an overabundance of innovation and from the position on the front against liberalism and later against socialist and social democratic thought. Importantly, it is only as a composite that the principles provided the political languages of conservatism with their characteristic morphology, interrelating and standing in an equal tension with one another; the meaning attributed to the individual structural principles varied and constituted a decisive moment in the dynamics of change for the political languages of conservatism.

Along with Michael Freeden, this volume follows the linguistic path on the way towards a history of conservatism, by conceptualizing politics as a communications process, in which a large number of speakers, writers, illustrators and designers are included. Freeden's attention to political language received one of its impulses from Germany, and from Bielefeld to be exact. It was there that Reinhart Koselleck developed his concept of conceptual history over the course of decades, and meticulously implemented it in his massive lexicon project, *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* (Basic Historical Concepts). These *Grundbegriffe*, or basic concepts, were defined as those concepts 'which no political and no linguistic community can forgo'[38] and which are 'unexchangeable',[39] so that conceptual history is based on the assumption that language constituted a 'methodically irreducible final instance … without which no experience and no science of the world or of history can be reached'.[40] The lexicon charted the development of the basic concepts of the modern political vocabulary of Germany, which formed between the middle of the eighteenth and the middle of the nineteenth centuries. According to Koselleck's widely disseminated hypothesis, they were characterized in this 'threshold period' (*Sattelzeit*) by four processual characteristics: The concepts were (a) democratized, i.e. used by all social classes; (b) temporalized, i.e. they received a linear inner temporal structure; (c) able to be ideologized and thus abstracted from the concrete; and (d) politicized, becoming part of the political struggle.[41] Koselleck, too, recognized the multilayered nature and breadth of meaning of political concepts, and underscored the political dispute that necessarily had to be carried out over its dimensions of meaning: concepts are formed, changed and reformulated time and again in the course of political discourse. He, furthermore, emphasized the temporal structure of concepts in the modern political vocabulary. For one thing, they all had their own histories with an impact on their semantic inventory. As Koselleck expressed it, concepts conserve the 'past in our language'.[42] He coined the metaphor of the 'space of experience' to capture these deep historical layers. For another, they all had a future dimension, pointing onwards beyond the present day. They create a 'horizon of expectation', each with its own temporal structure.[43] Koselleck wished to have his concept of conceptual history be understood as a contribution to social history, and sought to move reflection

on the concepts beyond the history of philosophy and ideas. Conceptual history was to support social history in its inquiry into 'the pregiven linguistic conditions under which such structures have entered into social consciousness, and under which they have been comprehended and also changed'.[44] This aim was only rarely fulfilled, and the lexicon entries of *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* were based to a large degree on texts of the most rarefied intellectual and political heights.[45] Critics took notice of this, as well as of the methodically problematic isolation of individual concepts.[46]

In the course of the past several decades, conceptual history has, departing from the criticism of Koselleck's concept, developed further into an internationally active field of historical semantics, taking on impulses from the cultural and linguistic sciences and making fruitful use of discourse-analytical approaches.[47] The German tradition of conceptual history was connected in dialogue with the intellectual history of the Cambridge School linked to Quentin Skinner and John Pocock.[48] Historians, linguists, computer linguists, political scientists and philosophers have applied their particular points of view to historical semantics. The field is thus multiperspectival and interdisciplinary so that a number of methodological approaches and practical applications can be tested within its framework.

Historical semantics – in contrast to Koselleck's lexicographical conceptual history – conceptualizes concepts within their particular semantic contexts, thus focusing on semantic networks, clusters of concepts, argumentational structures, metaphors and semantic fields,[49] in order to identify political languages – or, as expressed by John Pocock, as characteristic, recognizable linguistic structures with their own grammar and regularities, which are able to provide direction for thought, speech and action.[50] This applies beyond language as well, underscoring the importance of non-linguistic symbols for communication. Historical semantics also embraces insights of linguistic pragmatics, and takes into account communication processes and specific 'situations of word usage' as 'moments of formulation, assertion or rejection of concepts'.[51] The actors thus move more closely towards the centre of analysis as the active dimension of linguistic expression is emphasized. Such a linguistic-pragmatic approach allows for the perusal of a 'history of conceptual assertion',[52] while also increasing understanding for communicative situations in which concepts could not be used to describe matters if, for example, they were discredited due to their integration into totalitarian vocabularies.[53] This opens up new avenues, especially with regard to the history of the second half of the twentieth century, that are particularly able to reflect on this specific dimension of the 'sayable' – or indeed 'unsayable'.[54] Historical semantics, not least, allows for the fruitful use of approaches in transnational history, in its inquiry into translation processes, transfer of meaning and the transnational dimension of concepts in national languages.[55] As Willibald Steinmetz has it, historical semantics comprises 'research into changes both in

the regular use of linguistic (and other) symbols as well as in the relationship of these symbols to cognitive correlates (concepts) and in the reference of these symbols to extralinguistic matters'.[56] Politics, in the sense of a cultural history of politics, is then also understood as an ongoing communications process, in which meanings are 'produced, and only through their repetition (and the expectation of repetition) become shared information'.[57]

It is indeed historical semantics that provides a second source of inspiration for this book along with Michael Freeden's linguistically founded theory of political ideology. This book investigates and compares the development of the concept of *Konservatismus* or conservatism in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom between 1945 and the early 1980s. The concept of conservatism serves here as a *tertium comperationis*. Along with Angelika Linke, concepts will be understood as the 'minimal *crystallization nuclei* of discourses or as their *distillations*'.[58] This discursive approach presupposes a neutral understanding of discourse. Along with Lucian Hölscher, discourse is understood here to be an 'ex post reconstructable structure of a socially and thematically delimited context of discussion', which emerges through the 'continuity of identical or similar questions, arguments and points of view over an extended period of time'.[59] Basic concepts, as Jörn Leonhard emphasizes, 'develop and work only in a discourse, which is unimaginable without them'; they are indeed interdependent.[60]

The concept of conservatism is, like all basic concepts of political vocabulary, embedded in different semantic networks, into which the concept's analysis can in turn provide insight. It numbers among the highly contested concepts of both countries, with ongoing disputes over its meaning – in intellectual debates, political disagreements, party-political discussions and controversies in the press. As the key concept in the political languages of conservatism, moreover, it serves as a concept of self-description and self-examination. The political languages of conservatism are not, however, identical with the *concept* of conservatism. Instead of presupposing that its morphology and internal structure become crystallized in the concept of conservatism, this book focuses on its position within its semantic networks. It investigates its semantic environment, uncovers the semantic networks into which the concept has been integrated, and searches for counterconcepts as well as parallel and alternative concepts. The book is hence able to capture the political languages of conservatism in both countries, throughout their processes of change, and to uncover their morphology – and by doing so, it eludes the 'cliff of semantic nominalism'.[61]

It is comparison that renders this perspective possible in the first place, in that it calls for the questioning of the concepts in the respective national languages and for them to be understood within their historical contexts; the comparison presupposes 'selection, abstraction and removal from the context' and requires a methodologically reflective approach.[62] This prevents a plunge from Leonhard's

cliff, which the comparison instead serves to expose. The historical-contrastive comparison by no means postulates the equation of the phenomena being compared. It is, by contrast, one of its strengths that both differences and commonalities can be revealed among the phenomena in question. Their individual outlines can only then take on clarity.[63] The comparison undertaken in this book is complemented by a transnational approach that pursues the reciprocal influences and processes of transfer along the lines of '*histoire croisée* of concepts'.[64]

The concept of conservatism was argued and debated – and indeed fought over – both in West Germany and in Britain between 1945 and the early 1980s. This book analyses these debates, with a focus on those figures who were actively involved: in both countries, that chiefly meant politicians, intellectuals, writers, journalists, representatives of associations, churchmen and party officials. And yet, the discursive spaces within which conservatism was discussed in West Germany and Britain differed widely. While the Conservative Party was able to practically monopolize the discourse in the United Kingdom, and even intellectual discussions mostly took place within the framework that the party provided, the debate over conservatism in West Germany did not unfold in any particular place but was characterized instead by its wide-ranging scope and the close nexus of intellectual and political discourse. The discussions interrelated closely in academic journals, party-political bodies, intellectual circles and the journalism of the day. They were carried out just as much in the German Party of the 1950s and the CDU and CSU as they were at conferences of the Protestant and Catholic academies,[65] academic symposia, daily newspapers and television studios. It may appear paradoxical that conservatism was discussed much less thoroughly and contentiously in the United Kingdom, with its influential conservative tradition, than in West Germany after 1945, where conservatism was viewed as a phenomenon exclusive to the illiberal Right. This discrepancy is reflected in this book in that the description of the German discourse is afforded a much larger space than that of the United Kingdom.

This book specifically connects *intellectual history* with the history of politics and parties, which are otherwise commonly addressed separately from each other.[66] However, the division between intellectual discourse and the (party-) political, often day-to-day debate in no way reflects the discursive realities of democratic publics after 1945. Neither intellectuals nor politicians communicated in a vacuum but aimed their linguistic performance either towards a particular audience or placed themselves within a discussion context. When they employed particular concepts, they were aware of their scope of meaning and sought to bring them to a head in line with their own thinking – especially with regard to the basic concept of conservatism. Intellectuals placed themselves within a political discourse when speaking out on the topic of conservatism in the democratic publics of West Germany and Britain; what they then said was understood as a political statement.

Viewing the British and West German concept of conservatism and the political languages of conservatism in both countries between 1945 and the early 1980s, in terms of comparison and the history of transfer, this volume investigates, first, the development of the concept's meaning. What effect did the history of the conservatisms of both countries have on the concept? What temporal structures characterized it? In which semantic networks was it embedded? What counterconcepts provided it with definition,[67] and what alternative, parallel and secondary concepts delimited it? To what degree were discursive space and conceptual development interrelated? Which commonalities and differences marked the conceptual development in comparison? And last, but not least: what structural principles defined the morphology of the political languages of conservatism?

Second, the book places the conceptual history within a broader German–British comparison: What significance did the specific national conceptualization have on the development of parties and political thought in the two countries? Was the language treated as an instrument of political action and, if so, what effects did this have? Did the widely different German and British experience with democracy manifest itself in the political languages of conservatism? This is connected with the question of the liberalization and 'Westernization' of West Germany after 1945, which is of particular importance with regard to a German conservatism burdened by anti-liberal and anti-democratic traditions. For many years, the research comparing Germany and Britain focused strongly on the theory of the German *Sonderweg* or 'special path', which concentrated on the history of the nineteenth century and described a 'German' journey towards modernity that diverted from developments in 'the West' and which ultimately culminated in disaster with the extermination policies of the Nazi regime.[68] The diametrically opposed development of conservatism in the two countries – liberalization and a slow process of reconciliation with democracy in one, and anti-liberalism and anti-democratic sentiment in the other – formed the foundation of the *Sonderweg* thesis. How did the situation then develop in the four decades following the new democratic beginnings?

This book also faces a narrative of British exceptionalism that focuses on the early liberalization of British conservatism and attempts to use that to explain Thatcherism, which began to emerge in the 1970s. British conservatism, it is commonly held, is thus much more similar to its US counterpart than to conservatisms across Europe. The strident British retreat from European institutions beginning in the late 1980s was founded, the argument goes, to a large degree, in these incongruities.[69] This narrative has particularly been stressed, time and again, following the momentous decision made by the British electorate in June 2016 to leave the European Union. The present volume questions this narrative through the means of comparison: How significant were the processes of Europeanization, which were set in motion by the dynamics of European

integration, especially for the United Kingdom? What effects did the European orientation of the Conservative Party have that took shape in the late 1950s? What were the consequences of the conversation between the Conservative Party and the CDU/CSU, which the two parties entered within the confines of European politics?

A third layer of inquiry focuses on the history of political language in the twentieth century. Research inspired by Koselleck has concentrated on the 'threshold period' and has largely stretched, chronologically, no further than the middle of the nineteenth century. Using the four characteristics that he posited for the modern political-social vocabulary, he was able to describe the reconstitution of the conceptual inventory between 1750 and 1850. Are they also able to capture the political vocabulary of the twentieth century with the same precision? Do further criteria need to be defined, as recently suggested by Christian Geulen, and further developed by Willibald Steinmetz?[70] Are traits specific to national languages to be expected? A comparative analysis of the concept of conservatism can help to illuminate these questions, as it is indeed one of the basic concepts in political vocabulary that emerged during the 'threshold period' and, as a concept of *-isms* and thus movements, underwent processes of politicization, ideologizability, temporalization and democratization, and hence serves here as an excellent example.[71] With its Latin derivation, it was, furthermore, one of the concepts – as was the concept of liberalism that was comparatively researched by Jörn Leonhard for the 'threshold period' – that occur in all European languages, and which had European and transatlantic dimensions from the very beginning.[72]

The present book can particularly contribute to this discussion as historical-semantic studies on the history of the twentieth century, and especially its second half, are by no means in great abundance. The discipline of linguistics has alone seen years of work on West German language history since 1945, and has produced valuable studies and lexicons that, of course, pursue linguistic questions and can therefore only satisfy the needs of contemporary history to a limited degree.[73] The language criticism that was solidly anchored in the culture of West Germany after 1945 also became a particular object of linguistic interest.[74] Studies in the fields of sociology and political science, as for example on concepts of the welfare state or the concept of the common good, have also enriched our knowledge of the political vocabulary.[75] Historical studies have made important inroads into issues of contemporary history such as Allied language policy, political correctness, religious languages, the semantics of politics, internal security, the West, work, sustainability, the significance of experience with totalitarianism for the development of political languages in the twentieth century, as well as on concepts 'after the boom'.[76] The historical-semantic approach has, by contrast, rarely been tested for British history after 1945. Studies inspired by the Cambridge School and the *linguistic*

turn of the 1980s focus on the history of the nineteenth century.[77] Richard Toye has published the first promising studies in contemporary history, which focus on the analysis of political rhetoric and are oriented towards models in political science inspired by cultural theory that conceptualize 'governance as storytelling'.[78]

Conservatism in contemporary history has, by comparison, been well researched for the United Kingdom, with a main focus on the Conservative Party. In addition to John Ramsden's party history, which stretches to the shift in party leadership from Edward Heath to Margaret Thatcher in 1975, alongside other publications with a broader scope, there are a large number of studies on Conservative politics in government and in opposition.[79] The historical research has been driven by the question of the place that the political thought of Thatcher and the political model of the party under her leadership (i.e. Thatcherism) has had within the history of British conservatism.[80] The intellectual history of conservatism is treated here within the framework of party history – with the exception of international research on Michael Oakeshott.[81]

West German conservatism has, by contrast, only been researched incompletely, especially as intellectual history and party history have been clearly separated. The research has paid particular attention to the 1950s in order to determine the paths and boundaries of the democratization of conservative thought in the incipient Federal Republic. Special interest has been placed on the representatives of the Weimar New Right, especially on Carl Schmitt, Ernst and Friedrich Georg Jünger, Martin Heidegger, Hans Freyer, Ernst Forsthoff, Hans Zehrer, Arnold Gehlen and Helmut Schelsky, as well as on their students.[82] Studies have also illuminated the intellectual development of journalists and writers, delving into core themes in conservative thought and conservative mobilization such as the topos of the elite and *Abendland* ideology.[83] Not by chance, Axel Schildt's overview extends the empirical scope not much further than the early 1960s.[84] Only older studies have been published on the history of the German Party, which explicitly viewed itself as conservative.[85] The history of the CDU and CSU, which are usually described as Christian Democratic and only as conservative in part, has also been explored chiefly for the 1950s and early 1960s with the exception of certain biographical studies and research on particular areas of politics, as well as Frank Bösch's short overview.[86] The history of the CDU has, generally speaking, been researched better than that of its Bavarian sister party, especially with regard to the period after the 1960s.[87] Research on West German conservatism has most recently turned towards these decades of upheaval both for the intellectuals and for the party-political arenas, and especially with an emphasis on the significance of '1968'.[88] By contrast, work on the New Right of the Federal Republic remains a desideratum in the field of contemporary history, even as research has been conducted on extremism in the field of political science for much longer.[89]

The transnational history of conservatism since 1945 in Europe and the United States has been the subject of little investigation so far. Even as research into US conservatism has seen a boom over the past several years and has led to important and highly original contributions, there have been few inquiries into the transnational dimensions of the emergence of conservatism since the 1930s.[90] A similar gap has been left in the research on British conservatism, which has also been chiefly examined as a national phenomenon, even if the influence of neoliberal transatlantic networks has been emphasized for the formation of Thatcherism and the British–American axis of the 1980s, as personified by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan.[91] West German conservatism has also been investigated in terms of its transnational dimensions, but to a very limited degree. The work of Susanne Peters and Alexander Gallus on William S. Schlamm has provided important impulses for this, as well as Johannes Großmann's in-depth study on elite foreign policy networks of a *Conservative International*.[92] By contrast, there has been extensive research on the integration of the CDU and CSU into Christian Democratic party networks that arose within the framework of the European integration process, although with a focus placed on the first two postwar decades.[93] Little is known thus far about the international activities of the Conservative Party. The present book places a new accent on research into interparty cooperation between the Conservative Party and the CDU/CSU from the 1950s through to the 1980s.

While the German–British comparison can now build on four decades of research tradition, this has, however, focused solely on Germany, with comparative work extremely rare in British research. German–British comparative studies have long moved past the Bielefeld School's focus on social history to embrace a wider variety of approaches.[94] Research comparing German and British history has increasingly turned its attention to the second half of the twentieth century, with two points of focus emerging: the German and British developments of the welfare state have been contrasted and investigated as typological cases, while recent studies have investigated the debate over the interpretation of the 1970s, viewed as a decade of extensive political, economic and cultural change with an impact on all Western societies. The end of the postwar boom, the shift from an industrial to a postindustrial society, the rise of the consumer society, the individualization and pluralization of lifestyles, the questioning of traditional moral orders, a push towards secularization, new social mobility, a strong politicization trend and alternative forms of politics, Europeanization and globalization are all processes that culminated in the 1970s, posing a fundamental challenge to society and the political arena. The era of high modernity, which had emerged around 1890, came to its end, and our current era began to take shape.[95]

In such a comparison, Britain and West Germany serve as paradigmatic, contrastive cases of crisis solving. The two countries were in fact both marked by a particular economic structure – in the case of the United Kingdom it was a

Keynesian market economy with a significant state sector and then a radical shift towards a neoliberal-oriented capitalist system, while West Germany continued to hold fast to its social market economy. The development towards a welfare state took two different paths: while a liberal form of welfare state was established in the United Kingdom, it was a conservative-corporatist form that took hold in West Germany.[96] The political culture was informed by different political systems – in West Germany, several parties were able to compete due to its mixed system of plurality and proportional representation, often culminating in coalition governments (concordance democracy), while in the United Kingdom the direct election of individuals was advantageous towards having two large parties contesting an absolute majority so that single-party governments were the rule there (competitive democracy).[97] The German–British comparison indeed contrasts two different societies after 1945. Britain emerged triumphant from the Second World War as the defender of freedom and democracy, only to come to terms with its rapid loss in international influence in the 1950s, the end of its empire and becoming a mid-range power facing internal political polarization, social inequality and racism. The Federal Republic of Germany was built in 1949 upon the ruins left behind by the Nazi regime, its war of annihilation and the Holocaust. The division of Germany manifested itself in the founding of the GDR that same year, and was cemented by the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961. West German society had to find its place within a democracy protected by the Western allies and regain its footing both economically and politically. The processes of change in the 1970s affected two very different societies in West Germany and the United Kingdom. It is this, in particular, that renders this comparison so fruitful, as convergences and divergences can be established, and the processes of change can be outlined with greater precision.[98]

Despite the vitality of comparative research, historical-semantic comparisons are seldom undertaken; Jörn Leonhard's work on the concept of liberalism as well as the comparative investigation of the semantics of the concept of the *Bürger* by Reinhart Koselleck, Ulrike Spree and Willibald Steinmetz represent exceptions that prove the rule.[99] Their focus lies on the nineteenth century; studies have yet to be published on the twentieth.

The present book places its focus on this research gap. The comparison of the German and British political languages of conservatism from 1945 to the early 1980s provides a look into a phenomenon that offers a fruitful perspective on the transformation processes of the 1970s. Especially in the research on West German history, the Left appears as the dynamic force of change, while British research relativizes this interpretation with its focus on Thatcherism. What significance did the political languages of conservatism actually take on in this context? In what way were they affected by, or did they help to form, the general processes of change? This study places its focus on the 1960s and 1970s, although this period cannot of course be separated from the whole history of

both countries since 1945. The development of the political languages of conservatism from 1945 through to the early 1980s is hence investigated here, as it was 1979 when the Conservative Party returned to government in the United Kingdom, and 1982 when the CDU and CSU formed a coalition with the FDP in West Germany. These changes of government lent a new quality to intellectual debates as well, and so the 1980s are excluded here – a choice that also has archival reasons reflecting the common thirty-year closure period.

All sources, published and unpublished, that reflect discourse on the concept of conservatism after 1945 in Germany and the United Kingdom are included in the analysis. In order to cover the public discourse, the study analyses newspapers, magazines and journals of all kinds, academic publications in the form of monographs and essays, manuscripts of radio and television programmes, lectures, speeches and the minutes of Germany's Bundestag as well as both British Houses of Parliament. Newspapers, magazines and journals that place themselves within the conservative spectrum, or that at least held conservative sympathies for periods of time, are of particular – if not exclusive – importance to the internal discourse over conservatism. They include *The Times*, *The Daily Telegraph*, *The Spectator*, *The Economist*, *Crossbow*, *Swinton (College) Journal*, *Solon*, *Monday News* and *Monday World* for Britain; and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ), *Die Welt*, *Die Welt am Sonntag*, *Christ und Welt* (after 1971: *Deutsche Zeitung. Christ und Welt*), *Der Rheinische Merkur*, *Bayernkurier*, *Merkur. Deutsche Zeitschrift für europäisches Denken*, *Die politische Meinung*, *Evangelische Verantwortung*, *Scheidewege*, *Criticón*, *Konservativ heute* and *Zeitbühne* for West Germany. The evaluation of newspapers cannot be comprehensive in scope for practical research reasons, so products of the Yellow Press and regional press can only be included selectively. The debates held within the parties did not only occur in public – at party conferences, in newspaper articles and in the pamphlets that were of such importance within the Conservative Party – but also behind closed doors. Relevant party records are therefore consulted as well. In the case of the CDU/CSU, published source volumes can be used to this end, especially the minutes of the CDU National Board (1950–73) as well as the minutes of the CDU/CSU Bundestag Parliamentary Group (1949–69) and the CSU *Landesgruppe* in the Bundestag (1949–72).[100] The minutes of the party conferences of the CDU and Conservative Party have been published, and those of the CSU party conferences are deposited at the Archiv für Christlich-Soziale Politik (ACSP). Internal working papers and memoranda, minutes of diverse party bodies, organizational records, personal correspondence and the like are also of interest. They are contained in the relevant party archives: the Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik (ACDP), the ACSP as well as the Conservative Party Archive at the Bodleian Library in Oxford. Margaret Thatcher's significant body of records can be found at the Churchill Archives Centre in Cambridge, and the website of the Margaret Thatcher Foundation

offers a large selection of sources from there. The CDU and CSU also provide digital access to a selection of their source materials on their websites, albeit a comparatively small one. The source corpora for the British and West German sides of the comparison are put together in a way that ensures the various genres of source materials are compiled in equal measure in order to avoid imbalances. The digitization and optical character recognition of a large portion of the source materials also serves here as a check on the results, so the qualitatively formed argument can be undergirded quantitatively as well.

This volume begins with an analysis of the British concepts of *conservatism* or *Toryism* from 1945 through to the early 1980s. The debates over its semantic content were closely intertwined with the programmatic discussions held within the Conservative Party. Shifts in meaning therefore coincided with change in party leadership, as is particularly evident in the cases of Harold Macmillan (1957–63), Edward Heath (1965–75) and Margaret Thatcher (1975–90). They therefore need to be analysed in depth, with a recurring focus on the strategies of conceptual politics on the part of factions within the party that sought to oppose the party leadership. This first part of the book will concentrate in particular on the structural principles of the political languages of conservatism in the United Kingdom.

The second part will investigate West German discourse on the concept of conservatism, which, as mentioned above, was much more divided and nuanced than was the case in Britain. It requires a more extensive depiction for that reason, and because the poorer state of research on West Germany provided less of a basis for the study. Much is presented here for the first time in terms of West German structures, contexts and personal networks, whereas that has long been available for the United Kingdom. The second major chapter will therefore investigate the intellectual and party-political branches of discourse on conservatism in West Germany, beginning with a focus on the debates of the 1950s within the circles of the Weimar New Right, the German Party, the *Abendland* Movement and journalism. This is followed by a historical-semantic analysis of the debates over the self-understanding of the Union parties in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and then by an in-depth view of the language-critical discourse within the CDU/CSU and the intellectual arena of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Lastly, the reframings of conservatism that followed the challenge of the 1968 student movement and the 1969 Social-Liberal government will be analysed. An initial conclusion will tie the strings of the comparison together.

The transnational dimension of the discourse on the concept of conservatism, using the example of cooperation between the Conservative Party and the CDU/CSU, will be presented in a final chapter. Their history from the 1950s to the 1980s will first be laid out, followed by the question of how the concept of conservatism was handled within this framework, which concepts the parties chose to describe themselves, and how communication manifested conceptually

within the European networks of Centre-Right parties. A final conclusion will weave together the comparative and transfer-historical threads to illuminate the variety of conservatisms in Europe after 1945 through the analysis of their political languages. The guardians of the concepts will thus come into sharper historical focus.

Notes

1. Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, 169.
2. On Thucydides' work and influence, see Rengakos and Tsakmakis, *Brill's Companion to Thucydides*; Meister, *Thukydides als Vorbild der Historiker*.
3. Hofmannsthal, 'The Letter', 74.
4. On Franz Josef Strauß, see the two biographies with their opposing political stances: Möller, *Franz Josef Strauß*; Siebenmorgen, *Franz Josef Strauß*.
5. ACSP, Sammlungen EDU, Pressemitteilung, EDU, CSU-Vorsitzender Franz Josef Strauß: EDU muss geistige Auseinandersetzung um Kollektivismus und Individualismus innerhalb der Demokratie führen, n.d. [1978].
6. Bachmann, 'Auf den Spuren', 189.
7. See Dipper and Koselleck, 'Begriffsgeschichte', 190.
8. Rabinbach, *Begriffe aus dem Kalten Krieg*, 73.
9. See MTFW, 102947, Margaret Thatcher, Speech to Finchley Conservatives, 31.1.1976.
10. 41. Bergedorfer Gesprächskreis, Protokoll, 11.
11. See Hacke, *Philosophie der Bürgerlichkeit*.
12. See Kroll, *Die kupierte Alternative*.
13. See Doering-Manteuffel, *Wie westlich sind die Deutschen?*
14. Leonhard, 'Von der Wortimitation', 45; on the problem of nominalism, see also Leonhard, *Liberalismus*, 81–85.
15. Koselleck, Spree and Steinmetz, 'Three *bürgerliche* Worlds?', 413.
16. Bachmann, 'Frankfurter Vorlesungen', 263.
17. See Pocock, 'Introduction', VII.
18. See e.g. Oakeshott, 'Contemporary British Politics'; also: Eccleshall, 'The Doing of Conservatism', 284–85.
19. Greiffenhagen, *Das Dilemma*, 1971, 17-19.
20. See Epstein, *The Genesis of German Conservatism*, 6–7.
21. Leo, 'Was ist conservativ?', 1864, 23.
22. See Kondylis, *Konservativismus*.
23. Mannheim, *Conservatism*, 88, emphasis in original.
24. Ibid., 101.
25. Ibid., 102.
26. Ibid., 107–9, emphasis in original.
27. Kirk, *The Conservative Mind*, 1953, 7–9.
28. Schildt, *Konservatismus in Deutschland*, 12–13.
29. See Lenk, *Deutscher Konservatismus*.
30. Muller, 'Introduction'.
31. Eccleshall, 'The Doing of Conservatism'.

32. See e.g. '"Konservativismus"', 1990; '"Konservativismus"', 2006; '"Conservatism"', 2010.
33. Freeden, *Ideology*, 51; for a comprehensive derivation, see Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*; also, in variation from this: Freeden, 'Thinking Politically and Thinking about Politics'; Freeden, 'Conclusion'; and Freeden, 'Concepts, Ideology and Political Theory'. For a discussion of the conceptual history, see Freeden, 'Ideology and Conceptual History'.
34. See Gallie, 'Essentially Contested Concepts'; Connolly, 'Essentially Contested Concepts'; Connolly, *The Terms of Political Discourse*; Collier, Hidalgo and Maciuceanu, 'Essentially Contested Concepts'. For a comparison of the approaches of Gallie and Koselleck, see Richter, 'Koselleck on the Contestability of "Grundbegriffe"'.
35. Freeden, *Ideology*, 54, emphasis in original.
36. Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 344–45.
37. See e.g. Freeden, *Liberal Languages*.
38. Koselleck, 'Stichwort: Begriffsgeschichte', 99.
39. Dipper and Koselleck, 'Begriffsgeschichte', 193.
40. Koselleck, 'Stichwort: Begriffsgeschichte', 99.
41. See Koselleck, 'Introduction', 10–15. On a discussion of the idea of the threshold period, see Joas and Vogt, *Begriffene Geschichte*, chapter IV: Prüfungen der Sattelzeitthese.
42. Koselleck, 'Die Geschichte der Begriffe und die Begriffe der Geschichte', 58.
43. See Koselleck, '"Space of Experience"'; on Koselleck's temporal theory, see Jordheim, 'Against Periodization'. On the potential of a history of time, see Geppert and Kössler, 'Zeit-Geschichte als Aufgabe'.
44. Koselleck, 'Social History', 32.
45. See Kollmeier, 'Begriffsgeschichte', 6.
46. The criticism is concisely summarized in ibid.
47. See Kollmeier, 'Begriffsgeschichte'; Steinmetz, 'Vierzig Jahre Begriffsgeschichte'; Busse, 'Begriffsgeschichte oder Diskursgeschichte?'; Hölscher, 'Zeit und Diskurs'; Guilhaumou, 'Geschichte und Sprachwissenschaft'; on historical semantics in linguistics, see Fritz, *Historische Semantik*; for an overview of discourse analysis, see Landwehr, *Historische Diskursanalyse*.
48. See Palonen, *Die Entzauberung der Begriffe*; Leonhard, 'Grundbegriffe und Sattelzeiten'; on the Cambridge School, see e.g. Hellmuth and Ehrenstein, 'Intellectual History'; Rosa, 'Ideengeschichte und Gesellschaftstheorie'.
49. See Schultz, 'Begriffsgeschichte und Argumentationsgeschichte'; also Reichardt, 'Wortfelder – Bilder'; Koselleck adopted these ideas and integrated them into his concept – see Koselleck, 'Stichwort: Begriffsgeschichte', 101.
50. See Pocock, 'The Concept of a Language'; regarding the approach of conceptual history: Pocock, 'Concepts and Discourses'; Skinner, 'Retrospect'. On early modern history, see Seresse, 'Zur Praxis'.
51. Steinmetz, 'Neue Wege', 17.
52. Kollmeier, 'Begriffsgeschichte', 12.
53. See Bendikowski and Hölscher, *Political Correctness*; Steinmetz, *Political Languages*.
54. On the concept, see Steinmetz, *Das Sagbare und das Machbare*.
55. See Steinmetz, 'Vierzig Jahre Begriffsgeschichte', 192–97; Pernau, 'Whither Conceptual History?'; Marjanen, 'Undermining Methodological Nationalism'; den Boer, 'National Cultures, Transnational Concepts'; Richter, 'More than a Two-Way Traffic'; Juneja and Pernau, 'Lost in Translation?'.

56. Steinmetz, 'Vierzig Jahre Begriffsgeschichte', 183.
57. See Mergel, 'Kulturgeschichte der Politik'; Frevert, 'Neue Politikgeschichte'. Relating to historical semantics, see: Steinmetz, 'Neue Wege'; Steinmetz, 'New Perspectives', 4; Craig and Thompson, 'Introduction'. On British new political history, see Brückweh and Steber, 'Aufregende Zeiten'.
58. Linke, 'Begriffsgeschichte – Diskursgeschichte – Sprachgebrauchsgeschichte', 40, emphases in original.
59. Hölscher, 'Zeit und Diskurs', 328; similarly, Leonhard, *Liberalismus*, 62–63; on the concept of discourse in discourse theory, see Landwehr, 'Diskurs und Diskursgeschichte'.
60. Leonhard, 'Grundbegriffe und Sattelzeiten', 83.
61. Leonhard, 'Von der Wortimitation', 45.
62. Haupt and Kocka, 'Historischer Vergleich', 23; Kaelble, *Der historische Vergleich*.
63. See Haupt and Kocka, 'Historischer Vergleich', 11–15; on the current state of and discussions on the historiographical comparison (including references to the relevant literature), see Welskopp, 'Comparative History'; Kaelble, 'Historischer Vergleich, Version: 1.0'.
64. See Marjanen, 'Undermining Methodological Nationalism', emphasis in original. On the debate on comparison and transfer, see Paulmann, 'Internationaler Vergleich'; Middell, 'Kulturtransfer'; Werner and Zimmermann, 'Vergleich, Transfer, Verflechtung'; Kaelble and Schriewer, *Vergleich und Transfer*; Siegrist, 'Comparative History'; Arndt, Häberlen and Reinecke, *Vergleichen, verflechten, verwirren?*; Haupt and Kocka, *Comparative and Transnational History*.
65. On their significance to the political culture of the Federal Republic of Germany, see Mittmann, *Kirchliche Akademien*.
66. Overviews of the research on intellectual history and the history of ideas are provided in Bavaj, 'Intellectual History'; Moses, 'Forum'; Biess, 'Thinking after Hitler'; McMahon and Moyn, *Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History*.
67. On the theory of counterconcepts, see Koselleck, 'The Historical-Political Semantics'.
68. See a summary in Steber, 'Modern Britain'; on the debate on the *Sonderweg*, see Kocka, 'German History'; Kocka, 'Asymmetrical Historical Comparison'; *Deutscher Sonderweg – Mythos oder Realtität?*; Klautke, 'Auf den Spuren'; Welskopp, 'Identität *ex negativo*'; Bauerkämper, 'Geschichtsschreibung als Projektion'.
69. See e.g. Cooper, *Margaret Thatcher*; Gamble, 'Europe and America'; Bluhm and Michael, 'Anglo-American Conservatism'.
70. See Geulen, 'Plädoyer'; Steinmetz, 'Some Thoughts'.
71. See Vierhaus, 'Konservativ, Konservatismus'; on Koselleck's theory of the concept of movements, see Palonen, *Die Entzauberung der Begriffe*, 249–50.
72. See Leonhard, *Liberalismus*.
73. See Stötzel, Wengeler and Böke, *Kontroverse Begriffe*; Strauß, Haß and Harras, *Brisante Wörter*; Niehr, *Schlagwörter*; Jung, Niehr and Böke, *Ausländer und Migranten*; Jung, *Die Sprache des Migrationsdiskurses*; Kämper, *Der Schulddiskurs*; Kämper, *Opfer – Täter – Nichttäter*; Stötzel and Eitz, *Zeitgeschichtliches Wörterbuch*; Herberg, Steffens and Tellenbach, *Schlüsselwörter der Wendezeit*; Kämper, *Wörterbuch zum Demokratiediskurs*; Kämper, *Aspekte des Demokratiediskurses*; Böke et al., *Politische Leitvokabeln*; Kilian, *Demokratische Sprache*. A concise summary of the historical criticism is provided in Kollmeier, 'Begriffsgeschichte', 15.
74. See Schiewe, *Die Macht der Sprache*; Dodd, *Jedes Wort*; Jung, 'Von der politischen Sprachkritik'; Polenz, *Deutsche Sprachgeschichte III*, 314–17.

75. See Lessenich, *Wohlfahrtsstaatliche Grundbegriffe*; Fischer and Münkler, *Gemeinwohl und Gemeinsinn*.
76. See Deissler, *Die entnazifizierte Sprache*; Hölscher, *Baupläne der sichtbaren Kirche*; Hölscher, 'Die Säkularisierung der Kirchen'; Eitler, 'Politik und Religion'; Gettys and Mittmann, 'Der Tanz'; Steinmetz, *Politik*; Steinmetz, *Political Languages*; Saupe, 'Innere Sicherheit'; Bendikowski and Hölscher, *Political Correctness*; Bavaj and Steber, *Germany and 'the West'*; Steinmetz and Leonhard, *Semantiken von Arbeit*; Seefried, 'Rethinking Progress'; Leendertz and Meteling, *Die neue Wirklichkeit*.
77. See esp. Stedman Jones, *Languages of Class*; also e.g. Lawrence, *Speaking for the People*; Epstein, *In Practice*; on the influence of Stedman Jones's approach, see Lawrence and Taylor, 'Poverty of Protest'; Stedman Jones positions himself historically in Stedman Jones, 'Return of Language'.
78. See Toye, 'Rhetorical Premiership'; Toye, '"Consensus" to "Common Ground"'; Toye, 'Words of Change'. For the mentioned political science-based approaches, see Bevir and Rhodes, *Interpreting British Governance*; Bevir and Rhodes, *Governance Stories*; Bevir and Rhodes, 'Authors' Response', here 176; Finlayson, 'From Beliefs to Arguments'; Finlayson and Martin, '"It Ain't What You Say…"'; Atkins et al., *Rhetoric in British Politics*; Beard, *Language of Politics*; Charteris-Black, *Politicians and Rhetoric*.
79. See e.g. Ramsden, *The Age*; Ramsden, *Winds of Change*; Ramsden, *Appetite for Power*; Bale, *The Conservatives since 1945*; Seldon and Ball, *Conservative Century*; Ball, *Conservative Party since 1945*; Blake, *Conservative Party from Peel to Major,* 1997; Hickson, *Political Thought*; Patterson, *Conservative Party and Europe*; Crowson, *Conservative Party and European Integration*; Ball and Seldon, *Heath Government*; Ball and Seldon, *Recovering Power*; Ball and Holliday, *Mass Conservatism*; Francis and Zweiniger-Bargielowska, *Conservatives and British Society*.
80. See esp. Geppert, *Thatchers konservative Revolution*; Vinen, *Thatcher's Britain*; Green, *Ideologies of Conservatism*; Green, *Thatcher*; Jackson and Saunders, *Making Thatcher's Britain*; Fry, *Politics of the Thatcher Revolution*. For an overview of the research on the era of the Thatcher governments, see Geppert, 'Großbritannien seit 1979'.
81. See Franco, *Michael Oakeshott*; Neill, *Michael Oakeshott*; Neill, 'Michael Oakeshott and Hans-Georg Gadamer'; Khan, 'Habermas and Oakeshott'; Müller, 'Re-Imagining "Leviathan"'; Banner, 'Existential Failure and Success'; Alexander, 'Oakeshott on Hegel'; Henkel, 'Vom Sinn einer philosophischen Theorie der Politik'.
82. See e.g. Mehring, *Carl Schmitt*; Morat, *Von der Tat zur Gelassenheit*; van Laak, *Gespräche*; Meinel, *Der Jurist*; Delitz, *Arnold Gehlen*; Gallus, *Helmut Schelsky*; Muller, *The Other God*; Payk, 'A Post-Liberal Order?'; Schöning and Stöckmann, *Ernst Jünger*; Goschler, 'Radikalkonservative Intellektuelle'.
83. See e.g. Schildt, *Zwischen Abendland und Amerika*; Conze, *Das Europa der Deutschen*; Reitmayer, *Elite*; Payk, *Der Geist der Demokratie*; Payk, '…die Herren fügen sich nicht'; Gallus, 'Von der "Konservativen Revolution"'; Görtemaker, *Ein deutsches Leben*; Asmussen, 'Hans-Georg von Studnitz'; Schildt, 'Deutschlands Platz'; Payk, 'Ideologische Distanz'; Kraus, 'Als konservativer Intellektueller'.
84. See Schildt, *Konservatismus in Deutschland*.
85. See Meyn, *Die Deutsche Partei*; Schmollinger, 'Die Deutsche Partei'; Nathusius, 'Am rechten Rand der Union'; an exception is Aschoff, 'Die Deutsche Partei'.
86. See Bösch, *Macht und Machtverlust*; Buchhaas, *Die Volkspartei*; Geiger, *Atlantiker gegen Gaullisten*; Grau, *Gegen den Strom*; Clemens, *Reluctant Realists*; Schumann, *Bauarbeiten*; Schwarz, *Die Fraktion als Machtfaktor*; Zein, *Die organisatorische Entwicklung*; for the

Adenauer era, see esp. Bösch, *Die Adenauer-CDU*; Granieri, *The Ambivalent Alliance*; Becker, *CDU und CSU*; Mitchell, *Origins of Christian Democracy*; Schmidt, *Zentrum oder CDU*. Significant biographies: Schwarz, *Adenauer*; Schwarz, *Helmut Kohl*; Oppelland, *Gerhard Schröder*; Szatkowski, *Karl Carstens*; Gniss, *Der Politiker Eugen Gerstenmaier*; Mierzejewski, *Ludwig Erhard*; Speich, *Kai-Uwe von Hassel*.

87. On the history of the CSU, see Mintzel, *Die CSU*; Schlemmer, *Aufbruch, Krise und Erneuerung*; Balcar and Schlemmer, *An der Spitze der CSU*; Milosch, *Modernizing Bavaria*; Weber, 'Föderalismus und Lobbyismus'.
88. See Schildt, 'Die Kräfte der Gegenreform'; Wehrs, *Protest der Professoren*; Hacke, *Philosophie der Bürgerlichkeit*; Bavaj, 'Das Trauma von "1968"'; Bavaj, 'Turning "Liberal Critics"'; Bösch, 'Die Krise als Chance'; Schmidt, '"Die geistige Führung verloren"'; Hoeres, 'Reise nach Amerika'; Hoeres, 'Von der "Tendenzwende"'; Goltz, 'Eine Gegen-Generation von 1968?'; Goltz, 'A Polarised Generation?'; Livi, Schmidt and Sturm, *Die 1970er Jahre*.
89. See e.g. Botsch, *Die extreme Rechte*; Botsch et al., *Politik des Hasses*; Brauner-Orthen, *Die Neue Rechte*; Greß, Jaschke and Schönekäs, *Neue Rechte und Rechtsextremismus*; Kowalsky and Schroeder, *Rechtsextremismus*; Backes and Jesse, *Politischer Extremismus*; Pfahl-Traughber, *'Konservative Revolution'*.
90. Overviews of the research are provided in Zelizer, 'Reflections'; 'Conservatism. A Round Table'; Lütjen, 'Aufstieg und Anatomie'.
91. See Jackson, 'The Think-Tank Archipelago'; Cooper, *Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan*; Cooper, '"Superior to Anything"'.
92. Peters, *William S. Schlamm*; Gallus, 'Der Amüsanteste unter den Renegaten'; Gallus, *Heimat 'Weltbühne'*, 210–78; Großmann, *Die Internationale der Konservativen*.
93. See e.g. Kaiser, *Christian Democracy*; Gehler, Kaiser and Wohnout, *Christdemokratie in Europa*; Gehler and Kaiser, 'Transnationale Parteienkooperation'.
94. See the overview of the research in Steber, 'Modern Britain and European Modernity'.
95. On the concept of high modernity, see Herbert, 'Europe in High Modernity', and Raphael, 'Ordnungsmuster der "Hochmoderne?"'; for a similar interpretation of the 1970s, see Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael, *Nach dem Boom*; Jarausch, *Das Ende der Zuversicht?*; Raithel, Rödder and Wirsching, *Auf dem Weg*; Ferguson, Maier and Manela, *Shock of the Global*; summarized in Geyer, 'Auf der Suche nach der Gegenwart'.
96. See Hockerts and Süß, *Soziale Ungleichheit im Sozialstaat*.
97. On typology, see Schmidt, *Demokratietheorien*, 306–18.
98. See Levsen and Torp, 'Die Bundesrepublik und der Vergleich'.
99. See Leonhard, *Liberalismus*; Koselleck et al., 'Three *bürgerliche* Worlds?'; on theoretical considerations of the historical-semantic comparison, see Leonhard, 'Language, Experience and Translation'.
100. See Buchstab, *CDU-Bundesvorstandsprotokolle 1950–1953*; Buchstab, *CDU-Bundesvorstandsprotokolle 1953–1957*; Buchstab, *CDU-Bundesvorstandsprotokolle 1957–1961*; Buchstab, *CDU-Bundesvorstandsprotokolle 1961–1965*; Buchstab, *CDU-Bundesvorstandsprotokolle 1965–1969*; Buchstab and Lindsay, *CDU-Bundesvorstandsprotokolle 1969–1973*; Heidemeyer et al., *Die CDU/CSU-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag, 1949–1969*; Zellhuber and Peters, *Die CSU-Landesgruppe im Deutschen Bundestag, 1949–1972*.